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In October 2012, the death of Savita Halappanavar reignited the abortion debate in the 
Republic of Ireland. In March 2013, ‘el caso Beatriz’ drew international attention to the 
complete criminalisation of abortion in El Salvador. Making sense of the parallels between 
these two tragedies was the starting point for this thesis: how did the social, political, and 
legal context resulting in these harms come to be, and how could it be transformed? To 
explore these questions, this thesis undertakes an intersectional feminist analysis of 
citizenship and international human rights law (IHRL) in relation to sexual and reproductive 
health and rights (SRHRs), specifically abortion. Focusing on El Salvador and Ireland, and 
undertaking a critical reading of abortion jurisprudence by the UN, European, and inter-
American human rights systems, this thesis argues that feminist campaigns for the 
decriminalisation of abortion at the national level and the advancement of SRHRs within 
IHRL at the regional and international levels are best understood as interconnected, and as 
part of a broader, longstanding, and ongoing struggle for feminists to realise women’s full 
citizenship and human rights. This struggle takes place through feminist engagement with the 
language and mechanisms of IHRL at the interconnected national, regional, international, and 
transnational levels of the human rights system, and as such it represents a multilevel feminist 
citizenship project: the contestation of women’s exclusion from and oppression by traditional 
understandings of citizenship that deny them the right to have rights and determine the scope 
of those rights. 
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international human rights law 
 




In October 2012, the death of Savita Halappanavar reignited the abortion debate in the 
Republic of Ireland. In March 2013, ‘el caso Beatriz’ drew international attention to the 
complete criminalisation of abortion in El Salvador. Making sense of the parallels between 
these two tragedies was the starting point for this thesis: why was such restrictive abortion 
legislation in place in these two countries despite its clearly negative impact on women’s 
human rights, and how and why were feminists making use of international human rights law 
(IHRL) in order to change the situation?  
 
To explore these questions, this thesis undertakes an intersectional feminist analysis of IHRL 
and citizenship in relation to sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHRs), specifically 
abortion. It argues that restrictive abortion legislation originates in and represents women’s 
exclusion from full citizenship on the basis of their reproduction and sexuality. It also argues 
that feminists have long campaigned for women’s full citizenship (defined as the right to 
have rights and to determine the scope of those rights): while campaigns for women’s right to 
vote might be the most famous example of feminist campaigns for women’s full citizenship, 
this thesis argues that campaigns for abortion access and SRHRs are another example of this 
longstanding, ongoing process. This thesis demonstrates that this process of fighting for 
women’s full citizenship takes place not only at the national level, but also at the regional, 
international, and transnational levels of the human rights system and feminist movement. All 
these different levels are connected by feminist activism around how best to interpret IHRL 
so that it represents and responds to women’s lived needs and realities, and so that it takes 
into account not just gender inequality but also racism, socioeconomic inequality, and other 
structural barriers to the full enjoyment of human rights. This multilevel feminist activism 
has been integral to IHRL recognising the importance and legitimacy of SRHRs, including 
abortion access, for the full realisation of women’s human rights. 
 
While this multilevel feminist activism (described in this thesis as a multilevel feminist 
citizenship project) has had multiple successes – the growing legitimacy of SRHRs in IHRL 
and the reform of Ireland’s abortion legislation in 2018 among them – it continues to face 
considerable challenges. As the situation in El Salvador demonstrates, there is considerable 
resistance to calls for the decriminalisation of abortion, largely because of the challenges to 
the patriarchal social order that such a change would pose. Furthermore, the very nature of 
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IHRL is rooted in the same intellectual tradition responsible for exclusionary, oppressive 
understandings of citizenship that deny women their rights. Therefore, feminists must make 
use of IHRL as it currently stands in order to advance women’s human rights, but they must 
also attempt to reshape IHRL so that it is informed by women’s experiences and addresses 
their concerns. In light of this approach to IHRL, this thesis undertakes a critical analysis of 
abortion legislation and its impact in El Salvador and Ireland, as well as a critical analysis of 
abortion jurisprudence by the UN, inter-American, and European human rights systems, in 
order to set out an approach to citizenship, IHRL, and SRHRs that would advance the 
intersectional feminist aim of ending the subordination of all historically oppressed groups 




Glossary and List of Abbreviations 
Glossary 
 
acompañarse   to enter into a romantic relationship 
 
campesino/a  usually translated as ‘a poor Latin American farmer or farm labourer.’ 
It emerged as a political identity and movement in the mid-19th 
century. The Salvadoran campesino movement of the 19th and 20th 
century consisted of indigenous, ladino, and mestizo labourers who 
campaigned for decent pay and conditions, land rights, and indigenous 
rights to collective land ownership. 
 
compañero/a   partner 
 
criollo/a  Latin Americans who are of solely or of mostly Spanish descent; they 
generally occupied positions of power and privilege in the racialised 
class hierarchy of colonial and postcolonial Latin American states. 
 
ladino/a  Spanish-speakers who were not originally from the Iberian peninsula 
(peninsulares), criollos, or indigenous peoples. They occupied a range 
of positions of power and privilege within the racialised class 
hierarchy of colonial and postcolonial Central American states 
 
mestizo/a  Mixed race, especially mixed Spanish and indigenous heritage. They 
were and are generally, but not necessarily, poor or working-class 
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In October 2012, the death of Savita Halappanavar reignited the abortion debate in the 
Republic of Ireland. In March 2013, el caso Beatriz drew international attention to the 
complete criminalisation of abortion in El Salvador. Making sense of the parallels between 
these two tragedies was the starting point for this thesis: how did the social, political, and 
legal context resulting in these harms come to be, and how could they be transformed? In 
addressing this question, it became apparent that women’s1 reproduction and sexuality, the 
concept and practice of citizenship, and the concept and practice of human rights are three 
interlinked sites of contestation. 
 
These dynamics can be laid bare through a feminist analysis of the human rights implications 
of the criminalisation of abortion. Every year, approximately 22 million women worldwide 
use tree roots, overdoses, and a range of other desperate measures to end their unwanted 
pregnancies.2 Forty-two percent of women of reproductive age live in one of the 125 
countries where abortion is prohibited entirely or permitted only to save a woman’s life or 
health.3 This is despite the fact that the average rate of unsafe abortion is estimated to be over 
four times higher in countries with more restrictive abortion laws than in those with less 
restrictive legislation.4 Between 13,865 to 38,940 women die from complications related to 
 
1 As has been highlighted by feminist and queer theorists such as Butler (1990) and Fineman, Jackson, and 
Romero (2009), the very term ‘woman’ is problematic because references to ‘women’s 
experiences/bodies/rights’ can inadvertently perpetuate the gender binary. At the same time, it is necessary to 
recognise that ‘women’ have suffered and continue to suffer discrimination due to being ascribed or identifying 
with this gender identity. Therefore, ‘women’ in this thesis refers to anyone who identifies as a woman, and its 
usage is informed by an understanding of it as a category and experience that is deeply personal, as well as 
historically and culturally variable (see for example Bordo, 2003; Connell, 1987; Jordanova, 1989; Laqueur, 
1990). ‘Female bodies’ and ‘the female reproductive system’ refer to biologically female bodies which neither 
define, nor necessarily correspond to, a person’s gender identity. These terms serve as shorthand, and are not 
intended to exclude gender diverse people or trans* men. 
2 S Singh et al, Abortion Worldwide 2017: Uneven Progress and Unequal Access (New York, Guttmacher 
Institute 2018) 22 
3 ibid, 4 
4 WHO ‘Increasing transparency of abortion laws and policies: launch of a new online database’ (WHO, 23 June 
2017) <http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/topics/unsafe_abortion/global-abortion-policies/en/> accessed 10 
August 2020; WHO, ‘Women and girls continue to be at risk of unsafe abortion’ (WHO, 28 September 2017) 
<http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/topics/unsafe_abortion/abortion-safety-estimates/en> accessed 10 
August 2020 
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unsafe abortion every year.5 The impact of restrictive abortion legislation is felt most acutely 
by and takes particular forms for women who experience other, intersecting forms of 
discrimination such as racism, poverty, disability, and geographical location.6 
 
While restrictive abortion legislation is often framed as being motivated by concern for 
“unborn life” or maternal health, this thesis argues that the real rationale behind restrictions 
on access to abortion is the regulation and control of women’s reproduction, sexuality, and 
bodies to ensure the stability and continuity of a patriarchal social order.7 In this patriarchal 
social order, the discourse of citizenship has historically operated to deny women’s status as 
citizens by conceptualising women as non-citizens whose role is to bear future citizens and 
the nation’s values.8 Women demanding access to abortion represent a direct challenge to this 
patriarchal citizenship discourse for two reasons. Firstly, it represents a rejection of their 
assigned role as bearers of future citizens: if women can access abortion and thus decide 
whether or not to carry a pregnancy to term, then women, rather than men and the state, get to 
decide whether or not a future citizen will be born. Secondly, demanding access to abortion 
represents women articulating a rights claim, something which only citizens, who can only be 
male, are allowed to do. Therefore, women’s struggle for reproductive autonomy, including 
abortion access, represents their struggle to assert their status as citizens, as ‘moral agents 
who claim all political and social rights…and generally equal rights to their well-being and 
freedom.’9 This thesis will demonstrate that the struggle for the recognition of women’s need 
 
5 Estimate based on WHO, ‘Maternal mortality’ (WHO, 19 September 2019) <https://www.who.int/news-
room/fact-sheets/detail/maternal-mortality> accessed 18 January 2021 and WHO, ‘Preventing Unsafe Abortion’ 
(WHO, 25 September 2020) <https://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/preventing-unsafe-abortion> 
accessed 18 January 2021 
6 K Ackerman et al, ‘“Every Body Has Its Own Feminism”: Introducing Transcending Borders’ in S Stettner 
et al (eds), Transcending Borders: Abortion in the Past and Present (Cham, Springer 2017) 2; G Sen, Power 
and Decision: The Social Control of Reproduction (Boston, MA, Harvard School of Public Health 1994) 1-2, 6 
7 K Ackerman et al, ‘ “Every Body Has Its Own Feminism”’ 2; K Browne, S Calkin, ‘Introduction’ in K 
Browne, S Calkin (eds), After Repeal: Rethinking Abortion Politics (London, Zed Books 2020) 4; RJ Cook et al, 
Reproductive Health and Human Rights: Integrating Medicine, Ethics and Law (OUP 2011) 11, 26; RJ Cook, 
BM Dickens, ‘Human Rights Dynamics of Abortion Law Reform’ (2003) 25 HRQ 1; R Sifris, Reproductive 
Freedom, Torture and International Human Rights: Challenging the Masculinisation of Torture (London, 
Routledge 2014) 123-6; BS Turner, Medical Power and Social Knowledge (2nd edn, London, Sage 1995) 21, 87, 
96 
8 M Enright, ‘‘Involuntary Patriotism’: Judgment, Women and National Identity on the Island of Ireland’ in M 
Enright et al (eds), Northern/Irish Feminist Judgments: Judges’ Troubles and the Gendered Politics of Identity 
(London, Bloomsbury 2017) 38; R Lister, Citizenship: Feminist Perspectives (2nd edn, Basingstoke, Palgrave 
Macmillan 2003) 1, 71-2; A Phillips, Engendering Democracy (London, Polity Press 1991) 3; N Yuval-Davis, 
‘The ‘Multi-Layered Citizen’’ (1999) 1 International Feminist Journal of Politics, 120-1; N Yuval-Davis, P 
Werbner, ‘Women and the New Discourse of Citizenship’ in N Yuval-Davis, P Werbner (eds), Women, 
Citizenship and Difference (London, Zed Books 1999) 5 
9 H Haker, ‘Reproductive Rights in the Twenty-First Century’ in H Widdows, IA Idiakez, AE Cirión (eds), 
Women’s Reproductive Rights (Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan 2006) 184 
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for straightforward, safe, and legal access to abortion as a human rights issue is best 
conceptualised as a struggle around the meaning of citizenship, understood as the right to 
have rights and to determine the scope of those rights. 
 
One of the ways in which feminists contest women’s longstanding exclusion from and 
oppression by the current understanding of citizenship is through using the language and 
mechanisms of human rights. This is because feminists have recognised that the language and 
mechanisms of human rights offer one of the most effective means currently available for 
challenging oppression and achieving social justice.10 This makes international human rights 
law (IHRL) a prime site in which to observe women’s contestation of their historical 
exclusion from citizenship on the basis of their reproduction and sexuality. Largely because 
of the efforts of transnational feminist activists, particularly from the Global South/Third 
World,11 the international and regional human rights systems are increasingly willing to 
recognise that the criminalisation of abortion results in human rights violations. However, 
there is still resistance to this at the domestic, regional, and international level: this is partly 
because of conservative forces which wish to maintain the status quo, but it is also due to 
limits inherent in the system given its Western liberal conceptual foundations. This thesis 
argues that the Western liberal legal tradition is inherently misogynistic, and perpetuates 
narrow understandings of concepts such as citizenship, the public-private divide, and 
autonomy which ignore, misrepresent or actively work against women’s lived experiences, 
needs and interests.12 These problematic conceptual foundations mean that legal reform 
 
10 H Charlesworth, C Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law: A Feminist Analysis (Manchester 
University Press 2000) 210-2; S Corrêa, R Petchesky, R Parker, Sexuality, Health and Human Rights (London, 
Routledge 2008) 152 
11 This thesis uses CT Mohanty’s definition of ‘Third World/Global South’ and ‘Third World peoples/Global 
South peoples’: the Third World/Global South is defined as the nation-states of Latin America, the Caribbean, 
Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, Africa, South and Southeast Asia, China, South Africa, and Oceania. 
‘Third World peoples/Global South peoples/BIPOC (Black, Indigenous, People of Colour)’ refers to Black, 
Latinx, Arab, Asian, and indigenous peoples in the US, Europe, and Australia. Rather than being a reductive, 
essentialist categorisation, the concepts of the Global South/Third World/Third World peoples are understood 
here as a ‘sociopolitical designation’ which emphasises the ‘common context of struggle’ that these countries 
and peoples experience as a result of racism, imperialism and colonisation (Mohanty in Mohanty, Russo, Torres 
(eds), 1991: 7, 10). This thesis will use the terms interchangeably as heuristics that emphasise contemporary 
unequal ‘geopolitical relations of power’ (Dados, Connell, 2012:12) arising from ‘the cumulative and 
continuing effects of colonization, imperialism, and Western domination’ (Litonjua, 2010: 1). Using these terms 
also highlights the forms of resistance – including critical engagement with the language and mechanisms of 
human rights – that these states and peoples undertake to challenge the current social, political, and economic 
order. The rationale behind using these terms in this manner will be discussed in greater detail in the 
methodology section of this chapter. 
12 E Barkely Brown, ‘To Catch the Vision of Freedom: Reconstructing Southern Black Women’s Political 
History, 1865-1880’ in AD Gordon (ed), African American Women and the Vote 1837-1965 (Amherst, 
University of Massachusetts Press 1997) 86; S Corrêa et al, Sexuality, Health and Human Rights, 151, 161; MA 
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guaranteeing access to reproductive healthcare must be complemented by a critique and 
reformulation of the concepts from which the law derives meaning and legitimacy. In 
recognising the gendered and ideological nature of law as a discourse, it can be understood as 
a site of contestation where alternative understandings of rights and legal subjects can 
emerge. This is necessary because of the symbolic force of these concepts and the entire 
international, regional and domestic legal architecture surrounding them that can be 
harnessed to progressive effect. As such, the research questions to which this thesis responds 
are: 
 
In what ways have intersectional feminists harnessed the language and mechanisms 
of international human rights law to advance women’s citizenship in the form of 
sexual and reproductive health and rights? 
 
In what ways can they further advance the multilevel feminist citizenship project of 
SRHRs, as represented by the decriminalisation of abortion, through their 
engagement with all levels of the human rights system? 
 
This research project is about ‘transnational multicultural feminism’13 and the ways in which 
this diverse movement uses the language and mechanisms of human rights to achieve social 
justice in general and reproductive freedom in particular. In framing my thesis in this manner, 
I am making a deliberate effort to challenge hierarchies such as race, class, and gender that 
inform IHRL as a practice and as an academic field. To ensure that this is clear throughout to 
the reader, the next two sections will discuss the methodology and terminology used 









Fineman, ‘Feminist Legal Theory’ (2005) 19; J Flax, ‘Beyond Equality: Gender, Justice and Difference’ in G 
Bock, S James (eds), Beyond Equality and Difference: Citizenship, Feminist Politics and Female Subjectivity 
(London, Routledge 1992) 189; BE Hernández-Truyol, ‘Human Rights Through A Gendered Lens: Emergence, 
Evolution, Revolution’ in KD Askin, DM Koenig (eds), Women and International Human Rights Law Volume 
1: Introduction to Women’s Human Rights Issues (New York, Transnational Publishers 1999) 31 
13 CT Mohanty, Feminism without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity (Durham NC, Duke 




This thesis employs a discursive intersectional feminist approach to IHRL. In order to 
understand this methodology, intersectional feminist methodology and critical approaches to 
IHRL will be considered in turn. 
 
1.1.1. Intersectional feminist methodology 
 
A minimalist definition of feminist methodology is an approach to research that is undertaken 
by feminists with a view to improving the status of women.14 Intersectional feminist research 
emphasises the importance of recognising and challenging not just gender-based inequality, 
but also ‘the interlocking effects of race, class, gender, and sexuality’ as identity categories 
and structural inequalities.15 An intersectional feminist approach to research disrupts a 
number of traditional approaches to scholarship in order to bring about social change. Three 
of these challenges are central to this research project: (1) challenging the assumption that 
research and existing power structures are neutral; (2) disrupting traditional boundaries 
between disciplines; and (3) complicating traditional accounts of phenomena by (a) charting 
their historical evolution and (b) centring them around the lived experience of marginalised 
groups. 
 
Feminist methodology challenges the idea that research can be objective and impartial: 
firstly, feminist methodology makes visible and critiques the ways in which supposedly 
neutral, objective, and authoritative ‘truths’ such as the law are in fact value-laden – informed 
by and serving to perpetuate racism, sexism, class-based oppression, homophobia, 
transphobia, and other forms of oppression.16 Secondly, feminist methodology aims to 
 
14 M Eichler ‘Feminist Methodology’ (1997) 45 Current Sociology, 9 
15 MT Berger, K Guidroz (eds), The Intersectional Approach: Transforming the Academy through Race, Class 
and Gender (Chapel Hill NC, University of North Carolina Press 2009); DW Carbado, KW Crenshaw, VM 
Mays, B Tomlinson, ‘Intersectionality: Mapping the Movements of a Theory’ (2013) 10 Du Bois Review 303; 
K Crenshaw ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color’ 
(1991) 43 Stanford Law Review 1241; P Hill Collins, Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and 
the Politics of Empowerment (London, Routledge 1990); b hooks, Feminist Theory: From Margin To Center 
(Boston, South End Press 1984); CT Mohanty, ‘Cartographies of Struggle: Third World Women and the Politics 
of Feminism’ in CT Mohanty, A Russo, L Torres (eds), Third World Women and the Politics of Feminism 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis, Indiana University Press 1991) 1; KY Taylor, How We Get Free: Black 
Feminism and the Combahee River Collective (Chicago, Haymarket Books 2017); B Thornton Dill, MH 
Kohlman, ‘Intersectionality: A Transformative Paradigm in Feminist Theory and Social Justice’ in SN Hesse-
Biber (ed), Handbook of Feminist Research: Theory and Praxis (2nd edn, London, Sage 2012) 154, 157 
16 M Hawkesworth ‘Truth and Truths in Feminist Knowledge Production’ in SN Hesse-Biber (ed), Handbook of 
Feminist Research, 94  
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dismantle these systems of oppression.17 This thesis challenges the idea that the law is neutral 
by highlighting the inherently patriarchal nature of the law as evidenced by the 
criminalisation of abortion, and by making visible and critiquing the ongoing inability of 
liberal understandings of the law and human rights to address women’s subordination 
through the criminalisation of abortion. It further challenges the idea that research should be 
neutral by advocating for a feminist approach to IHRL that will end women’s oppression. To 
do so, the analysis makes use of a range of concepts and methods drawn from across 
disciplines. 
 
Intersectional feminist methodologies are often inter-, multi- and/or transdisciplinary.18 This 
is because these methodologies challenge the boundaries between disciplines, boundaries 
which are the product of androcentric knowledge production that ‘universalise the 
experiences of a fraction of the human population’ (i.e. cisgender,19 heterosexual, middle-
class, non-disabled white men).20 They also enable feminist researchers to make use of a 
range of tools to identify and challenge ‘sexist, racist, homophobic, and colonialist points of 
view.’21 This thesis undertakes intersectional feminist research by drawing upon literature 
and methodology from feminist theory, critical legal studies, citizenship studies, and 
postcolonial theory. In synthesising their analyses of power, justice, and rights, this thesis 
draws attention to and interrogates the ways in which we define certain concepts that 
underpin the foundations of IHRL. Following on from this, it argues for a transformative 
approach to these concepts and to IHRL that will acknowledge the historical, systemic 
oppression of women, and that will ensure that IHRL represents and responds to the diversity 
of women’s lived needs and realities. This relates to the third and final element of 
intersectional feminist methodologies of relevance here: charting the historical evolution of 
phenomena, and centring the lived experience of marginalised groups. 
 
By charting the historical evolution of certain concepts and phenomena, and by centring the 
lived experience of marginalised groups, intersectional feminist methodologies uncover 
‘subjugated knowledge’ that can be used to ‘foment social change.’22 By validating and 
 
17 M Eichler ‘Feminist Methodology’, 13 
18 S Reinharz, Feminist Methods in Social Research (OUP 1992) 240; B Thornton Dill, MH Kohlman, 
‘Intersectionality’, 157 
19 A person whose gender identity corresponds to the gender they were assigned at birth. 
20 M Hawkesworth ‘Truth and Truths in Feminist Knowledge Production’, 93 
21 SN Hesse-Biber ‘Introduction’ in SN Hesse-Biber (ed), Handbook of Feminist Research, 5-6 
22 ibid, 1, 3 
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making visible the experiences of historically oppressed groups, a better understanding of 
structural inequalities can emerge, enabling a more effective response to the deep-seated 
causes and consequences of oppression.23 This thesis charts the historical evolution of 
phenomena and centres the lived experiences of marginalised groups to advocate for social 
change in the following ways. Firstly, it undertakes a discursive analysis of citizenship to 
make visible women’s longstanding exclusion from and oppression by it on the basis of their 
reproductive capacity and sexuality, as epitomised by the criminalisation of abortion. 
Secondly, it undertakes a discursive analysis of IHRL to make visible the limits of the current 
liberal legal framework in addressing the harms that arise from the criminalisation of 
abortion. Thirdly, by carrying out these interlinked discursive analyses, it makes visible the 
origins and evolution of the concept of SRHRs as an alternative intersectional feminist 
understanding of citizenship and rights that is grounded in the lived experiences of women in 
all their diversity. Naming and making visible this process of intersectional feminist struggle 
for a transformative vision of citizenship and rights at the domestic, regional, and 
international levels of the human rights system not only corrects traditional accounts of the 
evolution of citizenship and IHRL that fail to recognise women’s exclusion from and 
oppression by these processes, but also provides feminists with a basis to reflect upon how 
best to approach the ongoing challenge of transforming political, economic, and social 




This thesis employs intersectional feminist approaches to research by challenging the 
assumption of neutrality, disrupting traditional disciplinary boundaries, and complicating 
traditional accounts of phenomena. It does so by drawing attention to the ideological nature 
of the law as a discourse, by taking the deliberately political stance of calling for social and 
political transformation to realise women’s liberation, by drawing upon concepts and 
methods from a range of disciplines, and by contextualising contemporary feminist struggles 
around SRHRs-as-citizenship as part of a long process by women in all their diversity to end 
the oppression of what hooks terms white supremacist capitalist patriarchy.24 
 
These intersectional feminist approaches to research are apparent in critical approaches to 
legal theory such as feminist legal theory, feminist approaches to IHRL, and Third World 
 
23 B Thornton Dill, MH Kohlman, ‘Intersectionality’, 157 
24 b hooks, Feminist Theory, 19, 22 
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Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). The next section will discuss these areas of 
scholarship and the ways in which this project makes use of them. 
 
1.1.2. Critical approaches to legal theory: feminist legal theory, feminist 
approaches to IHRL, and TWAIL 
 
Feminist legal theory understands the law as a discourse and power structure that upholds and 
perpetuates sexist, racist, and class-based assumptions about society and legal subjects.25 
Feminist legal theorists argue that since the law is a discourse, it is site of contestation over 
meaning and power, one where alternative understandings of the law can be articulated to 
achieve social justice.26 Many feminist legal theorists have focused on the law’s construction 
of women’s bodies, reproduction, and sexuality as a key site for this contestation. Smart 
terms this the ‘legal gaze’ and argues that the legal gaze has constructed a female subject 
considered potentially disruptive to the social order if her sexuality and reproductive ability 
are left unregulated.27 Therefore, the regulation of reproduction, sexuality, and women’s 
bodies – for example through the criminalisation of abortion – is an important area to explore 
from an intersectional feminist legal theory standpoint. An intersectional feminist legal 
theory approach to the criminalisation of abortion argues that the underlying motives for such 
legislation are the control of women’s reproduction and sexuality in the service of the 
continuity and stability of a white supremacist capitalist patriarchal social order. Therefore, it 
is necessary to challenge not just the legislation in question but also the social, cultural, 
political, and economic structures which led to its implementation and which perpetuate and 
exacerbate its impact. 
 
Since the early 1990s, feminist legal theorists have analysed these issues as they manifest in 
IHRL.28 They argue that law is androcentric since ‘the structure of the international legal 
 
25 K Crenshaw ‘Mapping the Margins’; MA Fineman, ‘Feminist Legal Theory’, 19; CA Forell, DM Matthews, 
A Law of Her Own: The Reasonable Woman as a Measure of Man (NYU Press 2000) xii, 3, 5; R Hunter, C 
McGlynn, E Rackley ‘Feminist Judgments: An Introduction’ in R Hunter, C McGlynn, E Rackley (eds), 
Feminist Judgments: From Theory to Practice (Oxford, Hart 2010) 6-7; C Smart, Feminism and the Power of 
Law (London, Routledge 1989) 
26 H Charlesworth, ‘Feminist Methods in International Law’ (1999) 93 AJIL 379; RJ Cook et al, Reproductive 
Health and Human Rights, 7;  S Corrêa et al, Sexuality, Health and Human Rights, 153; DL Rhode, Justice and 
Gender: Sex Discrimination and the Law (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press 1989) 320 
27 C Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law, 90-113; C Smart, Regulating Womanhood: Historical Essays on 
Marriage, Motherhood and Sexuality (London, Routledge 1992) 13, 7 
28 KD Askin, DM Koenig (eds), Women and International Human Rights Law Vols 1, 2, 3; G Binion, ‘Human 
Rights: A Feminist Perspective’ (1995) 17 HRQ 509; C Bunch, ‘Women’s Rights as Human Rights: Toward a 
Re-Vision of Human Rights’ (1990) 12 HRQ 486; D Buss, A Manji (eds), International Law: Modern Feminist 
Approaches (Oxford, Hart 2005); H Charlesworth, C Chinkin, S Wright, ‘Feminist Approaches to International 
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order reflects a male perspective and ensures its continued dominance’29 through its 
perpetuation of the male as normative standard; the perpetuation of the public/private 
dichotomy and its expression in new forms; the prioritisation of civil and political rights over 
economic, social and cultural rights; the logic of competing rights and the ways in which it 
can operate to the detriment of women; and an inability or unwillingness to challenge the 
structural barriers to the realisation of women’s human rights.30 Many of these feminist 
critiques of IHRL focus on its problematic construction of women’s bodies, reproduction, 
and sexuality, and its resultant failure to acknowledge the harms done to women through 
restrictive abortion legislation as human rights violations.31 They argue for an alternative 
approach to IHRL and legal reasoning that is grounded in women’s lived experiences and 
which names and responds to the historical, structural, and intersecting forms of oppression 
continuing to impede the full realisation of women’s human rights and citizenship. 
 
The fact that Third World women have experienced the brunt of this oppression, and the fact 
that Third World feminist contributions have been critical to articulating transformative 
approaches to IHRL such as SRHRs, means that it is crucial to engage with Third World 
Approaches to International Law (TWAIL). TWAIL is a critical approach to legal theory that 
highlights the ways in which the modern international legal system is informed by and 
 
Law’ (1991) 85 AJIL 613; H Charlesworth, C Chinkin, ‘The Gender of Jus Cogens’ (1993) 15 HRQ 63; H 
Charlesworth, C Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law; C Chinkin, ‘Feminist Interventions into 
International Law’ (1997) 19 Adelaide Law Review 13; RJ Cook, ‘Women’s International Human Rights Law: 
The Way Forward’ (1993) 15 HRQ 230; CA MacKinnon, Are Women Human? And Other International 
Dialogues (London, Belknap Press 2006); D Otto, ‘Holding Up Half The Sky, But For Whose Benefit?: A 
Critical Analysis Of The Fourth World Conference On Women’ (1996) 6 Australian Feminist Law Journal 7; D 
Otto ‘The Exile of Inclusion: Reflections on Gender Issues in International Law over the Last Decade’ (2009) 
10 Melbourne Journal of International Law 11; J Peters, A Wolper (eds), Women’s Rights, Human Rights: 
International Feminist Perspectives (London, Routledge 1995) 
29 H Charlesworth, C Chinkin, S Wright ‘Feminist Approaches to International Law’, 621 
30 ibid, 625, 634, 635 
31 G Binion, ‘Human Rights: A Feminist Perspective’, 509; H Charlesworth et al, ‘Feminist Approaches to 
International Law’, 630; RJ Cook, S Howard, ‘Accommodating Women’s Differences under the Women’s Anti-
Discrimination Convention’ (2007) 56 Emory Law Journal 1040; A Cornwall, A Welbourn (eds), Realizing 
Rights: Transforming Approaches to Sexual & Reproductive Well-Being (London, Zed Books 2002); S Corrêa, 
R Reichmann, Population and Reproductive Rights: Feminist Perspectives from the South (London, Zed Books 
1994); MK Eriksson, ‘Abortion and Reproductive Health: Making International Law more Responsive to 
Women’s Needs’ in KD Askin, DM Koenig (eds), Women and International Human Rights Law. Volume 3: 
Toward Empowerment (New York, Transnational Publishers 2001) 3; RP Petchesky, K Judd (eds), Negotiating 
Reproductive Rights: Women’s Perspectives Across Countries and Cultures (London, Zed Books 2001); RP 
Petchesky, Global Prescriptions: Gendering Health and Human Rights (London, Zed Books 2003); R 
Rebouché, ‘Abortion Rights as Human Rights’ (2016) 25 Social and Legal Studies 765; G Sen et al (eds), 
Population Policies Reconsidered: Health, Empowerment, and Rights (Cambridge MA, Harvard University 
Press 1994); R Sifris, Reproductive Freedom, Torture and International Human Rights: Challenging the 
Masculinisation of Torture (London, Routledge 2014); H Widdows, IA Idiakez, AE Cirión (eds), Women’s 
Reproductive Rights 
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perpetuates the same power dynamics and structures of imperialism and colonialism.32 In 
keeping with an intersectional feminist methodology, it aims to transform the current 
political, social, and economic order through challenging liberalism’s supposed neutrality, 
disrupting traditional disciplinary boundaries, and unearthing subjugated knowledges through 
charting the historical evolution of phenomena and centring the lived experiences of 
marginalised groups.33 
 
While feminist and Third World approaches to international law acknowledge the importance 
of engaging with the law and human rights, they also highlight the risks inherent in doing 
so.34 Given that the law and human rights are embedded in the Western liberal intellectual 
tradition, these discourses are liable to appropriation, misinterpretation and subversion, 
inhibiting or even undermining the advancement of historically oppressed groups’ 
liberation.35 Although ‘human rights offer the most viable rhetorical structure currently 
available’ for advancing claims for social justice, and although IHRL provides a normative 
and institutional system for articulating rights claims and claims for accountability and 
redress, ‘human rights alone can never fulfil justice.’36 Instead, human rights and IHRL must 
be understood as ‘part of a process focused on challenging unequal power relations’, a 
process which must include other forms of campaigning for social justice such as grassroots 
activism.37 Smart terms this ‘decentring’: while making use of the language and mechanisms 
of law and human rights to advance social justice, feminists must not lose sight of the fact 
that these discourses are inherently limited in how much they can achieve, and so they must 
 
32 M Mutua, ‘What is TWAIL?’ (2000) 94 American Society of International Law Proceedings 31. See also BS 
Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto’ (2006) 8 International Community Law 
Review 3 
33 OA Badaru, ‘Examining the Utility of Third World Approaches to International Law for International Human 
Rights Law’ (2008) 10 International Community Law Review, 380-385; GM Frisso, ‘Third World Approaches 
to International Law: Feminists’ Engagement with International Law and Decolonial Theory’ in SH Rimmer, K 
Ogg (eds) Research Handbook on Feminist Engagement with International Law (Cheltenham, Elgar 2019) 479-
498; M Mutua, ‘What is TWAIL?’ 31; P Parmar, ‘TWAIL: An Epistemological Inquiry’ (2008) 10 International 
Community Law Review 363. 
34 H Charlesworth, C Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law, 201, 212; F Ní Aoláin, ‘Gendered Harms 
and their Interface with International Criminal Law: Norms, Challenges, and Domestication’ (2014) 16 
International Feminist Journal of Politics 622; P Parmar, ‘TWAIL: An Epistemological Inquiry’ 369; L Ramina 
‘TWAIL - “Third World Approaches to International Law” and Human Rights: Some Considerations’ (2018) 5 
Journal of Constitutional Research, 263-267; C Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law, chapters 7, 8 
35 D Majury ‘Strategizing in Equality’ in MA Fineman, NS Thomadsen (eds), At The Boundaries of the Law: 
Feminism and Legal Theory (London, Routledge 1991) 331-2 
36 S Corrêa et al, Sexuality, Health and Human Rights, 152 
37 S Bradshaw, ‘Is the Rights Focus the Right Focus? Nicaraguan Responses to the Rights Agenda’ (2006) 27 
Third World Quarterly, 1338. See also N Menon, Recovering Subversion: Feminist Politics Beyond the Law 
(Chicago IL, University of Illinois Press 2004) 5-6, 44-5 
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also make use of non-legal strategies and activism to transform the current white supremacist 




This section articulated the overarching methodology for this thesis: a critical intersectional 
feminist approach to IHRL informed by feminist theory, feminist legal theory, feminist 
approaches to international law, and TWAIL. The guiding principles of this methodology are 
a commitment to political, economic and social transformation through (1) exposing the 
inherently ideological nature of supposedly neutral discourses and power structures such as 
the law, human rights, and citizenship (2) engaging in inter/multi/transdisciplinary research 
and so disrupting traditional academic boundaries, and (3) unearthing subjugated knowledges 
and elaborating theory through an emphasis on (a) critical historical contextualisation and (b) 
the lived experiences of historically oppressed groups. This approach is appropriate for this 
thesis because it is concerned with women’s bodies, reproduction and sexuality as a site of 
exclusion from and oppression by the androcentric Western liberal intellectual tradition as 
exemplified by the discourses of law, human rights, and citizenship. Moreover, such an 
approach ensures a deliberate attentiveness to intersecting forms of oppression such as race, 
class, dis/ability, and sexuality that further exacerbate the regulation of women’s bodies and 
sexualities in the name of these discourses. It emphasises the central role of Global 
South/Third World feminists in advancing transformative understandings of IHRL, rights and 
citizenship, something which is too often ignored by the Global North. Finally, this 
methodology accurately represents the origins and rationale of SRHRs in general and 
campaigns for the decriminalisation of abortion in particular. It understands them to be 
transformative counter-narratives of citizenship and human rights that contest exclusion and 
oppression, and that call for the language and mechanisms of IHRL to represent and respond 
to women’s lived needs and realities. 
 
In order to understand the methodology and theoretical framework underpinning this thesis, 
certain key terms must be identified and explained. The next part of this chapter will define 





38 C Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law, chapter 8 
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This part of the chapter defines key concepts of relevance to this thesis. These include 
liberalism and its attendant concepts of citizenship, autonomy, equality, and justice. This part 
of the chapter also includes definitions of SRHRs as they are understood by intersectional 
feminists and as they are understood within IHRL. 
 
This thesis offers an intersectional feminist critique of IHRL and, by extension, Western 
liberalism. It provides an alternative, transformative vision of some of the main concepts 
from this intellectual tradition that inform contemporary IHRL. In order to articulate this 
critique clearly, the first section defines Western liberalism, citizenship, autonomy, equality, 
and justice. It provides a brief overview of how these concepts are traditionally understood 
from a liberal perspective, before articulating the alternative, transformative understanding of 
them advocated for by this thesis. Concepts such as citizenship, equality and justice are best 
understood as ‘momentum concepts’: ideas that can be continually developed to realise their 
egalitarian and anti-hierarchical potential and so serve as tools for oppressed groups in their 
struggles for social justice.39 While their emancipatory potential has been recognised by 
academics and social justice activists, they have also highlighted the long history of exclusion 
and the persistence of the exclusionary tendencies arising from these liberal concepts.40 
Despite this, these concepts have too much symbolic and real politico-legal power to be 
abandoned.41 Therefore, feminist engagement with these liberal concepts – and by extension 
with the international and regional human rights systems that are based upon them – must be 
understood as a necessary, contested process that is just one element of the wider 
intersectional feminist aim of liberation for all historically oppressed groups.42  
 
39 T Basok, S Ilcan, J Noonan, ‘Citizenship, Human Rights, and Social Justice’ (2006) 10 Citizenship Studies 
267; N Kabeer (ed), Inclusive Citizenship: Meanings and Expressions (London, Zed Books 2005); R Lister, 
‘Inclusive Citizenship: Realizing the Potential’ (2007) 11 Citizenship Studies 49; C Mouffe (ed), Dimensions of 
Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community (London, Verso 1992); K Zivi, Making Rights Claims: 
A Practice of Democratic Citizenship (OUP 2012), 7-9, 68 
40 E Jelin, ‘Engendering Human Rights’ in E Dore (ed), Gender Politics in Latin America: Debates in Theory 
and Practice (New York, Monthly Review Press 1997), 67; R Lister, Citizenship, 4-5; A Shachar, The 
Birthright Lottery: Citizenship and Global Inequality (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press 2009), 7 
41 H Charlesworth, C Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law, 212; N Kabeer ‘The Search for Inclusive 
Citizenship: Meanings and Expressions in an Interconnected World’ in N Kabeer (ed), Inclusive Citizenship, 3, 
9 
42 R Voet cited in R Lister ‘Sexual Citizenship’ in EF Isin, BS Turner (eds), Handbook of Citizenship Studies 
(London, Sage 2002) 197 
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Sa’ar defines liberalism as ‘an umbrella term for political orders that promote the idea of civil 
society, where people are entitled to certain freedoms, rights, and protection from arbitrary 
power.’43 Its five central characteristics are rationality, autonomy, individualism, equality 
before the law, and an abstentionist state that respects a divide between public and private.44 
While liberalism presents itself as neutral and inclusive, it is in fact informed by and 
responsible for perpetuating racism, sexism, and other forms of oppression.45 This is because 
liberalism takes the cisgender, heterosexual, white, middle-class, non-disabled male as 
normative standard, and constructs a political, economic, social, and legal order that is based 
on protecting and maintaining the power, privilege, and interests that correspond to this 
perspective.46 Moreover, the liberal tradition relies heavily upon Aristotelian dichotomies 
such as public/private, reason/emotion, mind/body, man/woman, and independent/dependent 
in which the former is ascribed superior moral value over the latter.47 As a result, the liberal 
legal order has constructed a legal subject and rights bearer – referred to here as the citizen – 
that fails to represent or respond to the lived needs and realities of the vast majority. The 
reductive concept of the ideal liberal citizen as rational, completely independent, cisgender, 
heterosexual, white, male, middle-class, and non-disabled does a disservice to the complexity 
of human experience, with a particularly detrimental impact on historically oppressed groups. 
Therefore, the liberal understanding of citizenship and rights does not speak to lived needs 
and realities, especially the lived needs and realities of historically oppressed groups. 
 
In response, feminists have drawn attention to the ideological nature of the liberal tradition, 
including its long history of excluding women from citizenship and rights on the basis of 
their gender and sexuality. They have articulated alternative understandings of liberal 
concepts such as citizenship, individuality, autonomy, equality, and justice, recognising the 
need to harness the normative power of these concepts to advance an alternative vision of 
political, economic, social, and legal structures. This section will now articulate the 
 
43 A Sa'ar ‘Postcolonial Feminism, The Politics of Identification, and the Liberal Bargain’ (2005) 19 Gender and 
Society 683 
44 S Fredman, Women and the Law (OUP 1997) 7 
45 ibid 684-5; C Mohanty ‘Cartographies of Struggle’, 21 
46 Sa'ar ‘Postcolonial Feminism’, 684-5 
47 R Lister, Citizenship, 68-72 
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intersectional feminist understandings of citizenship, autonomy, equality, and justice that 




Arendt conceptualised citizenship as the ‘right to have rights’48 which Balibar expanded upon 
to conceptualise citizenship as ‘the active ability to assert rights in a public space, or better 
yet, dialectically, the possibility of not being excluded from the right to fight for one’s 
rights.’49 The dynamic and contested nature of citizenship has been a major focus of 
contemporary citizenship studies, with citizenship understood as a process that encompasses 
juridical, political, economic and cultural practices, and that determines access to 
opportunities and resources.50 In this thesis, citizenship is understood not as the legal status of 
being a recognised national of a particular state, but as the entitlement of an individual to 
participate in the process of shaping the community to which they belong.51 Being a citizen 
means that an individual has a voice that is considered legitimate in determining the scope 
and nature of rights, and in deciding who is entitled to them – it means having the right to 
have rights, and to define what those rights should entail. The ways in which feminists can 
engage with this process has been the subject of academic inquiry since the early 1990s.  
 
The starting point for feminist critiques of citizenship was to highlight its long history of 
excluding and oppressing women.52 They argued that the traditional ideals of the citizen and 
citizenship are rooted in Western liberalism; therefore, these liberal ideals of the citizen and 
citizenship takes the cisgender, heterosexual, white, middle-class, non-disabled male as 
normative standard, and they rely upon Aristotelian dichotomies. As a result, the traditional 
discourse of citizenship fails to represent or respond to the lived needs and realities of 
historically oppressed groups such as women, and often actively works against them. This is 
especially apparent in relation to women’s bodies, reproduction, and sexuality. Feminist 
citizenship scholars argue that the traditional liberal idea of citizenship requires the control of 
 
48 H Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, Meridian Publishing 1958) 269 
49 É Balibar, Citizenship (T Scott-Railton tr, London, Polity Press 2015) 65 
50 J Clarke et al, Disputing Citizenship (Bristol, Policy Press 2014) 2, 29; EF Isin, GM Nielsen (eds), Acts of 
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women’s reproduction and sexuality to ensure the continuity and stability of a patriarchal 
social order. According to the traditional liberal understanding of citizenship, women are 
‘nation bearers’ – non-citizens who belong in the private sphere – rather than ‘rights bearers’ 
– citizens who belong in the public sphere – whose role is to produce and educate future 
citizens, rather than to exercise citizenship.53 
 
In regard to the domestic level of the nation-state, feminists have highlighted that the 
exclusionary, oppressive nature of citizenship is further exacerbated by the ‘pivotal roles’ that 
‘gendered bodies and sexuality’ play in constructing the nation.54 Nationalism and the 
formation of nation-states relies on particular constructs of masculinity and femininity which 
perpetuate the paradox that women are central to the biological reproduction of the nation but 
must be excluded from its social and political reproduction.55 As will be demonstrated 
throughout this thesis, in the postcolonial contexts of Ireland and El Salvador, ideas about 
nationalism and national identity, gender, race/ethnicity, class, and religion intertwined with 
the gendered discourse of citizenship to result in the intense regulation of women’s 
reproduction and sexuality, epitomised by the criminalisation of abortion.56 
 
In response to the traditional liberal citizenship discourse’s exclusionary, oppressive 
tendencies, feminists have articulated alternative understandings of citizenship. They argue 
that in spite of the harms that have been done to women and other oppressed groups in the 
name of citizenship and rights, these concepts have too much symbolic and real power to be 
abandoned.57 Instead, citizenship and rights should be understood as dynamic and contested 
processes in which new rights can be demanded and new meanings given to those which 
already exist.58 They believe that it is only by acknowledging that citizenship has a long 
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history of exclusion and oppression, and that the full realisation of citizenship is a contested, 
unfinished process that women’s full citizenship – their right to have rights, and to shape 
those rights to respond to their needs – can be realised. 59 
 
The need for control over one’s own body, sexuality, and reproduction has been a central 
tenet of these feminist reformulations of citizenship. Both Lister and Yuval-Davis have 
emphasised the centrality of realising SRHRs to women’s full citizenship.60 They argue that 
SRHRs form ‘the very basis of the possibility of effective participation of women in both 
civil society and the polity.’61 However, realising SRHRs is arguably the most acutely 
contested aspect of women’s struggle for full citizenship. This is because it poses a direct 
challenge to the stability and continuity of the patriarchal social order in two ways. Firstly, 
women demanding access to contraception and abortion represents women demanding the 
right to determine if and when to have children – this represents women articulating rights 
claims when only citizens (who can only be male) have the right to do so. Secondly, women 
demanding access to contraception and abortion represents women rejecting their assigned 
role in the citizenship project as non-citizens with the sole purposes of maintaining the 
nation’s honour, and producing and educating future citizens. 
 
Understanding of these dynamics – the exclusion and control of women on the basis of their 
reproduction and sexuality in the name of citizenship and nation, and feminist contestation of 
this exclusion and oppression – sheds new light on the intensely contested process of 
domestic, regional, international, and transnational campaigns for the decriminalisation of 
abortion and the advancement of SRHRs. The increasing importance of IHRL to this process 
has been recognised by feminists. 
 
Feminist citizenship scholars have argued that citizenship should be conceptualised as a 
‘multi-layered construct’ in which the practices and processes of citizenship take place on a 
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range of levels: the national, transnational, and supra-national. According to this 
understanding of citizenship, the language and mechanisms of IHRL should ‘be viewed as a 
specific layer of supra-national citizenship’, one which is potentially more responsive to 
women’s rights claims than the domestic level.62 Supra-national citizenship practices take the 
form of political mobilisation around human rights discourse, and the use of human rights 
litigation in regional and international human rights fora by individuals and NGOs.63 The 
language and mechanisms of IHRL are therefore being utilised as political tools ‘for 
“outsiders” at the gates of citizenship.’64 As such, attempts to advance SRHRs including 
access to abortion at the domestic, regional and international levels should be understood as 
interlinked layers of a multi-level feminist citizenship project: feminists are working within 
and across these interconnected levels to reformulate human rights in order to challenge 
women’s historic exclusion from the right to have rights and determine the scope of those 
rights, and to reformulate rights so that they represent and respond to women’s lived realities. 
In order to reformulate citizenship and rights in this manner, concepts such as autonomy, 




 According to traditional liberal understandings of the legal subject, autonomy is afforded to 
individuals who demonstrate the sufficient level of rationality and ability to make decisions 
concerning their own life and that these decisions should be respected and protected from 
disproportionate, exterior interference.65 In terms of citizenship, this entails the right to 
actively participate in the public sphere, and to not have one’s activities in the private sphere 
interfered with, provided that they are not in contravention of the moral, social and political 
order.66 In principle, this seems unproblematic and almost self-evident. However, as with 
many other cornerstones of liberalism, it is highly ideological and exclusionary: according to 
liberalism, only cisgender heterosexual white men have the sufficient degree of rationality 
required to exercise full citizenship in the public sphere; women, enslaved and colonised 
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peoples, and other groups marked as “other” by liberalism, are considered incapable of 
exercising the independence and rationality required for full citizenship.67 This liberal 
understanding of autonomy is in turn based on a range of false dichotomies 
(rationality/emotionality, mind/body, man/woman, public/private) that do not accurately 
represent the complexity of human experience, and have been used to oppress liberalism’s 
“others”, be it through the denial of independence to colonised peoples, or refusing women 
control over their own bodies.68 The traditional liberal understanding of the rational 
autonomous legal subject misrepresents the complexity of lived experience, creates and 
perpetuates false dichotomies which lead to reductive understandings of rights such as the 
right to privacy, and excludes and oppresses those who do not meet its narrow criteria. In 
response, alternative understandings of autonomy have been articulated by philosophers and 
political theorists. 
 
These alternative understandings of autonomy attempt to reconcile or transcend the liberal 
dichotomies of independent/dependent, mind/body, public/private to better represent and 
respond to lived experience. The concepts of dignity, relational autonomy, and vulnerability 
are particularly relevant to these alternative understandings of autonomy. 
 
According to McCrudden, dignity is a broad concept characterised by three core elements: 
every human being possesses intrinsic worth by virtue of being human, this intrinsic worth 
should be recognised and respected by others, and the state should ensure the necessary 
conditions for the realisation of human dignity.69 In a similar vein, Dixon and Nussbaum 
argue that human dignity requires ‘a reciprocal willingness, on the part of individuals, to treat 
others as subjects and not merely as objects’70 and that this recognition of individuals’ full 
subjectivity requires respect for autonomy, and the creation of conditions conducive to that 
autonomy, so that individuals ‘can determine their own destiny in areas of central concern.’71 
They argue that restrictive abortion legislation ‘may burden or violate the dignity of women’ 
by denying them the ability to exercise decision-making autonomy, by harming their ‘health, 
bodily integrity’ and ‘emotional well-being’, and by impeding their ability to pursue the life 
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course they had envisioned.72 These approaches to dignity emphasise the importance of 
recognising individuals’ as full legal subjects – in other words, as full rights-bearers or 
citizens – who have complex physical, emotional, and psychological needs that must be met 
to ensure their dignity is respected.73 Dixon and Nussbaum also emphasise the importance of 
considering structural factors – such as race, class and gender – and their influence on 
facilitating or impeding human dignity. An awareness of the complexity of human 
experience, and the ways in which power structures can impede or facilitate human dignity 
and flourishing, is also evident in feminist approaches to relational autonomy and 
vulnerability. 
 
Relational autonomy understands individuals as capable of free will and agency while 
simultaneously recognising that we are embedded in and formed by complex webs of both 
interpersonal relationships and wider societal structures such as race, class, and gender.74 
Similar themes are apparent in Fineman’s work on vulnerability: she defines vulnerability as 
universal, constant, and inherent to the human condition; as central to the formation of our 
identities and relationships; and as varying among individuals on the basis of their different 
positions in intersecting power structures. 75 According to these approaches to dignity, 
relational autonomy, and vulnerability, different interpretations of the law and human rights 
have the potential to either facilitate or harm autonomy and dignity, and the potential to either 
lessen or exacerbate vulnerability.76 By reconceptualising the liberal approach to autonomy, 
privacy, and integrity/security of the person in this manner, an intersectional feminist 
approach to IHRL allows for a fuller understanding of legal subjects. It does so by 
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recognising the validity and centrality of not just rationality but also emotions and 
embodiment to our subjectivity, and by drawing attention to and enabling an analysis of 
power structures which facilitate or impede autonomy and dignity. Such an approach to 
IHRL means that women’s agency and deservingness of autonomy can be fully recognised, 
the profound personal impact and structural nature of gendered harms can be identified and 
addressed, and the understanding of relationships as innately antagonistic can be 
reformulated to better represent and respond to the complexity of pregnancy decisions.77 The 
ways in which the international and regional human rights systems could adopt such an 
approach to address current shortcomings in their legal reasoning will be explored in Chapter 
3 of this thesis in relation to the right to privacy and the right to freedom from torture and 
CIDT. The ways in which these bodies could approach the principles of non-discrimination 
and equality to better respond to women’s lived realities will also be discussed, in light of the 




According to a liberal approach, equality is simply defined as treating individuals identically. 
This is known as formal equality.78 As has been highlighted by feminists, liberalism’s 
principle of equal treatment is problematic for two reasons. Firstly, it takes the male as 
normative standard and only recognises inequality in terms that reflect that identity and 
experience.79 Secondly, it restricts its analysis to the idea of similarly-situated individuals, i.e. 
the idea that inequality only occurs if two individuals in the same situation are treated 
differently.80 Rather than requiring a minimum standard of decent treatment, formal equality 
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In response, feminists have proposed a substantive approach to equality. Substantive equality 
recognises that ‘equality must go beyond consistent treatment of likes’ and instead address 
structural causes of disadvantage and oppression.82 While substantive equality is usually 
defined as being concerned with either equality of opportunity or equality of results, Fredman 
argues that it should be understood as a multi-faceted concept which has the four 
complementary and interconnected aims of redressing disadvantage; addressing stigma, 
stereotyping and violence; facilitating participation; and accommodating difference, 
including through structural change.83 The necessity of taking this substantive, even 
transformative, approach to equality in regard to women’s human rights is apparent: by 
recognising the longstanding control of women’s reproduction and sexuality through the 
criminalisation of abortion as rooted in beliefs about women’s inherent inferiority, 
undertaking such an approach to equality in IHRL can address not only the direct harms that 
arise from restrictive abortion legislation, but also address the deeper, structural forms of 
discrimination that inform and exacerbate such legislation. While there is evidence that the 
inter-American human rights system, European human rights system, and UN human rights 
treaty monitoring bodies are moving towards a substantive approach to equality reasoning, 
the idea of the similarly-situated individual test of formal equality still persists in their 
reasoning, thus impeding the full realisation of women’s human rights and citizenship. These 
issues will be discussed in Chapter 3. As will be argued throughout this thesis, one of the 
ways that the international and regional human rights bodies could address the root causes of 
women’s exclusion and oppression would be by moving towards this transformative 
understanding of equality. This requires moving from discussions of inequality/equality to 
ones of oppression/liberation; while the terminology of equality and non-discrimination will 
be used throughout this thesis since it is enshrined in IHRL, it will be argued that equality 
and non-discrimination need to be understood as having transformative potential that can lead 
to the structural changes required to end white supremacist capitalist patriarchy. The 
importance of embracing a transformative understanding of liberal concepts is also apparent 
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Traditional liberal understandings of justice are limited to respect for the freedom of 
individuals and institutions from undue interference by others, and the utilitarian approach of 
guaranteeing the maximum amount of happiness to the maximum number of people.84 
Certain liberal philosophers such as Rawls recognised the limits of this approach and argued 
for a more expansive understanding of justice that they referred to as social justice.85 They 
argued that the basic structure of society and its legal, economic and cultural practices and 
institutions should be grounded in the virtue of being just, and should facilitate the ability of 
individuals to live life according to their own wishes.86 Feminist philosophers and activists 
advanced this further, arguing that social justice should mean the elimination of structural 
injustice and the realisation of ‘social equality of groups, and mutual recognition and 
affirmation of group differences.’87 Young recognised the importance of engaging with 
international institutions such as the human rights system to counter this domination, 
oppression, and exclusion.88 Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, social justice is 
understood as the process of challenging structural injustices so that everyone has the right to 
have rights and to determine the scope of those rights, thus guaranteeing their ability to 
flourish. 
 
Reflections on justice also lead to an interrogation of traditional approaches to adjudication, 
and their limits in realising social justice. Contemporary legal systems, including 
international human rights mechanisms, are generally grounded in an adversarial and 
retributive approach to justice: the two parties in conflict present their versions of events, the 
adjudicating body determines which version is more plausible, and punishment is meted out 
to the wrongdoer in order to provide satisfaction for the wronged party.89 Such an approach is 
not entirely conducive to social justice for the following reasons.  
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Firstly, given that it is grounded in the liberal intellectual tradition, it fails to recognise harms 
that fall outside the scope of the ideal liberal legal subject’s experience. Secondly, it fails to 
address the root causes of harms and wrongs, such as the structural nature of white 
supremacist capitalist patriarchy. Thirdly, the adversarial nature of adjudication perpetuates 
dichotomies of right/wrong, victim/perpetrator, as well as the reductive idea that wrongdoing 
can only be addressed through punishment. Such an approach fails to create the space 
necessary for a more appropriate and sensitive treatment of individuals who have experienced 
trauma, for a meaningful exploration of the respective parties’ positions and how if at all it is 
possible to reconcile them, and for the recognition and implementation of measures that can 
redress both the individual harms and the structural conditions that gave rise to them. 
Scholars and practitioners of restorative and transformative justice have highlighted three 
issues and some of the ways in which they can be addressed. Many of their suggestions are 
appropriate for an intersectional feminist approach to IHRL, as will now be discussed. 
 
Restorative justice ‘aims to restore the status and heal relationships and injuries of victims 
and the wider community in the wake of an ethical breach.’90 It makes use of non-adversarial 
approaches such as mediation to not only deal with conflict but also contribute to social 
justice.91 Transformative justice understands justice as ‘a set of general principles for 
allocating collective benefits, opportunities and burdens’ that is attuned to and determined to 
address the structural nature of the marginalisation and oppression of ‘groups like women, 
children, minorities and indigenous peoples.’92 In contrast to the procedural justice approach 
that characterises domestic law and IHRL, restorative and transformative justice are 
concerned with a substantive understanding of justice that seeks to transform the 
‘psychosocial, socioeconomic and political power relations in society’ to ensure universal 
respect for, protection, and fulfilment of human rights.93 They recognise that the legal process 
is just one avenue for realising the social, political and economic transformation required to 
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guarantee all individuals the potential to flourish.94 As will be discussed in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’ friendly settlements procedure 
serves as an example of how IHRL can make use of restorative and transformative 
approaches to justice to better represent and respond to women’s lived realities and 
experiences, and to acknowledge these realities and experiences as the basis for human rights 
interpretation and implementation. 
 
To summarise, throughout this thesis the terms ‘justice’ and ‘social justice’ will be used to 
refer to the realisation of a legal, political, social and economic order in which all individuals 
can flourish. Framing justice in these terms foregrounds the need to address structural 
inequality, also referred to in this thesis as systemic inequality, oppression, or 
structural/systemic oppression. The use of these terms is grounded in an understanding of 
justice as substantive, restorative, and transformative, rather than as procedural and 
retributive. The need to adopt such an approach to justice in order to counter women’s 
historical exclusion and oppression, and to realise their right to have rights and determine the 
scope of those rights, is a cornerstone of this thesis and the concept of SRHRs. The next 





SRHRs in intersectional feminism 
 
The concept of sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHRs) is a transformative 
intersectional feminist challenge to traditional liberal IHRL. SRHRs combine four 
interrelated fields: sexual health, sexual rights, reproductive health and reproductive rights. 
They affirm the rights and freedoms of people of all sexual orientations and gender identities 
to enjoy safe, satisfying sexual relations free of coercion, discrimination and violence should 
they wish to engage in sexual activity, and to have the freedom to make informed decisions 
about their sexual and reproductive health, including if or when to have children.95 The focus 
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on SRHRs in this thesis, rather than on reproductive rights only, is deliberate: as an 
intersectional feminist research project, it is vital to recognise the role of Global South 
feminists and LGBTQ* scholars and activists in developing SRHRs. It is also vital to 
recognise that campaigns for straightforward access to safe and legal abortion are part of a far 
wider movement to challenge the exclusion and oppression of women and gender-diverse 
people through current discourses on gender, sexuality, and reproduction.  
 
SRHRs as a concept and movement have their origins in the theory and praxis of Global 
South feminists. In response to coercive, violent, and discriminatory birth control and 
population control programmes informed by imperialist, racist, heterosexist thinking,96 they 
articulated their claims for ‘the complete physical, mental, spiritual, political, social and 
economic well-being of women and girls, based on the full achievement and protection of 
women’s human rights.’97 Reproductive autonomy or reproductive freedom, defined as ‘the 
right to have, or not to have, children with dignity and with all the necessary material 
conditions to make raising children a sustainable life choice’,98 is a central tenet of their 
approach to contesting women’s historical exclusion from and oppression by the traditional 
discourses of citizenship and human rights. Reproductive freedom includes access to 
contraception, abortion, and decent education and information on sexual and reproductive 
health, as well as freedom from forced sterilization and other coercive, eugenic practices.99 
Intersectional feminist understandings of SRHRs-as-reproductive-freedom recognise and 
emphasise that the full realisation of SRHRs can only take place through structural political, 
economic, social and legal change: they argue that the realisation of SRHRs requires a 
comprehensive ‘framework that promotes all people’s well-being and women’s full 
citizenship [emphasis added].’100 As such, intersectional feminist engagement with the 
language and mechanisms of IHRL represents just one aspect of a wider project to transform 
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society. Feminist efforts to ensure the recognition and legitimacy of SRHRs within IHRL is a 
means to an end, but not the end in itself: the language and mechanisms of IHRL represent a 
tool to achieve social transformation. As such, the intersectional feminist project of SRHRs 
can be understood as an attempt to close the gap between IHRL as it currently stands and the 
lived realities and experiences that should inform its interpretation and application. This 
process is ongoing, as evidenced by the growing recognition of SRHRs within IHRL. 
However, this process is limited unless IHRL adopts the intersectional feminist 
understanding of concepts such as justice and rights underpinning SRHRs. 
 
SRHRs in IHRL 
 
As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapters Two and Three, SRHRs have been 
recognised within IHRL by the UN, the inter-American, the European, and the African 
human rights systems as a legitimate family of human rights. These human rights systems 
have recognised that the following rights and principles are necessary for the full realisation 
of SRHRs: 
 
• The principle of non-discrimination and equality  
• The right to life  
• The right to be free from torture  
• The right to marry and found a family  
• The right to seek, receive and impart information  
• The right to a fair trial  
• The right to privacy  
• The right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion  
• The right to health  
• The right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress.101  
 
 
101 See Annex 1 and also: African Union, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the 
Rights of Women in Africa (The Maputo Protocol) (adopted 11 July 2003, entered into force 25 November 
2005) art 14; CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, Women’s Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights in 
Europe (Strasbourg, CoE 2017) 47-56; UNFPA et al, Reproductive Rights are Human Rights: A Handbook for 
National Human Rights Institutions (New York, United Nations 2014) 89-115; UNGA, ‘Programme of Action 
Adopted at the International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo, 5-13 September 1994’ 
(A/CONF.171/1313, September 1994) para 7.3; WHO, Safe Abortion: Technical and Policy Guidance for 
Health Systems (2nd edn, Geneva, World Health Organization 2012), 19 
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As will be illustrated in the next two chapters, there is evidence that the intersectional 
feminist approach to SRHRs is slowly being adopted by these international and regional 
human rights mechanisms: they are increasingly attentive to the connection between 
restricting access to reproductive and sexual healthcare on the one hand and discriminatory 
attitudes to women on the other, and they are also increasingly attentive to the intersecting, 
structural nature of such discrimination on the basis of gender, race, class, age, geographical 
location, and disability. However, the persistence of the liberal legal framework and its 
underlying principles continues to limit the full reach of these two necessary developments, 




Part 2 of this introductory chapter defined the key concepts of liberalism, citizenship, 
autonomy, equality, and justice as they are understood for the purposes of this thesis. It also 
explained how SRHRs are understood within intersectional feminism, and how they are 
understood within IHRL. The next part of this chapter engages with the literature that has 
informed the development of this research project’s methodology and concepts. It also 
highlights how this thesis’s subject and approach contribute to the existing body of research 
on intersectional feminist approaches to IHRL.  
 
 




While undertaking research for this thesis, the gendered and interconnected nature of 
citizenship, rights, and reproduction became apparent. The need to synthesise existing 
literature from feminist legal studies, political theory, and sociology on these discourses, and 
the need to articulate the connections between them in order to understand and respond better 
to the harmful impact of the criminalisation of abortion, was evident. This thesis makes the 
following original contributions to research. Firstly, it makes use of the concept of citizenship 
to synthesise longstanding feminist critiques of liberalism and IHRL and it applies them to an 
issue of critical, real-world importance: the need for straightforward, safe, and legal access to 
abortion. Secondly, by making use of the concept of citizenship, this thesis identifies 
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commonalities, parallels, and connections between domestic, regional, international, and 
transnational feminist human rights struggles around abortion access and SRHRs that might 
not otherwise be apparent, for example in relation to the case studies of El Salvador and 
Ireland. Thirdly, by drawing attention to the Global South feminist and inter-American 
human rights system contributions to the development of SRHRs in IHRL, this thesis 
challenges dominant forms of knowledge production that dismiss and ignore the value of 
Global South theory and praxis. Finally, by applying this theoretical framework to the case 
studies of El Salvador and Ireland, it draws attention to the situation in El Salvador – 
considerably less well-known than that in Ireland, at least in European academia – and 
provides an up-to-date account of the situation in Ireland. In regard to both case studies, 
applying the theoretical framework of a multilevel feminist citizenship project makes visible 
the multifaceted harms that restrictive abortion legislation and its underlying rationale causes, 
the ways in which feminists in both countries make use of the language and mechanisms of 
human rights to contest these harms, and the need for an intersectional feminist approach to 
the decriminalisation of abortion by activists and the human rights system in order to realise 
women’s full citizenship. 
 
This part of the chapter is divided into three sections. The first section discusses the literature 
on feminist approaches to citizenship. Section two considers feminist approaches to IHRL 
and SRHRs. Section three provides an overview of the literature on El Salvador and Ireland. 
 
1.3.1. Feminist approaches to citizenship 
 
One of the first and most important feminist critiques of citizenship is Pateman’s 1988 The 
Sexual Contract. Its thesis is that the liberal social order simultaneously relies upon and 
makes invisible the patriarchal social order, which she refers to as the sexual contract.102 The 
sexual contract ‘establishes men’s political right over women’ and the ‘orderly access by men 
to women’s bodies’, excluding women from rights and citizenship on the basis of their 
embodiment, sexuality, and reproduction.103 Their role is to reproduce future citizens of 
legitimate parentage, rather than to exercise citizenship themselves.104 Despite citizenship’s 
claims to neutrality and inclusiveness, citizenship and the social contract are in fact 
ideological and exclusionary, and mean that women can never fully access citizenship and 
 
102 C Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 12-3 
103 ibid, 14 
104 ibid, 61 
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the public sphere on the same terms as men due to their association with the body, 
reproduction, and sexuality.105 Pateman focused on marriage and employment to illustrate her 
thesis, but the relevance of such an approach to the legal regulation of reproduction and 
sexuality is evident. If women’s place in the citizenship project is in the subordinate position 
of non-citizen and bearer of future citizen, and if men are entitled to control women’s 
reproduction and sexuality to ensure the continuity and stability of this social order, then 
surely the regulation of reproduction and sexuality through legislation on abortion requires 
analysis.  
 
During the 1990s, numerous feminist scholars such as Lister, Phillips, and Walby expanded 
upon Pateman’s idea of the gendered and exclusionary nature of citizenship. They undertook 
feminist analyses of citizenship to articulate alternative understandings of citizenship as a 
contested discourse which required reformulation to better represent and respond to women’s 
lived experiences.106 While their work alluded to the importance of realising reproductive 
rights such as access to abortion to ensure women’s full citizenship, it was not the main focus 
of their research.107 Moreover, their work lacked an explicitly intersectional focus. 
 
In order to ensure a more intersectional approach and in order to demonstrate the validity of 
applying such a framework to the relationship between abortion/SRHRs and IHRL, this thesis 
supplements these European feminist approaches to citizenship with feminist analyses of 
gender and nation, and Latin American feminist analyses of citizenship. Yuval-Davis has 
identified the connections between gender, reproduction, nation, citizenship and IHRL 
through the concept of the multi-layered citizen. She recognises that the struggle for 
reproductive rights ‘should be seen as a vital part of the more general struggle for women’s 
emancipation’108 and that this struggle takes place in the interconnected arenas of domestic, 
regional, international and transnational feminist activism around the language and 
mechanisms of IHRL.109 Moreover, her work is explicitly intersectional, highlighting and 
reflecting upon how power structures and identity categories such as race, nationality, and 
dis/ability interact with gender to create specific challenges to the realisation of women’s full 
 
105 ibid, 278, 340. See also S Thompson et al, ‘The Sexual Contract 30 Years On’, 94-5 
106 A Phillips, Engendering Democracy; R Lister, Citizenship; S Walby, ‘Is Citizenship Gendered?’ 
107 R Lister, Citizenship, 125-6; A Phillips, Engendering Democracy, 108-9; S Walby, ‘Is Citizenship 
Gendered?’, 380 
108 N Yuval-Davis, Gender and Nation, 38 
109 N Yuval-Davis, ‘The ‘Multi-Layered’ Citizen’, 119 
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citizenship.110 This intersectional awareness and commitment to a dynamic understanding of 
citizenship as a contested process which can be used to achieve social transformation is also 
apparent in the work of Latin American feminist scholars, and feminist scholars who 
specialise in Latin American studies.111 The particular historical and political Latin American 
context of colonisation, inequality, dictatorship, and authoritarianism, and their ongoing 
impact, has given rise to an active feminist scholarship and praxis which is aware of and 
committed to challenging the hierarchies of race, class, gender, age, dis/ability and 
geographic location that oppress women.112  
 
This thesis synthesises and develops these feminist approaches to the relationship between 
citizenship, gender, reproduction and sexuality. It uses them to provide an in-depth analysis 
of the struggle for abortion rights in particular and SRHRs in general. Drawing upon Yuval-
Davis’s idea of multilevel citizenship, this thesis demonstrates that feminist campaigns for 
abortion access are part of a long struggle for women’s full citizenship, and that this struggle 
takes place domestically, regionally, internationally, and transnationally in relation to the 
language and mechanisms of IHRL. This thesis does so by considering the origins and 
evolution of SRHRs within IHRL, and by considering the origins and evolution of restrictive 
abortion legislation and feminist responses to it in El Salvador and Ireland. Making use of the 
theoretical framework of a multilevel feminist citizenship project results in a comprehensive 
understanding of the connections between these sites of contestation.  
 
Drawing upon feminist analyses of citizenship also demonstrates the interconnected nature of 
these critiques and feminist critiques of IHRL, and the necessity of making use of both forms 
of critique to ensure that IHRL represents and responds to women’s lived realities. It will be 
argued that an intersectional feminist approach to IHRL requires not just engagement with 
human rights as they are currently interpreted, but also engagement with and reformulation of 
the liberal concepts of citizenship, autonomy, equality, and justice that underpin it. The next 
 
110 ibid, 123-127; N Yuval-Davis, Gender and Nation, 7, 38, 118-9 
111 E Dagnino, ‘Culture, Citizenship, and Democracy: Changing Discourses and Practices of the Latin American 
Left’ in SE Alvarez, E Dagnino, A Escobar (eds), Cultures of Politics, Politics of Cultures: Re-Visioning Latin 
American Social Movements (Boulder CO, Westview Press 1998) 33; E Jelin ‘Engendering Human Rights’, 65; 
M Molyneux, Women’s Movements in International Perspective: Latin America and Beyond (London, Palgrave 
2001); V Vargas ‘International Feminisms: The World Social Forum’ in JS Jaquette, KA Staudt (eds), Feminist 
Agendas and Democracy in Latin America (London, Duke University Press 2009) 145. See also A Carosio (ed), 
Feminismo y cambio social en América Latina y el Caribe (Buenos Aires, CLACSO 2012) and F Gargallo, Las 
ideas feministas latinoamericanas (Bogotá, Ediciones desde abajo 2004) 
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section discusses key literature on feminist approaches to IHRL and SRHRs, its 
commonalities with feminist critiques of liberalism and citizenship, and the ways in which 
this thesis synthesises these two sets of critique to develop a comprehensive intersectional 
feminist approach to IHRL and abortion. 
 
1.3.2. Feminist approaches to IHRL and SRHRs 
 
As noted in this chapter’s methodology section, there was a proliferation of feminist critiques 
of international law and IHRL in the 1990s and early 2000s. SRHRs were also the subject of 
extensive feminist scholarship in the early 1990s and 2000s in response to their growing 
visibility and legitimacy at the international level.113 Academics and activists working within 
the fields of IHRL and development reflected on the risks and benefits of engaging with 
IHRL, and of using the language of human rights and development.114 They also highlighted 
the importance of challenging structural inequality in order to fully realise women’s human 
rights.115 
 
 In drawing upon this body of literature, this thesis demonstrates that feminist approaches to 
IHRL in general and SRHRs in particular continue to be of relevance. As will be argued 
throughout this thesis, ensuring that IHRL represents and responds to women’s lived realities 
is an ongoing process, and one which is particularly contested in relation to SRHRs such as 
abortion access. This thesis also contributes to this body of literature by making linkages 
between it and feminist critiques of liberalism and citizenship. In doing so, this thesis 
develops an original, comprehensive, and coherent feminist critique of liberalism and IHRL 
that addresses not just the limited interpretations of IHRL currently impeding the full 
realisation of women’s human rights, but also the underlying causes of these limited 
interpretations. It argues that it is only by undertaking a discursive analysis of these 
underlying principles that an approach to IHRL that represents and responds to women’s 
lived realities can be articulated.  
 
 
113 See for example C Bunch, ‘Beijing, Backlash and the Future of Women’s Human Rights’ (1995) 1 Health 
and Human Rights 449; RP Petchesky, Global Prescriptions; J Peters, A Wolper (eds), Women’s Rights, Human 
Rights; H Widdows, IA Idiakez, AE Cirión (eds), Women’s Reproductive Rights 
114 A Cornwall, ‘Buzzwords and Fuzzwords: Deconstructing Development Discourse’ (2007) 17 Development 
in Practice 471;  N Kabeer, ‘Tracking The Gender Politics of the Millennium Development Goals: Struggles For 
Interpretive Power in the International Development Agenda’ (2015) 36 Third World Quarterly 377;  D Otto, 
‘Holding Up Half The Sky, But For Whose Benefit?’ 
115 S Corrêa et al, Sexuality, Health and Human Rights; R Petchesky, ‘Human Rights, Reproductive Health and 
Economic Justice: Why They Are Indivisible’ (2000) 8 Reproductive Health Matters 12 
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Since IHRL is only meaningful if it impacts upon the daily lives of individuals at the 
domestic level, since domestic and transnational feminism around the meaning of human 
rights has informed the development of IHRL and SRHRs, and since the starting point for 
this thesis was the impact of the criminalisation of abortion on women in Ireland and El 
Salvador, it is necessary to consider these two countries and existing literature on them to 
address this thesis’s research question in full. 
 
 
1.3.3. El Salvador and Ireland 
 
While Ireland and its restrictive abortion legislation has been the focus of considerable 
academic research and international public attention, the situation in El Salvador has received 
comparatively little attention. Indeed, El Salvador has been referred to as ‘Latin America’s 
least researched nation-state.’116 This thesis makes use of the parallels between the situation 
in Ireland and El Salvador to draw more attention to El Salvador in European, English-
speaking academia. It does so by drawing upon the available academic literature concerning 
the history and politics of El Salvador and Central America,117 as well as publications by 
 
116 A Lauria-Santiago, L Binford, ‘Local History, Politics, and the State in El Salvador’ in A Lauria-Santiago, L 
Binford (eds), Landscapes of Struggle: Politics, Society, and Community in El Salvador (University of 
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117 TP Anderson, Politics in Central America: Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua (Westport 
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Rebellion, and Change (6th edn, Boulder CO, Westview Press 2015); S Chant, N Craske, Gender in Latin 
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Salvador, 1977-1992 (CUP 2016); CD Deere, M León, Empowering Women: Land and Property Rights in Latin 
America (University of Pittsburgh Press 2001); J Didion, Salvador (London, Granta 1983); E Galeano, The 
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London, Serpent’s Tail 2009); V González, K Kampwirth (eds), Radical Women in Latin America, Left and 
Right (University Park, PA, Pennsylvania State University Press 2001); JL Gould, AA Lauria-Santiago, To Rise 
in Darkness: Revolution, Repression, and Memory in El Salvador, 1920–1932 (Durham NC, Duke University 
Press 2007); M Htun, Sex and the State: Abortion, Divorce, and the Family under Latin American Dictatorships 
and Democracies (CUP 2003); JS Jaquette, KA Staudt (eds), Feminist Agendas and Democracy in Latin 
America; K Kampwirth, Feminism and the Legacy of Revolution: Nicaragua, El Salvador, Chiapas (Athens 
OH, Ohio University Press 2004); A Lauria-Santiago, L Binford (eds), Landscapes of Struggle; F Martínez 
Castro, ‘Historia del feminismo en El Salvador’ (speech presented the 30th of August 2010) 
<http://www.uca.edu.sv/facultad/clases/chn/m100136/HISTORIA-DEL-FEMINISMO-EN-EL-
SALVADOR(Ponencia).doc> accessed 18 October 2019; S Migden Socolow, The Women of Colonial Latin 
America (CUP, 2000); B Potthast, Madres, obreras, amantes: protagonismo femenino en la historia de América 
Latina (JL Acanda tr, Madrid, Iberoamericano 2010); S Rivera Berruz ‘Latin American Feminism’ The Stanford 
Encyclopaedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 edition), EN Zalta (ed) <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/feminism-
latin-america/> accessed 18 October 2019; JD Shayne, The Revolution Question: Feminisms in El Salvador, 
Chile, and Cuba (London, Rutgers University Press 2004); R Sprenkels, ‘Ambivalent Moderation: The FMLN’s 
Ideological Accommodation to Post-War Politics in El Salvador’ (2019) 54 Government and Opposition (2019) 
536; M Thomson Women of El Salvador: The Price of Freedom (London, Zed Books 1986); MT Tula, Hear My 
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feminist and human rights organisations,118 to provide a comprehensive account of the 
historical and political context that led to the complete criminalisation of abortion in the 
country and feminist responses to it. The theoretical framework highlights the parallels 
between the situation in Ireland and El Salvador arising from their shared experience of an 
exclusionary, oppressive postcolonial/post-conflict idea of citizenship that emphasised the 
need to control women’s reproduction and sexuality through restrictive abortion legislation. 
The theoretical framework also highlights that the Salvadoran feminist movement has made 
extensive use of the language of citizenship and rights to frame their campaigns for abortion 
law reform, and that they have engaged with and indeed shaped the inter-American and UN 
human rights systems in their attempts to guarantee the full realisation of women’s 
citizenship and rights. In keeping with the methodology and aims of this thesis, focusing on 
El Salvador and emphasising the important contributions that Salvadoran and Latin American 
feminists have made to advancing an intersectional understanding of SRHRs within IHRL 
challenges current Eurocentric, white supremacist narratives that discount the importance of 
Global South feminist research and praxis. This represents an original and vital contribution 
to current literature on abortion, SRHRs, and IHRL.  
 
This desire to challenge dominant narratives and forms of knowledge production also informs 
the comparative study of the regional human rights systems that a comparative study of 
Ireland and El Salvador entails. By focusing on the three human rights systems under 
consideration here, it highlights the integral contributions of Latin American feminists to the 
development of SRHRs and their growing legitimacy within IHRL. It also highlights the fact 
that, of the three human rights systems under consideration, the inter-American human rights 
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system has taken the approach to the interpretation of SRHRs that is most in keeping with 
their transformative, intersectional feminist core. Therefore, this thesis makes the original 
contribution of addressing the lack of attention afforded to the inter-American human rights 
system by European academia, a contribution that is especially important given that it 
addresses implicit biases that knowledge from the Global South is of lesser value, and that 
the Global North has little to learn from the production of knowledge there. In reality, as will 
be demonstrated throughout this thesis, the European human rights system and the European 
and Irish feminist movements could learn much from their Global South counterparts on how 
to advance an intersectional, transformative understanding of citizenship and rights. 
 
In regard to Ireland the European human rights system, there have been numerous high-
profile cases and controversies arising from Ireland’s abortion legislation,119 and so there is a 
considerable body of literature on Ireland’s abortion legislation and on jurisprudence 
concerning its abortion legislation.120 Many of these works, as well as studies of modern Irish 
history and society, identify the connection between the dominant discourses of citizenship 
and national identity on the one hand and restrictive abortion legislation on the other.121 This 
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thesis builds upon and contributes to this existing body of literature in two ways. Firstly, by 
using the theoretical framework of a multilevel feminist citizenship project, it demonstrates 
the interconnected nature of domestic campaigns for the decriminalisation of abortion on the 
one hand and the advancement of SRHRs within the international and regional human rights 
systems on the other. It highlights that the Irish feminists’ use of the language of rights and 
citizenship in their domestic campaigns for the decriminalisation of abortion and Irish 
feminist engagement with IHRL through the ECtHR and the UN human rights treaty 
monitoring bodies are two interconnected processes that can be best understood through the 
framework of a feminist multilevel feminist citizenship project. Secondly, given that this 
research was conducted between 2017 and 2020, it provides an up-to-date account of a 
significant moment in the history of Ireland’s abortion legislation. The constitutional article 
and legislation restricting abortion access were reformed in 2018-9, largely in response to the 
dual pressure of domestic civil society activism and UN human rights treaty monitoring body 
concluding observations and views calling for abortion law reform. Applying the theoretical 
framework of a multilevel feminist citizenship project highlights the fact that feminist usage 
of the language of citizenship and human rights and feminist engagement with IHRL 




In bringing together a range of feminist critiques of citizenship and human rights, this thesis 
constructs a comprehensive appraisal of the theoretical and real-world challenges facing the 
full realisation of SRHRs, and it develops a schema for overcoming these challenges. It also 
demonstrates the ongoing utility and importance of feminist legal theory to contemporary 
issues in IHRL. This thesis also demonstrates the relevance of the concept of citizenship to 
feminist reconfigurations of IHRL. It provides insights into the dynamics of reshaping 
existing rights and claiming new ones. It also offers a perspective on the relationship between 
domestic, regional, international and transnational activism and jurisprudence that would 
otherwise remain unexplored. The comparative element of this study serves three purposes. 
 
Society 568; E Luibhéid, ‘Sexual Regimes and Migration Controls: Reproducing the Irish Nation-State in 
Transnational Contexts (2006) 83 Feminist Review 60; S Mullally, Gender, Culture and Human Rights: 
Reclaiming Universalism (Oxford, Hart 2006); JM Smith, Ireland's Magdalen Laundries and the Nation's 
Architecture of Containment (University of Notre Dame Press 2007); L Smyth Abortion and Nation: The 
Politics of Reproduction in Contemporary Ireland (Aldershot, Ashgate 2005); MG Valiulis, ‘Power, Gender, 
and Identity in the Irish Free State’ (1995) 6 Journal of Women’s History 117; MG Valiulis, ‘The Politics of 
Gender in the Irish Free State, 1922-1937’ (2011) 20 Women’s History Review 569 
 36 
Firstly, it highlights commonalities in the reasoning behind restrictive abortion legislation, 
demonstrating that such legislation is not an aberrant and isolated occurrence, but 
symptomatic of the deep-rooted issues in legal discourse that have been highlighted by 
feminists. Secondly, it also allows for a critical reading of the ways in which SRHRs are 
interpreted by human rights systems. Thirdly, it draws attention to under-researched states 
and institutions that have been neglected by Western (European) scholarship due to the power 
dynamics in academia that privilege certain voices and topics over others. The ways in which 
these ideas are presented and developed throughout this thesis will now be discussed. 
 
1.4. Overview of Thesis Structure  
 
The theoretical framework of this thesis, the concept of a multilevel feminist citizenship 
project, is the subject of Chapter 2. This chapter sets out the conceptualisation of citizenship 
underpinning the theoretical framework. It then illustrates how citizenship is a concept which 
has long been used to exclude and oppress women, including in El Salvador and Ireland, but 
which can be reclaimed and reformulated to advance women’s needs, interests, and full 
personhood before the law. Applying this discursive understanding of citizenship as a 
contested process to the origins, evolution and legitimacy of women’s human rights and 
SRHRs in IHRL, the chapter considers the extent to which the UN, inter-American and 
European human rights systems have incorporated SRHRs into their jurisprudence. In doing 
so, this chapter demonstrates that the liberal foundations of citizenship and rights have served 
to oppress women, but that they can be reworked to harness the symbolic power and 
emancipatory potential of these discourses. This provides general context for the close 
reading of their jurisprudence in Chapter 3. 
 
Engaging in a critical reading of jurisprudence from the UN, inter-American and European 
human rights system pertaining to abortion access, Chapter 3 analyses the extent to which 
these systems have adopted the intersectional feminist approach required to fully advance 
SRHRs and, by extension, women’s human rights/full citizenship. While acknowledging the 
considerable advances made in this respect, particularly by the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights (IACHR) and the UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies, it highlights 
the persistence of the androcentric Western liberal legal framework and its inability to 
represent and respond to women’s lived realities, particularly in relation to understandings of 
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the right to privacy, freedom from torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment (CIDT), and the principle of non-discrimination. The chapter argues 
that alternative understandings of these rights informed by an intersectional feminist 
approach, and that an alternative, non-adversarial approach to adjudication, would better 
represent and respond to women’s lived needs and realities. 
 
Chapter 4 of this thesis, concerning El Salvador, contextualises the complete criminalisation 
of abortion in the country and the gendered/raced/classed impact of this legislation on women 
in El Salvador. It highlights the ways in which Salvadoran and transnational feminist 
engagement with the inter-American and UN human rights systems represents feminist 
contestation of women’s exclusion from and oppression by the traditional liberal citizenship 
discourse. Although abortion remains completely criminalised in El Salvador, and although 
women continue to be actively prosecuted for having had an abortion, Chapter 4 
demonstrates that national, regional, international and transnational human rights actors are 
increasingly vocal and unified in their calls for the government to reform Salvadoran abortion 
legislation to ensure compliance with its human rights obligations, and that this is a direct 
result of feminist activism on the issue. 
 
Chapter 5, concerning the Republic of Ireland, highlights the ways in which these same 
dynamics are evident in an ostensibly very different context. In placing these two cases in 
dialogue with one another, this thesis argues that their common legacy of colonialism and 
conservative Catholicism has created a particular national identity that is harmful to women. 
It also argues that placing these two case studies in dialogue highlights the shared dynamics 
of feminist activism in relation to the language and mechanisms of IHRL. While the situation 
in El Salvador regarding abortion has yet to change, the fact that Ireland’s abortion legislation 
was considerably reformed in 2018-2019 illustrates that multilevel feminist citizenship 
projects can result in the changes needed to make the law better represent and respond to 
women’s lived realities. Chapter 5 considers the origins and impact of Ireland’s restrictive 
abortion legislation, and feminist responses to it at the national, regional, and international 
levels of the human rights system. It demonstrates that this feminist engagement with the 
language and mechanisms of IHRL resulted in the 2018-9 abortion law reform, and it argues 
that further feminist engagement with this process of contesting women’s exclusion from and 
oppression by the traditional citizenship discourse is necessary to ensure full and 
straightforward access to safe and legal abortion in Ireland. 
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Chapter 6 reflects on the extent to which the language and mechanisms of IHRL can be and 
have been harnessed by feminists to fully realise women’s status as rights-bearers with a 
place in the citizenship project. It will argue that this is an ongoing process that has enjoyed 
some success, as evidenced by the growing legitimacy of SRHRs in IHRL. In order for this 
process to continue successfully, however, a more coherent theoretical approach – such as the 
intersectional feminist one articulated in this thesis – is required by the regional and 
international human rights systems, and the national and transnational feminist and human 
rights organisations. A commitment to intersectional feminism will enable domestic, regional 
and international actors to recognise otherwise potentially hidden power dynamics and 
imbalances that inform and are perpetuated by the law, and it will ensure that they take the 
steps necessary to address them. The limits of this thesis, as well as potential avenues for 




This chapter has set out the background, research question, methodology, definitions of key 
concepts, original contribution, and structure of this thesis. Undertaking a discursive 
intersectional feminist approach to IHRL, this thesis argues that feminist attempts to reshape 
the language and mechanisms of IHRL and its underlying concepts in relation to abortion 
access and SRHRs are a vital endeavour to counter women’s historical and ongoing exclusion 
from and oppression by the liberal citizenship discourse. The nature of this struggle in the 
interrelated arenas of the UN, inter-American and European human rights systems; El 
Salvador and Ireland; and civil society will serve as the subject of the subsequent chapters. 







SRHRs as a Multilevel Feminist Citizenship Project 
 
This chapter develops the theoretical framework guiding this project: the idea of a multilevel 
feminist citizenship project. This framework understands campaigns for the decriminalisation 
of abortion at the national level, and campaigns for the advancement of sexual and 
reproductive health and rights (SRHRs) at the regional and international level of the human 
rights system, as interlinked processes of feminist contestation around who has the right to 
have rights and what those rights should entail. 
 
Part 1 discusses the conceptualisation of citizenship and the multilevel feminist citizenship 
project underpinning the theoretical framework. It demonstrates that citizenship is a concept 
which has long been used to exclude and oppress women, but that feminists have articulated 
alternative understandings of it to advance an intersectional feminist approach to the law and 
human rights. Part 2 applies this discursive understanding of citizenship to the origins, 
evolution, and legitimacy of women’s human rights and SRHRs in international human rights 
law (IHRL). Part 3 discusses the extent to which the UN, inter-American and European 
human rights systems have incorporated SRHRs into their jurisprudence, providing general 
context for the close reading of their jurisprudence in Chapter 3.  
 
This chapter argues that SRHRs are best understood as a multilevel feminist citizenship 
project. A multilevel feminist citizenship project is defined as feminists working at the 
interconnected national, regional, and international levels of the human rights system to 
realise women’s right to have rights, and to determine the scope of those rights. SRHRs, and 
specifically the decriminalisation of abortion, are particularly acute sites of contestation 
because they challenge the deep-rooted exclusion of women from citizenship on the basis of 






2.1. Citizenship  
 
2.1.1. What it is citizenship? 
 
Chapter 1 explained that citizenship is understood as a dynamic, contested process over the 
right to have rights and to determine the scope of those rights.1 Feminists have highlighted 
the long history of excluding and oppressing women within the concept of citizenship given 
its origins in a typically white male Western liberalism. The traditional liberal idea of 
citizenship requires the control of women’s reproduction and sexuality to ensure the 
continuity and stability of a patriarchal social order. This understanding of citizenship sets up 
womanhood and citizenship as mutually exclusive, with women serving as ‘nation bearers’ 
(i.e., non-citizens who belong in the private sphere) whose role is to produce and educate 
future citizens rather than ‘rights bearers’ (i.e., citizens who belong in the public sphere).2  
 
In response to the exclusionary, oppressive aspects of the traditional liberal citizenship 
discourse, feminists articulated alternative understandings of citizenship as a dynamic and 
contested process in which new rights can be demanded and new meanings given to those 
which already exist.3 The need for women to have the freedom to make decisions about their 
own bodies, sexuality, and reproduction is a central tenet of these feminist reformulations of 
citizenship, with scholar-activists emphasising the centrality of realising SRHRs to women’s 
full citizenship.4 However, realising SRHRs, especially abortion access, is arguably the most 
acutely contested aspect of women’s struggle for full citizenship because it poses a direct 
challenge to the patriarchal social order. Firstly, women demanding access to abortion 
 
1 T Basok, S Ilcan, J Noonan, ‘Citizenship, Human Rights, and Social Justice’ 267; J Clarke et al, Disputing 
Citizenship, 2, 29; EF Isin, GM Nielsen (eds), Acts of Citizenship; N Kabeer (ed), Inclusive Citizenship; R 
Lister, ‘Inclusive Citizenship’ 49; C Mouffe (ed), Dimensions of Radical Democracy; A Shachar, The Birthright 
Lottery, 7; BS Turner, ‘Contemporary Problems in the Theory of Citizenship’ in BS Turner (ed), Citizenship 
and Social Theory, 2; K Zivi, Making Rights Claims, 7-9, 68 
2 M Enright, ‘‘Involuntary Patriotism’’, 38; AM Jaggar ‘Arenas of Citizenship’, 91-110; R Lister, Citizenship, 1, 
71-2; C Pateman, The Sexual Contract; C Pateman, ‘Equality, Difference, Subordination, 15; A Phillips, 
Engendering Democracy, 3; S Thompson et al, ‘The Sexual Contract 30 Years On’, 94-5; N Yuval-Davis, ‘The 
‘Multi-Layered Citizen’’,120-1; N Yuval-Davis, P Werbner, ‘Women and the New Discourse of Citizenship’, 5 
3 R Lister, Citizenship, 6; R Lister et al, Gendering Citizenship in Western Europe, 72; M Molyneux, ‘Justicia 
de género’; A Phillips, Engendering Democracy, 3; B Siim, Gender and Citizenship; S Walby, ‘Is Citizenship 
Gendered?’ 
4 R Lister, Citizenship, 19; RP Petchesky, ‘Owning and Disowning the Body; N Yuval-Davis, Gender and 
Nation, 38 
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represents women demanding the right to determine if and when to have children – this 
represents women articulating rights claims when only citizens (who can only be male) have 
the right to do so. Secondly, women demanding access to abortion represents women 
rejecting their assigned role in the citizenship project as non-citizens whose sole purpose is 
producing and educating future citizens. 
 
By understanding citizenship in the above manner, this thesis frames domestic, regional, 
international, and transnational campaigns for the decriminalisation of abortion and the 
advancement of SRHRs as a process of feminist contestation of women’s exclusion from and 
oppression by the traditional citizenship discourse. The actors involved, the practices and 
processes of citizenship, and the challenges and opportunities presented by each of these 
interlinked levels – domestic, regional, international, and transnational – will now be 
considered. 
 
Multilevel aspects of citizenship and their relationship to IHRL 
 
Feminist citizenship scholars argue that citizenship should be conceptualised as a ‘multi-
layered construct’ in which the practices and processes of citizenship take place at the 
interconnected national, regional, transnational, and international levels. According to this 
understanding of citizenship, the language and mechanisms of IHRL are a ‘specific layer’ of 
citizenship, one which is potentially more responsive to women’s rights claims than the 
domestic level.5 The language and mechanisms of IHRL are therefore being utilised as 
political tools ‘for “outsiders” at the gates of citizenship.’6 Therefore, attempts to advance 
SRHRs including access to abortion nationally, regionally and internationally should be 
understood as interconnected layers of a multi-level feminist citizenship project: feminists are 
working nationally, regionally, internationally, and transnationally to reformulate human 
rights in order to challenge women’s historic exclusion from citizenship, and to reformulate 
citizenship so that it represents and responds to women’s needs. They do so by mobilising 
around the discourse of human rights, gathering research and evidence, campaigning and 
 
5 H Charlesworth, C Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law, 210; N Yuval-Davis, ‘The ‘Multi-Layered 
Citizen’’, 122, 127, 128 
6 R Lister, Citizenship, 43 
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awareness raising, alliance-building with actors who share their aims, and strategic litigation 
in regional and international human rights fora by individuals and NGOs.7  
The main actors at each level, the ways in which feminists contest women’s exclusion from 
and oppression by the traditional citizenship discourse at each level, and the opportunities 
and challenges that each level presents for this process, will now be discussed. 
 




The international level of the human rights system consists of the United Nations (the UN). 
This thesis focuses on the UN Secretariat’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR), and the human rights monitoring mechanisms within it. To chart the 
development of SRHRs within the UN human rights system, it also refers to UN General 
Assembly (UNGA) Resolutions, the UN Commission on the Status of Women (UN CSW) 
which is within the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), and publications by 
specialised UN agencies such as the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United 
Nations Population Fund (UNFPA).  
 
The OHCHR’s human rights monitoring mechanisms include the human rights treaty 
monitoring bodies, the Charter-based bodies of the Human Rights Council (UNHRC), and 
the Special Procedures of the UNHRC. The Special Procedures include Special Rapporteurs 
and Working Groups on thematic issues such as the right to health, freedom from torture, and 
discrimination against women and girls. 
 
The human rights treaty monitoring bodies are committees of experts responsible for 
assessing state compliance with a human rights treaty. They do so by reviewing periodic 
reports submitted by States Parties detailing their compliance with their treaty obligations and 
publishing Concluding Observations in response; issuing General 
Comments/Recommendations on the nature and scope of treaty provisions; and hearing 
individual complaints against states alleging violations of treaty provisions, on which the 
 
7 X Casas, ‘They are Girls not Mothers: The Violence of Forcing Motherhood on Young Girls in Latin America’ 
(2019) 21 Health and Human Rights Journal,163; N Yuval-Davis, ‘The ‘Multi-Layered Citizen’’, 127 
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Committee will issue Views.8 While these Concluding Observations, General Comments, and 
Views are not ‘per se legally binding, they have real legal significance’ because they place 
expectations upon states to uphold the legally-binding human rights obligations enshrined in 
the human rights treaties, and because they inform the jurisprudence of the ICJ and regional 
human rights systems.9 
 
There are nine ‘core’ human rights treaties, each with its own treaty monitoring body.10 Eight 
of these are discussed in this thesis because they have addressed SRHRs and/abortion in their 
work: the Human Rights Committee (HRC), which monitors implementation of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), which monitors implementation of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee), which monitors 
implementation of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW); the Committee against Torture (CAT) which monitors implementation of 
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (UNCAT); the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC Committee), which 
monitors implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); the Committee 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD Committee) which monitors 
implementation of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD); and the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD Committee), which monitors 
implementation of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD).  
 
As will be discussed in parts 2 and 3 of this chapter, the UN human rights treaty monitoring 
bodies and special procedures have contributed to the development of SRHRs in IHRL 
through their Concluding Observations, General Comments and Recommendations, Views, 
reports, and statements. In relation to abortion specifically, their overall position is that 
abortion should be permitted at a minimum in the case of a risk to the pregnant person’s life 
or health, in the case of rape or incest, and in the case of lethal or fatal foetal abnormalities; 
 
8 NS Rodley, ‘The Role and Impact of Treaty Bodies’ in D Shelton (ed), The Oxford Handbook of International 
Human Rights Law (OUP 2013) 626-633 
9 ibid, 639, 641 
10 ibid 622 
 44 
otherwise multiple human rights could be violated.11 Certain treaty monitoring bodies, 
Special Rapporteurs, and Working Groups have gone even further, calling for complete 
decriminalisation of abortion or stating that waiting times, medical authorisation by multiple 
professionals, and similar restrictions undermine women’s rights to non-discrimination and 
bodily autonomy/integrity.12 Part 2 of this chapter will argue that the development of the UN 
position on SRHRs and abortion represents the multilevel feminist citizenship project 
because it is the direct result of transnational feminist activism contesting women’s exclusion 
from and oppression by the traditional discourse of citizenship and rights. Feminists contest 
this exclusion and oppression in their capacity as UN staff, academics, and civil society 
activists. They do so by advocating for a specific focus on women’s human rights issues; 
participating in UN conferences; submitting information to and participating in the 
monitoring bodies’ and special procedures’ periodic review sessions; and engaging with the 
individual complaints procedure. Feminist contestation of women’s historical exclusion from 
and oppression by citizenship and human rights is also evident in the inter-American human 




The IAHRS consists of the Organization of American States’ Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (IACHR) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR). This 
thesis also considers the role of the Comisión interamericana de mujeres (the Inter-American 
Commission of Women, CIM), a specialised organisation of the Organization of American 
States (OAS), in the advancement of women’s human rights including SRHRs.  
 
The IACHR is a quasi-judicial body responsible for promoting the observance and protection 
of human rights in all OAS Member States.13 It has the authority to examine individual 
complaints of human rights violations by OAS Member States.14 The IACHR is composed of 
 
11 See Annexes 1-3 
12 CRC Committee, ‘Concluding Observations on the combined third and fourth periodic reports of Ireland’ 
(CRC/C/IRL/CO/3-4, 1 March 2016) paras 57-8 (CRC 2016 Ireland Concluding Observations); SR torture 2013 
report, paras 46-50, para 90; SR torture 2016 report, paras 14, 42, 43-4, 51; Working Group on the issue of 
discrimination against women in law and in practice (WG women), ‘Report of the Working Group on the issue 
of discrimination against women in law and practice: eliminating discrimination against women with regard to 
health and safety’ (A/HRC/32/44, 8 April 2016) paras 76, 79, 105(d), 106(e) (WG women 2016 report) 
13 LJ Reinsberg, Advocacy Before the Inter-American System: A Manual for Attorneys and Advocates (San 
Francisco CA, International Justice Resource Center, 2014) 6-7, 13 
14 ibid, 7 
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seven human rights experts who meet three times a year to hold meetings and make decisions 
on petitions. The IACHR’s three main areas of work are overseeing the individual complaints 
procedure, monitoring the human rights situation in OAS Member States, and addressing 
thematic human rights issues such as women’s rights.15 It monitors the human rights set out 
in the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; the American Convention on 
Human Rights (ACHR) and its protocols on economic, social and cultural rights (the Protocol 
of San Salvador) and the abolition of the death penalty; and conventions on specific human 
rights issues such as the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment, and 
Eradication of Violence against Women (the Belém do Pará Convention).16 It can also issue 
precautionary measures, a mechanism which requires states to take urgent action to prevent 
irreparable harm to persons or groups in the OAS Member States.17 The IACtHR is the other 
key actor for the protection and promotion of human rights in OAS Member States. 
 
The IACtHR was established by the ACHR and it became operational in 1980.18 The Court 
has contentious jurisdiction over states that have signed and ratified the ACHR and accepted 
its jurisdiction. It also exercises advisory jurisdiction regarding the interpretation of human 
rights obligations and treaty provisions; this advisory jurisdiction is available to all OAS 
Member States, not just those which have acceded to the ACHR and accepted the Court’s 
adjudicatory function. The Court does not receive contentious individual cases directly – 
cases are only referred to it by the IACHR when a State which is party to the ACHR has 
failed to comply in a timely manner with the IACHR’s recommendations regarding an 
individual petition. The IACtHR also has the power to issue provisional measures, a 
mechanism which requires states to take urgent action to prevent irreparable harm to 
individuals or groups in OAS Member States. Along with the IACHR and IACtHR, OAS 
specialised organisations such as CIM play an important role in developing IHRL. 
 
CIM predates both the OAS and the UN, having been founded in 1928 by feminists from 
across the Americas to contest their exclusion from citizenship in the domestic and the 
 
15 ibid 
16 ibid. See also IACHR, ‘Basic Documents in the Inter-American System’ 
<https://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/basic_documents.asp> accessed 26 November 2020 
17 OAS, American Convention on Human Rights ‘Pact of San José’ (adopted 22 November 1969, entered into 
force 18 July 1978) OAS Treaty Series No. 36, art 41(b) (ACHR); IACHR, ‘Statute of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights’ (OAS Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2/80, Vol. 1 at 88) art 18(b); OAS, ‘Charter of 
the Organization of American States’ (A-41, entered into force 13 December 1951) art 106 
18 ACHR, arts 33, 52 
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emerging regional political fora.19 CIM conducted research on the legal status of women in 
the Americas throughout the 1930s and 1940s, and – as will be highlighted in the next part of 
this chapter – was integral to the UN agreeing to create the UN Commission on the Status of 
Women. CIM became a specialised organisation of the OAS when the OAS was established 
in 1948.20 As will be argued in part 3 of this chapter as well as in Chapter 4, CIM’s origins in 
the 20th-century transnational feminist movement, and its longstanding commitment to 
challenging women’s exclusion from and oppression by the law, have made it an important 
body for the advancement of SRHRs within the IAHRS. 
 
The current position of the IAHRS regarding abortion is the same as that of the UN, i.e. that 
in order to ensure that women’s human rights are respected, protected, and fulfilled, abortion 
should be decriminalised at a minimum in the case of a risk to the pregnant person’s life or 
health, in the case of rape or incest, and in the case of fatal foetal abnormalities. As will be 
detailed in part 3, certain OAS bodies have gone even further, and are involved in efforts to 
have an Inter-American Convention on SRHRs adopted. In contrast to this engagement with 
UN human rights developments and overall progressive approach to women’s human rights 
and SRHRs, the European human rights system has been less influenced by the UN human 
rights system, and it has taken a more conservative, deferential approach to human rights 
protection in general and SRHRs in particular. 
 
The European human rights system 
 
The Council of Europe (CoE) was founded in 1949.21 This thesis focuses on the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR), and the 
Commissioner for Human Rights to assess the European human rights system’s approach to 
SRHRs. This is because the ECtHR is the main human rights body of the CoE. It  hears cases 
brought by individuals against States Parties alleging violations of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR).22 This thesis considers the ECSR, an independent body which 
 
19 CIM, ‘A Brief History of the Inter-American Commission of Women’ (Washington DC, CIM, 2001) 
<https://oas.org/en/cim/docs/BriefHistory[EN].pdf> accessed 3 September 2020, 7; E DuBois, L Derby, ‘The 
Strange Case of Minerva Bernardino: Pan American and United Nations women's right activist’ (2009) 32 
Women’s Studies International Forum, 45 
20 CIM, ‘A Brief History’, 4 
21 CoE, Statute of the Council of Europe, London (ETS No. 1, 3 August 1949) 
22 CoE, Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
restructuring the control machinery established thereby, (ETS No.155, 1 November 1998) 
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oversees Member State compliance with the European Social Charter (ESC), because it has 
heard complaints relating to SRHRs including abortion access. This thesis considers the 
Commissioner for Human Rights, an independent and impartial non-judicial institution that is 
responsible for promoting awareness of and respect for human rights in CoE Member States, 
because numerous Commissioners have demonstrated a commitment to SRHRs. The other 
reason for focusing on these three bodies is that a detailed review of the CoE’s ‘quadrilogue’ 
– the Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly (PACE), the Conference of 
INGOs, and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities – indicated that there is a 
diversity of opinions within these bodies on SRHRs and abortion, rather than a unified 
stance.23 Moreover, with the exception of the Committee of Ministers’ responsibility for 
ensuring implementation of ECtHR judgments (see Chapter 5), the extent to which these 
bodies influence debates around SRHRs and abortion access in CoE Member States, rather 
than simply reflect them, is unclear. 
 
In contrast to both the UN and the inter-American system, the ECtHR and ECSR have taken 
a far more conservative approach to SRHRs. In regard to abortion, they have adopted the 
position that states can determine whether or not to legalise abortion, and that violations of 
women’s rights will only arise if, where legal, abortion is not accessible. This position falls 
below the minimum standard that intersectional feminists, the UN human rights treaty 
monitoring bodies, and the IAHRS have adopted. As Chapters 3 and 5 will argue, this 
position serves as a major impediment to the advancement of the multilevel feminist 
citizenship project that SRHRs represent. Nevertheless, the European human rights system 
represents an important actor and forum for feminists to contest women’s exclusion of and 
oppression by the traditional liberal discourse of citizenship and rights. This contestation 
takes place primarily through individuals and NGOs bringing cases before the ECtHR or 
lodging collective complaints with the ECSR. The Commissioner for Human Rights – and 
certain judges and ECSR members – have also demonstrated a commitment to intersectional 
feminist approaches to IHRL in their reports, concurring, and dissenting opinions. In fact, the 
 
23 With the exception of some statements in support of gender equality and LGBTQ* rights, SRHRs do not 
feature at the Conference of INGOs or the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities (see for example CoE 
Congress of the Local and Regional Authorities, Human Rights Handbook for Local and Regional Authorities 
Vol. 1 (Strasbourg, Congress of the Local and Regional Authorities 2019) 9; Conference of INGOs, ‘Combating 
discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation and gender identity’ (CONF/PLE(2012)REC3, 27 January 
2012); Conference of INGOs, ‘Gender Equality: a universal value, principle and human right to be respected 
and promoted in all fields’ (CONF/PLE(2012)REC5, 27 June 2012). Within PACE, there is significant 
divergence on SRHRs. See for example PACE Resolution 1607 (16 April 2008), which is overall reasonably 
progressive but opens with the statement ‘Abortion must, as far as possible, be avoided.’ 
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current Commissioner has made SRHRs a main focus of her mandate, and has called on CoE 
Member States to adhere to UN, rather than CoE, standards on SRHRs and abortion. 
Therefore, feminists should continue to engage with the European human rights system, even 
though intersectional feminist approaches to IHRL have yet to become as embedded in the 
European human rights system as they have in the UN and inter-American systems. The next 
section considers the nature of the multilevel feminist citizenship project at the domestic 
level. 
 
The domestic level 
 
The nation-state represents the domestic level of the multilevel citizenship. As will be argued 
in this chapter and in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis, in both El Salvador and Ireland the 
exclusionary, oppressive citizenship discourse interacted with similarly oppressive, 
exclusionary discourses of nationalism, gender, race/ethnicity, class, and religion to result in 
the intense regulation of women’s reproduction and sexuality, epitomised by the 
criminalisation of abortion. Feminists contest this exclusion and oppression in their capacity 
as activists, academics, politicians, and individuals directly affected by the criminalisation of 
abortion. They do so through protesting restrictive abortion legislation, campaigning for 
constitutional and legislative change, and tabling legislation. These actors also engage with 
the regional and international human rights systems by submitting information during the UN 
human rights treaty monitoring body periodic reporting period; attending IACHR meetings 
and sessions; meeting with and providing information to Commissioners and Rapporteurs 
during country visits; and filing complaints, petitions, and cases. This engagement represents 
one of the integral ways in which the various levels of the multilevel citizenship project 
overlap and are interlinked. So too does the work of transnational feminist activists and 
organisations. 
 
The transnational level 
 
Transnational feminism is defined as ‘the fluid coalescence of organisations, networks, 
coalitions, campaigns, analysis, advocacy and actions that politicise women’s rights and 
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gender equality issues beyond the nation-state.’24 The concept of transnational feminism was 
first articulated by BIPOC scholar-activists to decentre ‘universalizing white, Western 
feminism.’25 It emphasises the need to build feminist solidarity across and in response to 
unequal relations of power, and the need to draw upon local knowledge and experience to 
respond to context-specific manifestations of oppression such as racism, sexism, 
neoliberalism, and neo-colonialism.26 Transnational feminist actors consist of informal 
connections among individuals and groups across borders, as well as more formalised 
organisations such as Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era (DAWN) and 
the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF). Transnational feminists engage with 
the international and regional human rights systems through participating in UN conferences 
and their follow-up processes; submitting information during review sessions and country 
visits; filing cases, petitions, and complaints; networking within and across borders around 
specific issues such as SRHRs; and ‘networking and movement building’ with other global 
social justice movements.27 As parts 1 and 2 of this chapter will demonstrate, transnational 
feminist activism to contest women’s exclusion from and oppression by citizenship and to 
realise ‘full and expansive citizenship’ has a long history and has been central to the 
establishment of a global women’s human rights agenda, including SRHRs.28 Despite its 
considerable achievements, the transnational level of the multilevel feminist citizenship 
project – like the other levels of the multilevel feminist citizenship project – presents not just 
opportunities but also challenges for the realisation of women’s full citizenship. The 
opportunities and challenges that characterise each of the interlinked levels of the multilevel 
feminist citizenship project are considered below. 
 
The multilevel feminist citizenship project: opportunities and challenges 
 
The international and regional human rights systems have provided an important forum for 
feminists to attain redress and to advance alternative understandings of citizenship and rights. 
 
24 R Baksh, W Harcourt, ‘Introduction’ in R Baksh, W Harcourt (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Transnational 
Feminist Movements, 4 
25 M Desai, ‘Critical Cartography, Theories, and Praxis of Transnational Feminism’ in R Baksh, W Harcourt 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Transnational Feminist Movements, 117 
26 ibid, 120-1. See also L Carty, CT Mohanty, ‘Mapping Transnational Feminist Engagements: Neoliberalism 
and the Politics of Solidarity’ in in R Baksh, W Harcourt (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Transnational 
Feminist Movements, 82-115 
27 R Baksh, W Harcourt ‘Introduction’, 4 
28 VM Moghadam ‘Transnational Feminist Activism and Movement Building’ in R Baksh, W Harcourt (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Transnational Feminist Movements, 55 
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As part 2 of this chapter will illustrate, transnational feminist activism around the UN human 
rights system resulted in SRHRs being recognised as important and legitimate within IHRL. 
This in turn influenced the regional human rights system’s approach to abortion and SRHRs, 
particularly the inter-American human rights system. Furthermore, as Chapters 4 and 5 will 
demonstrate, feminists in both El Salvador and Ireland have engaged with the respective 
regional human rights systems as well as the UN human rights system to raise awareness of 
the negative human rights impact of restrictive abortion legislation, to obtain redress for 
women directly impacted by this legislation, and as a means of exerting pressure on national 
governments to reform legislation and so guarantee women’s full human rights and 
citizenship. 
 
However, these human rights systems are not without their limits. There are issues common 
to the international and regional human rights system as a whole such as inadequate funding 
and resources, the part-time nature of the IACHR and IACtHR, an increasing backlog in 
cases, difficulty ensuring implementation and compliance on the part of states, and, 
occasionally, outright opposition from states.29 Moreover, as Chapter 3 will illustrate, each of 
these human rights systems continues to apply liberal legal reasoning which does not always 
acknowledge or meaningfully address the ways in which restrictive abortion legislation 
impedes the realisation of women’s full citizenship. 
 
The domestic level provides the opportunity to realise direct, real-world change through the 
implementation of legislation and policy guaranteeing access to abortion and SRHRs that 
responds to the local context. There are several states where abortion legislation ensures 
straightforward, safe and legal access to abortion, usually through decriminalisation and, in 
the case of South Africa, through an explicitly human rights-based approach. One of the most 
recent examples of a state where abortion has been fully decriminalised following extensive 
 
29 RK Goldman ‘History and Action: the Inter-American Human Rights System and the Role of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights’ (2009) 31 HRQ, 883; D González-Salzberg ‘Complying (Partially) 
with the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ in P Fortes et al (eds), Law and 
Policy in Latin America: Transforming Courts, Institutions, and Rights (London, Palgrave Macmillan 2017) 39-
56; JM Pasqualucci, The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (2nd edn, CUP 
2012) 24-7; NS Rodley, ‘The Role and Impact of Treaty Bodies’, 642; D Shelton, ‘The Rules and the Reality of 
Petitions Procedure in the Inter-American Human Rights System’ (2015) 5 Notre Dame Journal of International 
and Comparative Law, 3-4; D Shelton ‘Performance of Regional Human Rights Courts’ in T Squatrito et al 
(eds), The Performance of International Courts and Tribunals (CUP 2018), 119-20, 128, 141 
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national deliberation is New Zealand.30 New Zealand’s Abortion Legislation Act of 2020 
removed abortion from the 1961 Crimes Act and permits abortion up to 20 weeks without 
restriction as to reasons and after 20 weeks if two healthcare practitioners deem it clinically 
appropriate.31 The Minister for Justice framed the decriminalisation of abortion as part of 
New Zealand’s longstanding commitment to women’s human rights and as a necessary 
corrective to legislation ‘from an age when law-making and decisions were dominated by 
men’s perspectives and an innate distrust of women.’32 By framing abortion in these terms, 
the Minister for Justice recognised the decriminalisation of abortion as part of longstanding 
feminist struggles for women’s human rights and full citizenship; through this framing he 
also recognised restrictive abortion legislation as denying women’s right and agency and as 
an expression of the legal gaze, i.e., the discursive construction of a female subject whose 
reproductive capacity and sexuality must be strictly regulated to ensure the stability of the 
social order.  
 
A similarly feminist, rights-based approach to abortion legislation is also evident in South 
Africa’s abortion legislation, which explicitly frames access to abortion in terms of human 
rights. The preamble to the 1996 Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act refers to ‘the right 
of persons to make decisions concerning reproduction and to security in and control over 
their bodies’ enshrined in the Constitution, situates access to abortion in the wider context of 
‘universal access to reproductive health care services’, emphasises the state’s ‘responsibility 
to provide reproductive health to all, and also to provide safe conditions under which the 
right of choice can be exercised without fear or harm’, and ‘promotes reproductive rights and 
extends freedom of choice by affording every woman the right to choose whether to have an 
early, safe and legal termination of pregnancy according to her individual beliefs.’33 By 
framing access to abortion in this manner, South African abortion legislation centres 
women’s right to exercise agency around their reproduction and so recognises them as 
citizens with the ability and the right to make such decisions. 
 
 
30 BBC News, ‘New Zealand passes law decriminalising abortion’ BBC News (London, 18 March 2020) 
<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51955148> accessed 5 February 2021 
31 Abortion Legislation Act 2020 (New Zealand), secs 10, 11 
32 A Little ‘This week we brought New Zealand’s abortion laws into the 21st century’ The Guardian (London, 
19 March 2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2020/mar/20/this-week-we-brought-new-
zealands-abortion-laws-into-the-21st-century> 
33 Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 1996 (South Africa). For a detailed analysis of the wider South 
African context, see R Hodes, Abortion Politics in a State in Transition: Contesting South Africa’s ‘Choice 
Act’’ in S Stettner et al (eds), Transcending Borders: Abortion in the Past and Present 171 
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While New Zealand and South Africa’s abortion legislation represent instances of the 
domestic level recognising and facilitating women’s rights and citizenship, in other contexts 
the domestic level is often the least responsive of the various levels to feminist calls for an 
alternative understanding of citizenship. Part 2 of this chapter and Chapters 4 and 5 of this 
thesis elucidate the ways in which powerful actors in El Salvador and Ireland fail to 
acknowledge or actively work against the unfinished project of realising women’s full 
citizenship. These actors include politicians, policy makers, and judges who evade 
discussions of abortion given its controversial nature. They also include members of the 
Catholic Church hierarchy and evangelical Protestant churches, conservative politicians and 
judges, and conservative lobby groups who work to maintain the patriarchal status quo. Not 
only that, the feminist and women’s movements in El Salvador and Ireland are generally 
voluntary and underfunded, and they are by no means unified or a monolith. As discussed in 
Chapter 5, the radical and transformative aspects of intersectional feminism are often the first 
casualties in building consensus for modest legal reform.  
 
Similar tensions and difficulties are apparent in the transnational feminist movement. This 
diffuse, under/un-funded collective faces opposition from longstanding and newly emerging 
coalitions of conservative actors. Furthermore, its diversity is simultaneously a strength and a 
weakness: power dynamics as well as ‘political, cultural and linguistic diversity, economic 
barriers, physical distance, and local political contexts’ can impede the vital work of building 
solidarity and recognising the commonality of struggles without erasing differences.34 
Nevertheless, the transnational feminist movement has been and continues to be an integral 
space and actor for developing transformative approaches to IHRL such as SRHRs. Its role in 
advancing SRHRs within IHRL is the subject of part 2 of this chapter, and the ways in which 
it has supported feminist activism in El Salvador and Ireland in their efforts to realise 
abortion access will be considered in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. 
 
Despite the considerable challenges facing the transnational feminist movement, feminist 
contestation of women’s historical exclusion from and oppression by the citizenship and 
IHRL discourses is an ongoing and necessary process that is but one element of the wider 
feminist aim of liberation for all historically oppressed groups.35 In applying the theoretical 
 
34 M Desai, ‘Critical Cartography, Theories, and Praxis of Transnational Feminisms’ in R Baksh, W Harcourt 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Transnational Feminist Movements, 124 
35 R Voet cited in R Lister ‘Sexual Citizenship’, 197 
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framework of a multilevel feminist citizenship project, the dynamics informing the growing 
legitimacy of SRHRs within IHRL, and the steps that must be taken to ensure their full and 




For the purposes of this research project, citizenship is conceptualised as a contested process 
around the idea of who has the right to have rights, and to determine the scope of those rights. 
This process takes place at the interlinked national, regional, international, and transnational 
levels. Citizenship is contested and dialectical in nature: it is equally capable of excluding 
and oppressing or including and liberating. Historically it has operated to exclude and 
oppress women, with their bodies, sexuality and reproduction being acute sites of this 
exclusion and control. Despite the risks of engaging with a dialectical concept such as 
citizenship, feminists have recognised the concept’s potential to advance their goal of a just 
social, economic, political, legal order. This potential is evident in feminists’ domestic, 
regional, international and transnational mobilisation around women’s political and economic 
rights and – particularly since the 1970s – SRHRs. Utilising the concept of multilevel 
citizenship processes enables us to fully understand this process and advance it further. 
 
In keeping with the intersectional feminist methodology articulated in Chapter 1, in particular 
the need to challenge assumptions of neutrality and to complicate traditional accounts of 
phenomena by (a) charting their historical evolution and (b) centring them around the lived 
experience of marginalised groups, the following section discusses the long history of 
exclusion that has characterised traditional understandings of citizenship, and how it 
influenced and eventually converged with the criminalisation of abortion. In undertaking this 
historical analysis, this section demonstrates the utility of employing a multilevel feminist 
citizenship process as the theoretical framework. This framework makes visible the ways in 
which contemporary feminist activism around SRHRs and specifically access to abortion is 
the continuation of a much older feminist project to realise women’s full citizenship, and 






2.1.2. Women’s historical exclusion from citizenship  
 
Focusing on El Salvador and Ireland, this section discusses the origins of the concept of 
citizenship in Graeco-Roman Antiquity, its evolution and “exportation” worldwide through 
colonisation during the early-modern period, the consolidation of the public-private divide as 
its conceptual foundation in the Enlightenment/Revolutionary period, and its modern 
expression in relation to citizen, nation and national identity from the 19th to the 21st century. 
Women’s exclusion from citizenship on the basis of their reproduction and sexuality, and the 
need to control their reproduction and sexuality to ensure the survival of the patriarchal social 
order, remains constant throughout, and is exemplified by the criminalisation of abortion. 
Women’s resistance to these restrictions and to the denial of their full citizenship, and 
feminist articulations of an alternative understanding of citizenship, are also highlighted. 
 
Early citizenship discourses 
 
The Western liberal legal concept of citizenship originates in the exclusionary, misogynistic 
Graeco-Roman understanding of citizenship. Only free, property-owning, legitimate sons of 
citizens could become citizens.36 Women could not be citizens because they purported to be 
inherently less intelligent, moral, and rational than men; moreover, social stability required 
men to exercise control over women’s sexuality.37 Furthermore, children were considered the 
property of the paterfamilias, the male citizen head of the household.38 Therefore, legal 
restrictions on abortion that were introduced during the imperial age of the Roman Empire 
were concerned with the fact that abortion denied a man’s right to his property or, had it been 
a son, a potential future heir and citizen.39 The criminalisation of abortion should therefore be 
understood as rooted in the belief that women are never capable of becoming citizens, and 
that their obligation to reproduce potential future citizens must be enforced. 
 
 
36 R Bellamy, Citizenship, 32; JGA Pocock, ‘The Ideal of Citizenship since Classical Times’ (1992) Queen’s 
Quarterly, 39-40 
37 N Tuana, The Less Noble Sex: Scientific, Religious, and Philosophical Conceptions of Woman’s Nature 
(Bloomington IN, Indiana University Press 1993) 79, 80 
38 A Clark, Desire: A History of European Sexuality (Abingdon, Routledge 2008) 27 
39 M Calloni ‘Debates and Controversies on Abortion in Italy’ in D McBride Stetson (ed), Abortion Politics, 
Women’s Movements and the Democratic State (OUP 2001) 181; JM Riddle, Eve’s Herbs: A History of 
Contraception and Abortion in the West (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press 1997) 95 
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The Graeco-Roman understanding of citizenship persisted and found new expression in 
medieval and early-modern religious, legal and scientific discourses.40 These justifications 
influenced the developing canon, civil and common law traditions. In regard to abortion, the 
Graeco-Roman belief in men’s entitlement to heirs and property, and in society’s need for 
future citizens, persisted: the Roman legal penalties against abortion for depriving the father 
of his property were adopted by Christian canon law.41 This body of law also provided a new 
justification for criminalising abortion with the concept of ensoulment (the moment at which 
the soul has entered the foetus).42 The idea that quickening, the first detected movements by 
the foetus, indicated that ensoulment had occurred found favour in Christian canon law, and 
from there passed into developing common and civil law.43 This is of significance for the 




Through colonisation, the misogynistic Western legal tradition – including restrictive 
abortion legislation grounded in the belief that women were incapable of full citizenship and 
in need of control – was introduced to El Salvador and Ireland. In the civil law tradition of 
the Central American colonies, abortion was considered a capital offence by New Spain’s 
criminal and canon law.44 In medieval English common law, which applied to Ireland, the 
general consensus was that abortion after quickening was murder and should be tried as 
such.45  
 
Along with restrictive abortion legislation, colonisation introduced the idea that certain 
groups of women required greater surveillance due to their race/ethnicity and class. This was 
because successful colonisation depended upon the supposed “civilisation” of indigenous 
peoples: Spanish/English women were conceptualised as bearers of the civilising colonial 
culture, while indigenous women were conceptualised as an inherent threat to this process 
 
40 E Berriot-Salvadore, ‘The Discourse of Medicine and Science’ in N Zemon Davis, A Farge (eds), A History 
of Women in the West Volume III: Renaissance and Enlightenment Paradoxes (A Goldhammer tr, London, 
Belknap Press, 1995) 348-388; I Maclean, The Renaissance Notion of Woman: A Study in the Fortunes of 
Scholasticism and Medical Science in European Intellectual Life (CUP 1995) 76 
41 A Sanger, Beyond Choice: Reproductive Freedom in the 21st Century (New York, PublicAffairs 2004) 21 
42 ibid 
43 J Keown, Abortion, Doctors and the Law: Some Aspects of the Legal Regulation of Abortion in England from 
1803-1982 (CUP 1988) 3-4 
44 NE Jaffery, ‘Reconceiving Motherhood: Infanticide and Abortion in Colonial Mexico’ (2012) 37 Journal of 
Family History, 5 
45 J Keown, Abortion, Doctors and the Law, 3-5; JM Riddle, Eve’s Herbs, 95-7 
 56 
due to their unruly sexuality.46 Moreover, ideas about appropriate sexual conduct and social 
propriety that were promoted by the colonial elites were internalised and adapted by the local 
populations.47 These mores included the importance of respectability to maintaining social 
order; the centrality of controlling women’s reproduction and sexuality to maintaining 
individual, family and societal respectability and stability; and conservative Catholicism, 
which became influential in El Salvador and central to national identity in Ireland. Chapters 4 
and 5 will highlight the recurrent themes of the interaction of restrictive abortion legislation, 
disproportionate surveillance of women deemed potentially disruptive to the social order, and 
conservative sexual mores centred on women’s behaviour in the contemporary 
implementation of restrictive abortion legislation in both countries. These understandings of 
respectability and conservative Catholic morals also interacted with Enlightenment discourse 
on the citizen to create the interrelated discourses of women as non-citizens, women as 
bearers of honour, women as bearers of nation, and women as bearers of future citizens. This 
influenced the creation and implementation of highly restrictive abortion legislation in 
postcolonial El Salvador and Ireland. 
 
Enlightenment, Revolution, Independence 
 
Enlightenment and Revolutionary philosophers perpetuated the longstanding consensus that 
women were incapable of full citizenship, and that women and their reproductive ability 
needed to be controlled in order to maintain social stability.48 Women were non-citizens, 
bearers of honour, bearers of nation, and bearers of future citizens. Their reproduction and 
sexuality needed to be controlled to ensure the stability of the social order, and their 
reproduction and sexuality were the basis for their exclusion from full citizenship. These 
ideas persisted and took new forms in the independent nation-states of El Salvador and 
Ireland, directly influencing the criminalisation of abortion in both countries. 
 
46 M O’Dowd, A History of Women in Ireland, 1500-1800 (London, Routledge 2005) 250; J Ohlmeyer 
‘Conquest, Civilization, Colonization: Ireland, 1540-1660’  in R Bourke, I McBride (eds), The Princeton 
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Latin America, 53, 56 
47 V Crossman, Poverty and the Poor Law in Ireland, 1850-1914 (Liverpool University Press 2013) 22, 26; NE 
Jaffery, ‘Reconceiving Motherhood’ 16; M O’Dowd, A History of Women in Ireland, 14-16; J Ohlmeyer 
‘Conquest, Civilization, Colonization’ 23, 27; MG Valiulis ‘Power, Gender, and Identity in the Irish Free State’, 
128 
48 C Pateman, ‘Equality, Difference, Subordination’, 14-16; R Perry, ‘Colonizing the Breast: Sexuality and 
Maternity in Eighteenth-Century England’ in JC Fout (ed), Forbidden History: The State, Society, and the 
Regulation of Sexuality in Modern Europe (University of Chicago Press 1992) 108; JJ Rousseau (transl B 
Foxley), Émile, or On Education (tr B Foxley, first published 1762, Project Gutenberg) 




El Salvador became an independent republic in 1841 following over 300 years of brutal 
colonisation.49 However, independence represented a continuation of colonisation’s power 
dynamics, with its unequal racial, political, social and economic structures remaining largely 
intact.50 During the 19th century, a centralised and authoritarian state was consolidated, one 
which alternated between oligarchical and military rule until the outbreak of civil war in the 
late 1970s.51 These regimes promoted a discourse of Salvadoran national identity which 
idealised a mythic pre-Colombian past while denigrating contemporary indigenous peoples 
and poor ladinos/mestizos, and which, until recently, erased the existence of Afro-descendant, 
Asian, and Middle Eastern populations.52 Throughout the 19th and 20th century, colonial ideas 
about women’s place in society and the centrality of their honour to familial and societal 
stability remained largely unchallenged. Working class/mestiza/campesina/indigenous 
women and their sexuality were viewed as potentially disruptive to the social order, while 
middle-to-upper-class, white/criollo/Spanish women were the bearers of morality. As a 
result, all women were subjected to regulation and control but in ways that varied depending 
on their place in the racial and class hierarchy: poor and rural women were (and continue to 
be) subjected to greater surveillance, and for Salvadoran women of any geographical 
location, ethnicity or social class, the social norms of honour, deference to male authority, 
and the strict regulation of their sexuality and reproduction were (and often still are) ever-
present.53 Women’s sexuality was the source of their and their families’ honour, 
contraception was taboo since it was believed to make women promiscuous, and women 
were ‘morally and religiously obligated’ to remain faithful to their compañero (partner) for 
life, even if their partner was abusive or abandoned them.54 It is unsurprising that the 
medieval and early-modern criminalisation of abortion and its underlying rationale was 
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maintained in 19th-century Spanish America, including El Salvador. 55 The criminalisation of 
abortion reflected the ongoing belief in women’s role as non-citizens who were obligated to 
maintain familial and societal honour, and to produce future citizens.  
 
Such thinking continued into the 20th century: under the 1956 Penal Code, abortion was 
illegal except where there was a risk to the pregnant woman’s life.56 In response to 
widespread clandestine abortion and its contribution to high rates of maternal mortality, 
abortion laws were liberalised under the 1973 Penal Code: abortion was legal when it was the 
only means of saving the life of the mother, in the case of rape, and in the case of foreseeable 
serious foetal deformity.57 Reduced penalties were imposed if a ‘woman of good conduct’ 
had an abortion in order to protect her reputation.58 This final provision is especially telling in 
regard to the rationale underpinning this legislation: abortion was an exceptional matter that 
was only acceptable if it did not disrupt the patriarchal social order and women’s subordinate 
position in it of non-citizen, bearer of legitimate future citizens, and bearers of honour. 
 
The civil war (c. 1979-1992) opened up new spaces for women to challenge their exclusion 
from citizenship.59 This was primarily the case among left-wing actors such as political 
parties and guerrilla groups such as the FMLN,60 the student and trade union movements, and 
human rights organisations, but right-wing women were also active as funders for 
conservative organisations and paramilitary groups, and as founders and supporters of the 
right-wing ARENA61 party. The experiences of left-wing women during the civil war led to 
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the establishment of the modern Salvadoran feminist movement. These women’s experiences 
of newfound freedom, education and training, organising and campaigning, and discussing 
their individual and shared experiences led activists and combatants alike ‘to question the 
social and sexual role assigned to Salvadoran women.’62 Many women became aware of the 
fact that their romantic partners, fellow trade union, party, or NGO members, and fellow 
guerrilleros were committed to class warfare, but not gender equality.63 In response, existing 
women’s organisations became more feminist in outlook and new, explicitly feminist groups 
were formed. 64 
 
It is common in post-revolutionary or post-conflict societies for the new regime to re-
establish order by enacting measures against women, such as by curtailing or forbidding 
participation in politics or the labour force, or by restricting reproductive autonomy through 
the criminalisation of abortion.65 This was evident in the immediate aftermath of the 
Salvadoran civil war. Following ARENA’s 1994 election win, major obstacles to the 
advancement of women’s full citizenship were implemented, including the complete 
criminalisation of abortion.66 That year, the Minister for Justice proposed maintaining the 
1973 legislation on abortion with some minor changes in the form of time limits.67 In 1995, 
the FMLN presented a bill to permit abortion in the case of rape, risk to the pregnant 
woman’s life, or in the case of serious foetal abnormalities.68 Seeing these proposals for 
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discussion and reform as a threat to ‘traditional values’ and the social order based upon them, 
the Catholic Church and anti-choice groups aligned with it mounted a campaign proposing 
that abortion be completely banned.69 Given support for this proposal within the conservative 
ARENA government, the legitimacy of the Catholic Church as a political actor in El Salvador 
because of its important role as a peace broker during and after the civil war, and the 
reluctance of feminist organisations to adopt a clear stance on such a controversial issue, a 
new provision was approved in 1997.70 Entering into force in 1998, it criminalised abortion 
without exception.71 A person who performs an abortion with the woman's consent, or a 
woman who self-induces or consents to someone else inducing her abortion, can be 
imprisoned for two to eight years. A person who performs an abortion to which the woman 
has not consented can be sentenced to between four and ten years’ imprisonment; if the 
person is a healthcare worker, they can be sentenced to between six and twelve years in 
prison.72 In order to ensure that these new provisions were not unconstitutional, the 
Constitution was reformed and the ‘unborn’ obtained a special constitutional status: the 
Salvadoran constitution defines life as beginning at the moment of conception.73  
 
Not only is abortion completely criminalised in El Salvador, those suspected of having had 
the procedure are actively prosecuted.74 In many instances, women have had the charge of 
abortion changed to that of aggravated homicide – the murder of a close family member – 
which carries a penalty of up to 40 years in prison.75 The women who have been prosecuted 
and imprisoned for abortion and aggravated homicide are mostly poor, rural, and 
indigenous/mestiza, representing a continuation of their disproportionate surveillance since 
colonial times.76 The concept of aggravated homicide also represents the continuity of 
colonial-era attitudes and legislation: colonial Spanish legislation classed abortion and 
infanticide as parricide, the murder of any persons related by consanguinity.77 This legislation 
in turn had been informed by civil and canon law that considered abortion a crime because it 
 
69 ibid 
70 CRR, Persecuted, 17; K Kampwirth, Feminism and the Legacy of Revolution, 95 
71 Agrupación Ciudadana, Del hospital a la cárcel, 47 
72 Asamblea Legislativa de El Salvador, Código Penal, Decreto No. 1030, Diario Oficial No. 105, Tomo 335 (10 
junio 1997), arts 133-137 
73 Constitución de la República de El Salvador, Decreto No. 38, Diario Oficial No. 234, Tomo 281 (16 
diciembre 1983, reformada por Decreto Legislativo No. 36, Diairio Oficial No. 102, Tomo 383, 4 junio 2009), 
art 1 
74 Agrupación ciudadana, Del hospital a la cárcel, 8, 10; Amnesty, On the Brink of Death, 36, 38 
75 ibid 
76 Agrupación Ciudadana, Del hospital a la cárcel, 16-26; CRR, Persecuted, 46-51; MT Ochoa, S García, ¿Por 
qué me pasó esto a mí?, 7-8, 41 
77 NE Jaffery, ‘Reconceiving Motherhood’ 5 
 61 
deprived a man of a potential heir and deprived the nation of a potential future citizen. In 
modern-day El Salvador, then, the complete criminalisation of abortion represents the denial 
of women’s citizenship and the control of their sexuality and reproduction in the service of 
the stability and continuity of a patriarchal social order. Restrictions on their sexual 
behaviour and their ability to access contraception or abortion were and continue to be based 
on the idea that they were incapable of full citizenship because their role in society is to 
reproduce future citizens and maintain the family’s/nation’s honour. The ways in which this 
exclusion resulted in the denial of women’s right to have rights and to determine the scope of 
those rights, and the ways in which feminists contested this exclusion at the domestic, 
regional, and international levels of the human rights system, is the subject of Chapter 4 of 




Although independence came to Ireland in 1922, almost eighty years after El Salvador, a 
similar unwillingness among independence leaders to challenge the gender order was evident. 
In fact, efforts were redoubled to exclude women from full citizenship. The construct of 
national identity to which the new leaders of the Irish Free State subscribed was informed by 
an ideal of the Irish citizen and nation as morally distinct from and superior to that of the 
United Kingdom. This distinction and superiority was best realised through ensuring that 
conservative Catholicism, familism, and traditionalism – and their keen focus on women’s 
respectability – permeated every aspect of law and society.78 In this context, Irish women’s 
role in the new nation was not to be a citizen, but rather the reproducer of citizens: a mother 
whose individual virtue represented the nation’s virtue.79 Therefore, women’s participation in 
the public sphere was constructed as harmful to the nation as a whole: this resulted in 
constitutional provisions and legislation limiting women’s rights to participate in political life 
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or work outside the home.80 It also resulted in the passage of legislation designed to control 
women’s reproduction and sexuality, in line with Catholic teaching and the conservative 
postcolonial gender order. The 1930 papal encyclical Casti Connubii condemned abortion, 
contraception and the dissemination of information about them and so the Criminal Law 
(Amendment) Act of 1935 prohibited the sale, importation and advertisement of 
contraceptives.81 Information on contraception and abortion was prohibited through the 
Censorship of Publications Acts of 1929 and 1946.82 These restrictions on women’s political, 
economic, and reproductive freedom were also expressed through the formalisation, 
consolidation and expansion of Ireland’s ‘architecture of containment’:83 the Magdalene 
laundries, mother and baby homes, reform schools, and industrial schools in which thousands 
of women and girls were incarcerated for transgressing social mores and sexual propriety.84 
Women and girls’ incarceration in these institutions ‘was operating smoothly by 1933’ and 
continued until 1996.85 As in El Salvador, the extent to which and the ways in which this 
legislative context impacted upon women depended on their position in the race/class/gender 
hierarchy. Women and girls whose behaviour and sexuality was deemed in greater need of 
surveillance – the poor, the working-class, the disabled, women and girls of colour or who 
had a mixed-race child, and Travellers – were more likely to be incarcerated in these 
institutions or resort to unsafe methods of contraception and abortion.86 
 
As for abortion, the colonial-era 1861 Offences Against the Person Act was maintained since 
it was in keeping with the newly-independent Irish state’s attitude to reproduction and 
sexuality. Under Sections 58 and 59 of the 1861 Act, the punishment for women who had an 
abortion or those who assisted them was life imprisonment, while the supply of abortifacients 
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(substances used to induce abortion) was punishable by three years in prison.87 The 1861 Act 
had been influenced by the 1803 Ellenborough Act, which framed female sexuality as a threat 
to public health and morality and which categorised early-term abortions (‘before 
quickening’) as a felony and later abortions (‘after quickening’) as murder.88 The 
Ellenborough Act represented the continuity of the criminalisation of abortion in Classical, 
medieval and early-modern times and its underlying rationale, namely the denial of women’s 
full citizenship, and the need to regulate women’s sexuality to ensure the continuity of the 
patriarchal social order. The influence of the Ellenborough Act on Sections 58 and 59 of the 
1861 Act represents further continuity of this discourse. These two provisions were in force 
in Ireland until 2013. Therefore, as in El Salvador, a direct line can be traced between 
contemporary Irish abortion legislation and the control of women’s sexuality and 
reproduction to exclude them from citizenship and ensure the continuity of a patriarchal 
social order. The introduction of the 8th Amendment to the Constitution in 1983, the other 
main basis of Ireland’s abortion legislation until 2018, was informed by similar exclusionary, 
misogynistic thinking around women, citizenship and nation. 
 
During the late 1970s and early 1980s, anti-choice activists in Ireland mobilised in response 
to the perceived threat that feminism and liberal foreign influences posed to traditional, Irish, 
Catholic values and the patriarchal gender order they supported.89 In 1980, the Pro-Life 
Amendment Campaign (PLAC) was established. Consisting of right-wing, conservative, 
Catholic individuals and organisations such as the Society for the Protection of Unborn 
Children (SPUC) and Opus Dei, PLAC argued that failing to recognise and protect the right 
to life of the unborn in the Irish Constitution in the face of ‘secular inroads from abroad’90 
threatened the survival of the Irish, Catholic nation.91 In 1983, a referendum to introduce an 
amendment to the Irish Constitution protecting the right to life of the unborn carried 66% to 
33%, with an electoral turnout of 50%.92 It became Article 40.3.3˚ of the Irish Constitution. 
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Also known as the 8th Amendment, it was one of the fundamental constitutional rights and 
read: 
 
The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the 
equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as 
practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right.93 
 
As in El Salvador then, the criminalisation of abortion and the constitutional protection of 
unborn life created a legislative context in which abortion was framed as threatening to the 
survival of the patriarchal social order. Women were denied the status of full citizen on the 
basis of their reproductive function through the criminalisation of abortion. The ways in 
which this impacted on women in Ireland, and the ways in which they effectively utilised the 
language and mechanisms of human rights at the domestic, regional and international levels 
of the legal system to contest this exclusion, is the subject of Chapter 5 of this thesis. This 
section will now turn to the ways in which women and feminists have challenged this 
exclusion from citizenship since at least the medieval period, illustrating the contested and 
dynamic nature of the discourse of citizenship, and illustrating the long history of feminist 
engagement with it. 
 
Feminist responses to women’s exclusion from citizenship 
 
While women were excluded from citizenship from its inception, this exclusion was not met 
with acquiescence. There is evidence of alternative proto-feminist and feminist 
understandings of citizenship from at least the medieval period, such as Cristine de Pizan’s 
Le Livre de la Cité des Dames (The Book of the City of Ladies).94 In the early-modern and 
Enlightenment period, proto-feminist thinking was evident in Latin America and Europe, 
with women advocating for marriage law reform, access to education, and the right to 
participate in public life.95 During the Revolutionary period, in response to philosophers’ and 
political actors’ ongoing exclusion of women from full citizenship and the public sphere, 
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feminists articulated alternative visions for a post-Revolutionary social order in which 
women could realise citizenship and membership of the public, political sphere.96  
 
This early feminist writing and campaigning laid the foundations for modern feminist 
activism in the 19th and early 20th century.97 The ways in which the early feminist movement 
did so in El Salvador and Ireland will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. These 
feminist campaigns for women’s inclusion in the citizenship project took place not only at the 
domestic level, but also transnationally. Through their involvement in the anti-slavery, 
women’s suffrage, and labour rights movements of the mid-19th to early 20th century, 
feminists from all over the world met at international conferences and formed international 
associations.98 These events and organisations served as useful sites for women to articulate 
alternative understandings of citizenship and contest the ‘social, legal, and economic 
injustice’ to which women were subjected.99 The International Woman Suffrage Alliance, the 
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom, and other transnational feminist 
organisations campaigned for this understanding of citizenship to be brought to bear on the 
emerging practice of international law. 
 
At the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, during which the decision was taken to form the League 
of Nations, feminists made use of the language of rights and citizenship to campaign for their 
needs, interests, and full citizenship to be recognised in the Covenant of the League of 
Nations.100 From the emergence of the modern international law system, then, feminists used 
the language and mechanisms of human rights to advocate for women’s full citizenship, and 
to contest the construction of rights and mechanisms that did not fully represent or respond to 
their needs. The right to regulate their own sexuality and reproduction proved to be one of the 
most controversial of these demands from the beginning. 
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The need for women to be able to control their own reproduction and sexuality was 
recognised as integral to the realisation of their full citizenship by at least some feminists as 
early as the 19th century.101 Due to the taboo nature of reproduction and sexuality – especially 
women’s – it was only in the 1920s that an early form of reproductive rights, the idea of 
“voluntary motherhood”, became a subject for more widespread public discussion. 
Worldwide, feminists campaigned for access to contraception and abortion, arguing that the 
ability to regulate their fertility was as necessary to their full citizenship as the right to vote or 
the right to work.102 During the interwar and post-war periods, there were numerous 
international conferences on birth control, sexuality, and voluntary motherhood. Ranging 
from racist, ableist eugenicists to advocates for women and LGBT rights, the disparate and 
often problematic strands of the birth control/family planning/voluntary motherhood 
movements coalesced into the International Planned Parenthood Foundation (IPPF), which 
was founded in 1952.103 Birth control advocates recognised that access to contraception and 
abortion were necessary to guarantee reproductive health and bodily autonomy, which in turn 
would ensure ‘women’s full exercise of citizenship [emphasis added].’104 The foundation of 
the UN in 1945, the OAS in 1948, and the CoE in 1949 created a new arena in which women 
could put forward this understanding of citizenship. The ways in which they did so are the 




Part 1 of this chapter discussed how citizenship is understood for the purposes of this project: 
as a contested, dynamic process in which actors claim their right to have rights and determine 
the scope of those rights. The ways in which the Western liberal concept of citizenship 
excluded and oppressed women by constructing them as non-citizens, bearers of future 
citizens, and bearers of the nation’s honour, and the ways in which this influenced legislation 
controlling their reproduction and sexuality such as the criminalisation of abortion, were 
illustrated with reference to El Salvador and Ireland. The potential for citizenship to be re-
imagined as an inclusive, emancipatory process for women, feminist awareness of this 
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potential, and feminist awareness of the need for women to have reproductive autonomy in 
order to realise their full citizenship, was also discussed. 
 
Part 2 of this chapter will consider feminists’ continued contestation of women’s exclusion 
from citizenship in IHRL, a process which is epitomised by the development of the concept 
of SRHRs from the 1970s to the present. Applying the theoretical framework of a multilevel 
feminist citizenship project to the development of SRHRs makes visible its connections to the 
earlier struggles for full citizenship considered in part 1, and the ongoing work of feminists at 
the international, regional, and national level to ensure that IHRL represents women’s right to 
have rights, and their right to determine the scope of those rights. 
 




This part concerns the origins, evolution, and growing legitimacy of SRHRs in IHRL, 
demonstrating that this process can be understood as a multilevel feminist citizenship project 
because it exemplifies feminists reshaping the language, scope and mechanisms of human 
rights so that they represent and respond to women’s lived realities. 
 
The first section considers the ways in which women had to contest their exclusion from the 
new post-war international organisations and the idea of human rights being formulated by 
them, and how this resulted in issues such as “voluntary motherhood” being sidelined. The 
second section discusses how the process of feminists contesting women’s exclusion from 
citizenship and rights intensified during the UN Decade for Women (1975-1985), and 
culminated in an important paradigm shift in UN development and human rights work in the 
1990s which facilitated the development and legitimisation of SRHRs. The third section 
describes SRHRs’ increasing legitimacy within IHRL since the 2000s, as evidenced by the 
UN’s increasingly clear commitment to them. 
 
2.2.1. The early years of the UN, 1945-1968 
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The creation of the post-war international human rights system represented a new site in 
which women were excluded from citizenship, but also a new site in which women could 
contest this exclusion.  
 
Women’s exclusion from IHRL – their exclusion from the right to have rights and to 
determine the scope of those rights – took several interlinked forms. Firstly, the subject of 
human rights was conceptualised as ‘white, Anglo-Western/European, Judeo-Christian, 
educated, propertied, heterosexual, able-bodied’ and above all ‘male.’105 This meant that 
these identities and experiences served as the normative standard for legal subjects, resulting 
in all other categories being marked as “other” – either in need of “special protection” due to 
their inferiority, or in need of greater surveillance and control due to their deviance.106 
Secondly, the public/private dichotomy resulted in rights being divided into the binary of 
civil/political versus economic/social, with civil and political rights being afforded higher 
priority.107 It also resulted in distinctions being made between issues deemed the exclusive or 
main focus of national (domestic) law and those deemed worthy of international legal 
attention – more often than not, those deemed to be at the discretion of domestic state 
governments had a disproportionate impact on women’s ability to exercise full citizenship, 
such as health or economic policy.108 Thirdly, rights were defined in ways which did not 
represent or respond to the lived realities of women and other historically oppressed groups: 
specific concerns such as rights within marriage or reproductive rights that were barriers to 
full citizenship were either framed in ways which were unhelpful to protecting and advancing 
women’s rights, or were not recognised as rights concerns at all.109 As a result, human rights 
at best could not respond to women’s needs, and at worst actively worked against them. The 
ways in which these three issues persist in modern IHRL will be explored in Chapter 3. 
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While the foundation of the modern human rights system perpetuated women’s exclusion 
from citizenship and rights, it also established a forum in which women could contest this 
exclusion.110 Latin American and South Asian feminists were integral to these efforts. For 
example, CIM lobbied for the creation of a body dedicated to women’s human rights within 
the UN, resulting in the foundation of the UN Commission on the Status of Women (UN 
CSW) in 1946.111 The UN CSW, along with the Third Committee on Social, Humanitarian 
and Cultural Affairs, enabled feminist actors to influence the drafting of the UN Charter and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).112 They campaigned for explicit 
commitments to women’s rights in both documents and as a result they both contain 
references to the equal rights of men and women, and to non-discrimination on the basis of 
sex.113 By ensuring the establishment of the CSW and by influencing the drafting of the UN 
Charter and the UDHR, feminist activists planted a seed for IHRL’s growing responsiveness 
to feminist interpretations of rights and citizenship in subsequent decades.114 Between a 
change in institutional culture at the UN in the late 1960s and early 1970s on the one hand 
and the emergence of “second-wave feminism” in the same period on the other, these 
feminist gains were built upon and expanded into the revolutionary idea of SRHRs. 
 
2.2.2. The emergence of reproductive rights at the UN, 1968-1985 
 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, development and human rights received more focus in the 
UN as a result of newly independent Third World countries joining the organisation.115 This 
is significant for SRHRs because they have their origins within and in response to both the 
UN’s development and human rights work. The UN’s initial approach to human rights was 
largely exclusionary of historically oppressed groups, and so too was its development work, 
which was seen as a purely economic issue of secondary importance to the UN’s political 
work of maintaining peace and security.116 UN development work was also informed by the 
population control approach, which holds that family planning should be promoted and 
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practiced in order to prevent overpopulation and political instability in the Third World.117 
The need to maintain an international social order of First World dominance and Third World 
subordination through the control of Black/Indigenous/racialised women’s bodies and 
sexuality permeates this approach to development, and represents the continuation of 
colonialist, imperialist thinking about the inherently disruptive and unruly nature of the 
subaltern. As with human rights, then, the UN approach to development did not reflect or 
respond to women’s needs and women’s agency; instead it actively worked against them. It 
was largely in response to the inability of the international politico-legal system to 
acknowledge women’s needs and realities, and the violations of women’s autonomy, dignity 
and personhood arising from this, that the concept of reproductive rights, which eventually 
became SRHRs, was formulated. 
 
In 1968, the first UN International Conference on Human Rights was held in Tehran to mark 
the 20th anniversary of the UDHR’s adoption and to set the agenda for the UN’s future human 
rights work. Recognising the opportunity to bring women’s specific needs and realities into 
the discourse of human rights, UN CSW delegates and the International Planned Parenthood 
Federation (IPPF) lobbied to have access to birth control recognised as a human rights 
issue.118 As a result, the Final Declaration included  ‘the basic human right’ of parents ‘to 
decide freely and responsibly on the number and spacing of their children, and a right to 
adequate education and information in that respect.’119 This served as the starting point for 
the development of SRHRs in subsequent decades, and represented feminist engagement with 
IHRL to ensure it responded to women’s needs and realities. 
 
In 1975, the Declaration of Mexico expanded upon the Proclamation of Tehran’s definition 
of a right to family planning, referring to the right of individuals and not just couples to 
decide ‘whether or not to have children as well as to determine their number and spacing.’120 
The 1975 Declaration of Mexico is important for these developments, and also because of the 
context in which it was proclaimed. The 1975 Mexico City Conference was the first of four 
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UN World Conferences on Women and marked the beginning of the UN Decade for Women, 
an initiative for which the UN CSW had lobbied.121 The Mexico City Conference served as ‘a 
massive global consciousness-raising movement’ for the modern transnational feminist 
movement.122 The World Plan of Action (WPA) adopted at this conference called for wide-
ranging social, economic and political change to advance women’s human rights, and called 
for the drafting and adoption of a convention on the elimination of discrimination against 
women.123 Their activism resulted in the drafting, adoption, and entry into force of 
CEDAW.124 The development of reproductive rights, the UN Decade for Women, and 
CEDAW represent necessary correctives to women’s initial exclusion from the multilevel 
citizenship project of IHRL. Antrobus states that the UN Decade for Women ‘must be seen in 
the context of international debates around issues of citizenship.’125 Therefore, transnational 
feminist activism around SRHRs at the UN should be understood as an integral part of the 
multilevel feminist citizenship project, one which seeks not simply to correct women’s 
exclusion from citizenship but to transform its very nature. This process intensified in the 
1980s and 1990s. 
 
The momentum afforded the transnational feminist movement by the UN Decade for Women 
meant that feminist criticisms of the population control approach to development began to 
have an impact in the 1980s.126 Feminists drew attention to the ways in which women in the 
Global South were being treated as ‘targets’ and ‘users’ of coercive family planning 
programmes, characterised by the use of forced sterilisation and unsafe contraceptive devices, 
which were focused on driving down birth rates to ensure continued provision of foreign aid 
and development loans.127 In response to these issues, the growth of conservatism and 
neoliberalism in the 1980s, and the AIDs pandemic, the concept of reproductive 
rights/reproductive freedom was developed. Reproductive rights/freedom is defined as the 
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right of ‘all women, regardless of class, race, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or physical 
ability…to have, or not to have, children with dignity and with all the necessary material 
conditions to make raising children a sustainable life choice.’128 Black American and Global 
South feminists played a vital role in articulating this concept and in advocating for the 
transformative approach to political, legal, and economic structures necessary for its full 
realisation.129 During the UN human rights conferences of the 1990s, they brought this 
understanding of reproductive rights/freedom to bear on the language and mechanisms of 
human rights. As a direct result of their efforts, the concept of SRHRs was developed within 
IHRL in subsequent decades. 
 
2.2.3. From reproductive rights to sexual and reproductive health and rights: 1990s to 
present 
  
The work of transnational feminist coalitions before and during the UN conferences in the 
1980s and 1990s was instrumental in ensuring that women’s rights, including SRHRs, were 
given particular attention at the 1993 Vienna World Conference on Human Rights, the 1994 
International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), and the 1995 Fourth 
World Conference on Women in Beijing.130 The final documents of these three conferences 
are testament to the ability of transnational feminist activists to reshape the language and 
mechanisms of human rights to represent and respond to women’s realities and so advance 
their full citizenship. The final documents also provided an impetus to the UN human rights 
system to incorporate and develop SRHRs in their jurisprudence, as evidenced by the 
increasing willingness of these bodies to engage with the concept since the 2000s. Therefore, 
as a direct result of feminist activism around human rights, SRHRs have become a recognised 
and legitimate family of rights within IHRL. 
 
As a direct result of transnational feminist activism at the conference and parallel NGO 
forum, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (VDPA) reflected their slogan, 
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‘women’s rights are human rights.’ 131 In regard to reproductive rights, the VDPA expanded 
on the 1968 Proclamation of Tehran and the 1975 Declaration of Mexico by framing access 
to ‘the widest range of family planning services’ as a woman’s human rights issue, and by 
emphasising its centrality to the full realisation of women’s equality, right to the highest 
attainable standard of health, the right to education, and the right to seek, receive and impart 
information.132 The ability of feminist transnational activists to place women’s issues on the 
human rights agenda, and to reshape human rights to respond to these issues, also informed 
the outcomes of the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) held in 
Cairo the following year. It was at this Conference that the contemporary definition of 
reproductive rights in IHRL was first articulated. 
 
The ICPD’s Programme of Action (ICPD PFA) represented a successful result of ‘years of 
concerted effort by women’s health movements around the world to gain recognition of 
women’s reproductive and sexual self-determination as a basic health need and human 
right.’133 It also adopted an intersectional approach to a certain extent by recognising the 
differential impact of not just gender but also age, race, and socioeconomic background on 
access to reproductive healthcare, and by recognising that a transformative approach to law, 
politics and economics was required to address these issues and so realise reproductive 
rights.134 The ICPD PFA set out the definitions of the concepts of reproductive health, 
reproductive healthcare, and reproductive rights that inform IHRL today.135 Reproductive 
rights are defined as the ‘basic right of all couples and individuals to decide freely and 
responsibly the number, spacing and timing of their children and to have the information and 
means to do so’, as well as ‘the right to attain the highest standard of sexual and reproductive 
health’, and the ‘right to make decisions concerning reproduction free of discrimination, 
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coercion and violence, as expressed in human rights documents.136 The ICPD PFA states that 
‘full attention should be given to the promotion of mutually respectful and equitable gender 
relations’, and it highlights factors impeding the full realisation of reproductive health 
including ‘discriminatory social practices; negative attitudes towards women and girls; and 
the limited power many women and girls have over their sexual and reproductive lives.’137 
These were significant advances, representing the recognition by IHRL of feminists’ 
longstanding claims that the ability to control one’s own reproduction and sexuality is 
integral to the full realisation of one’s citizenship. 
 
The need for safe, legal, straightforward abortion access as part of the realisation of 
reproductive rights was discussed for the first time at this Conference. It resulted in the ICPD 
PFA including references to the negative health and human rights impact of unsafe abortion, 
albeit in heavily qualified terms due to pressure from the Vatican-led conservative 
coalition.138 The cautious, conservative language of the ICPD PFA concerning abortion – as 
well as the absence of any discussion of LGBTQ* rights – was critiqued and developed in 
subsequent years, including at the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women. These 
dynamics illustrate the fact that feminist engagement with the language and mechanisms of 
human rights is a dynamic, contested and ongoing process. 
 
The Beijing PFA restated the ICPD definitions of reproductive rights, reproductive health, 
and reproductive healthcare.139 Concerning abortion specifically, paragraph 8.25 of the ICPD 
PFA was restated, but slightly expanded, with states agreeing to ‘consider reviewing laws 
containing punitive measures against women who have undergone illegal abortions.’140 The 
inclusion of paragraph 96 in the final document, which refers to the human rights of women 
‘to have control over and decide freely and responsibly on matters related to their 
sexuality…free of coercion, discrimination and violence’ paved the way for the development 
of the concept of sexual rights in subsequent years. Feminist achievements at the Vienna, 
Cairo and Beijing Conferences served as an important starting point for further evolution in 
the concept and legitimacy of SRHRs from the late 1990s to the present, often in the face of 
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concerted resistance and opposition.141 Feminist and LGBTQ* activists, as well as responsive 
state governments, continued to make use of the language and mechanisms of human rights 
to advance their transformative understanding of human rights.  
 
In regard to sexual health and rights, understood as LGBTQ* rights, there has been growing 
attention to them within the UN since the 2010s. In 2011 and 2014, the UNHRC adopted 
resolutions affirming the rights of LGBT people and the need to combat violence and 
discrimination against them.142 In 2016 the UNHRC established an independent expert on 
sexual orientation and gender identity, who began their work in June 2017.143 Sexual health 
and rights have thus rightly been recognised by the UN system as integral to IHRL, and are 
receiving increasing attention in their work. 
 
In regard to reproductive health and rights, the UN treaty monitoring bodies have 
demonstrated an increasing confidence and coherence vis-à-vis the legitimacy and scope of 
reproductive health and rights, including abortion access. They have issued Views, 
Concluding Observations and General Recommendations and General Comments during the 
2000s and 2010s that represent an increased confidence in challenging states’ restrictive 
abortion legislation that builds on and asserts the understanding of women’s human rights 
developed at the Vienna, Cairo and Beijing Conferences. In 2005, the HRC found that Peru 
had violated the right to be free from torture and CIDT and the right to privacy by failing to 
provide the applicant with access to abortion despite serious threats to her physical and 
mental health.144 This was the first View concerning abortion decided upon by the treaty 
monitoring body. It was followed in 2011 by LMR v Argentina, where the HRC again found 
the state responsible for violations of LMR’s rights to equality and non-discrimination, to be 
free from torture and CIDT, and to privacy, by failing to ensure access to the abortion she 
was legally entitled to under domestic legislation as an intellectually disabled woman who 
had become pregnant as the result of rape.145  
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In 2011, the CEDAW Committee issued two views emphasising the importance of quality 
obstetric care, including access to abortion, in ensuring that women’s human rights are fully 
respected, protected, and fulfilled.146 In 2016 and 2017, the HRC issued its views in the cases 
of Mellet v Ireland and Whelan v Ireland, both of which held the state responsible for 
violations of the right to be free from torture and CIDT, the right to privacy, and the right to 
equality before the law.147 Although these Views represent an assertion of the UN’s stance 
that abortion must be decriminalised in at least some circumstances, and although they also 
indicate some awareness of the need for an intersectional approach, the reasoning is 
characterised by inconsistencies and limitations as a result of the liberal legal framework. The 
need for an intersectional feminist approach to legal reasoning that adheres to the idea of 
SRHRs articulated by feminists is necessary to guarantee the full realisation of this ambitious 
multilevel feminist citizenship project.148 This will be discussed in further detail in Chapter 3 
of this thesis. Before doing so, it is first necessary to consider the current UN, inter-American 




Since the foundation of modern IHRL, feminists have contested their exclusion from it as 
part of their efforts to realise women’s full citizenship. Their efforts directly led to the UN 
system’s recognition of the legitimacy of SRHRs, and are testament to their ability to 
advance a transformative approach to human rights. Even if this process is unfinished and 
faces considerable opposition, the concept of SRHRs has evolved and grown in legitimacy 
throughout the international and regional human rights systems through feminist and 
LGBTQ* activists reshaping the language and mechanisms of human rights to reflect their 
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2.3. SRHRs at the UN, OAS, and CoE today: an unfinished feminist 
citizenship project 
 
This part recaps the current scope of SRHRs within the UN, and discusses their scope in the 
inter-American and European human rights systems. SRHRs and their intersectional feminist 
core have been most effectively adopted by the UN and the inter-American human rights 
systems, with the European human rights system lagging behind. 
 
2.3.1. SRHRs at the UN 
 
As demonstrated in Part 2 of this chapter, SRHRs evolved from the right to family planning 
into reproductive rights, and from there into SRHRs. This process came about through 
feminist activism within and around the UN to make human rights and development more 
representative of and responsive to women’s lived realities with a view to realising their full 
citizenship. As already discussed, the UN defines SRHRs as the rights and freedoms of 
people of all sexual orientations and gender identities to enjoy safe, satisfying sexual 
relations free of coercion, discrimination, and violence, and to have the freedom to make 
informed decisions about their sexual and reproductive health, including if or when to have 
children.149 The UN human rights system’s current position on abortion is that it should be 
permitted at a minimum in the case of a risk to the pregnant person’s life or health, in the 
case of rape or incest, and in the case of lethal or fatal foetal abnormalities to prevent 
violations of women’s human rights. Certain treaty monitoring bodies or working groups 
have called for complete decriminalisation or have stated that waiting times, medical 
authorisation by multiple professionals, and similar restrictions undermine women’s rights to 
non-discrimination and bodily autonomy/integrity.150 The legitimacy of SRHRs including 
abortion has been more consistently asserted in recent years: for example, CESCR’s 2016 
General Comment No. 22 states that ‘the right to sexual and reproductive health is an integral 
part of the right to health enshrined in article 12’ of the ICESCR.151 Therefore, the approach 
to human rights advocated for by feminist and LGBTQ* activists at UN conferences has in 
large part influenced the UN human rights system. However, as will be highlighted in the 
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next chapter, there are still some limitations in the reasoning employed by treaty monitoring 
bodies in relation to SRHRs, particularly abortion. 
 
The legitimacy of SRHRs as a family of rights in IHRL is also evident in the regional human 
rights systems. Of the two regional human rights systems under consideration here, the inter-
American is the most committed to the protection and promotion of women’s human rights, 
including SRHRs.152 
 
2.3.2. SRHRs in the IAHRS 
 
As discussed in Part 1 of this chapter, the transnational Latin American feminist movement 
and CIM were integral to women’s human rights being afforded any attention in the early 
years of the UN. These two actors have also enabled feminists to bring their demands for 
women’s full citizenship to bear on the IACHR and IACtHR. While issues relating to SRHRs 
were largely absent from the work of IAHRS until the 1990s, since then CIM, the IACHR, 
and the IACtHR have demonstrated an ever-increasing commitment to the protection and 
promotion of SRHRs in the region, and an ever-increasing commitment to the understanding 
of SRHRs articulated by feminists. The current IACHR and IACtHR stance on abortion is 
that it should be legal at a minimum where there is a risk to the pregnant person’s life or 
health, in the case of rape, and in the case of fatal foetal abnormality.153 The OAS’s Pan 
American Health Organization (PAHO), CIM, and the Follow-Up Mechanism to the Belém 
do Pará Convention (MESECVI) have gone even further, stating that Member States’ denial 
of SRHRs is a form of gender-based violence that can result in gross human rights violations 
which disproportionately impact on girls and women who experience other, intersecting 
forms of discrimination.154 They also argue that ‘guaranteeing the realisation and protection 
of SRHRs is fundamental for the realisation of women’s full citizenship’, with restrictions on 
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SRHRs representing ‘the new frontier for the subordination and discrimination against 
women’ and ‘a restriction on the exercise of their citizenship and human rights.’155 Recently, 
CIM and MESECVI – in conjunction with Latin American and Caribbean feminist 
organisations – began a campaign to have the IAHRS adopt a Convention on Sexual and 
Reproductive Rights.156 In 2014 MESECVI’s Committee of Experts adopted the Declaration 
on Violence against Women, Girls and Adolescents and their Sexual and Reproductive 
Rights.157 It states that restrictions on access to safe abortion and the absolute prohibition of 
abortion constitute torture, and calls on states to permit access to abortion at a minimum in 
the case of a risk to the life or health of the pregnant person, in the case of fatal foetal 
abnormality, and in the case of sexual violence, incest and forced pregnancy.158 The 
declaration frames the denial of women’s and girls’ access to sexual and reproductive 
information and services as based in ‘stereotypes that reduce the primary role of women to 
motherhood and prevent them from making decisions about their sexuality and 
reproduction.’159 Should the Declaration gain momentum, the IAHRS may become the first 
human rights system with a Convention dedicated to SRHRs that takes an explicitly 
intersectional feminist approach to IHRL. These developments represent the IAHRS’s 
longstanding progressive approach to human rights, which is the result of the presence of a 
dedicated women’s rights agency and also the result of the particular historical and political 
context in which the OAS evolved. In contrast to the relative stability of the Western 
European states that founded the CoE, the majority of OAS Member States from its 
foundation in 1948 to the early 1990s were ruled by brutal authoritarian regimes and/or 
experiencing civil war; moreover, many OAS Member States were and continue to be 
characterised by profound inequality and instability, and the legacy of colonialism and US 
interference.160 This challenging context prompted the IAHRS to articulate an understanding 
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of human rights that would respond to the systemic and widespread nature of violations 
occurring in the region, an understanding which required a structural approach to intersecting 
forms of oppression and discrimination.161 
 
Beginning in the 1990s, the IACHR devoted considerable attention to SRHRs, and has since 
then articulated a progressive, often expressly intersectional, approach to their protection and 
promotion that is in line with the scope of SRHRs envisioned by feminists. From 1993, 
women’s human rights issues were given increasing attention in IACHR annual and country 
reports, in large part as a result of the UN World Conference on Human Rights held in 
Vienna.162 The IACHR’s 1998 Report on the Status of Women in the Americas, which was 
written in conjunction with CIM, includes a section on the right to health and reproductive 
health, which it interpreted as being enshrined in article XI (right to health) of the American 
Declaration, articles 5 (right to physical, mental, and moral integrity) and 26 (progressive 
development) of the ACHR, and articles 4 and 5 (women’s right to full enjoyment of all 
human rights) of the Belém do Pará Convention.163 This demonstrates the receptiveness of 
the IACHR to human rights standards developed by feminists at the UN human conferences 
of the 1990s and cooperation between CIM and the IACHR to advance women’s human 
rights and full citizenship. During the 2000s and 2010s, SRHRs received particular attention 
in the IACHR’s thematic, annual, and country reports, as well as in several individual 
petitions.164 Since 2009, the IACHR has dedicated panels at its periodic sessions to women’s 
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and girls’ human rights, women human rights defenders, maternal mortality, reproductive 
rights, emergency contraception, and access to abortion.165 
 
The first IACHR jurisprudence on abortion is the 2007 friendly settlement Paulina Del 
Carmen Ramírez Jacinto (Mexico).166 The parties agreed to a friendly settlement, an IACHR 
mechanism which focuses on reparation measures to benefit the direct alleged victims and 
wider society through structural change such as legislative reforms, public policy 
implementation, and community programmes.167 Chapter 3 will argue that the non-
adversarial nature of the friendly settlement mechanism, and its focus on the structural 
changes required to achieve restorative and transformative justice, is particularly effective for 
respecting, protecting and fulfilling women’s human rights, and for challenging the 
underlying causes of their exclusion from citizenship and rights. 
 
CIM’s 2012 and 2013 studies on women and citizenship, which frame SRHRs as 
fundamental to the realisation of women’s full citizenship, appear to have influenced the 
IACHR’s approach to SRHRs from 2013 to the present. In 2013, the IACHR mentioned the 
negative impact of the criminalisation of abortion on women’s human rights in its annual 
report for the first time, and it also issued precautionary measures concerning the complete 
criminalisation of abortion in El Salvador, discussed further in Chapter 4.168 The IACHR’s 
2015 report on Honduras, 2017 report on Venezuela, 2018 reports on El Salvador and 
Honduras, and 2019 report on El Salvador make explicit references to SRHRs and the 
measures that states must take to ensure their full realisation.169 The 2018 and 2019 El 
Salvador reports and the 2018 Honduras report discuss the negative human rights impact of 
the complete criminalisation of abortion, and state that abortion should be legal at a minimum 
where there is a risk to the pregnant person’s life or health, in the case of rape, and in the case 
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of fatal foetal abnormality.170 The IACHR has therefore broadly adopted the understanding of 
abortion and SRHRs that has been articulated by feminists: that it is only through 
straightforward, safe, and legal access to abortion that women’s human rights can be 
respected, protected, and fulfilled. The Court has also demonstrated a growing commitment 
to SRHRs and to feminist approaches to legal reasoning.  
 
Despite initially being more conservative than the IACHR and despite an unwillingness or 
inability to adopt an intersectional feminist approach to legal reasoning,171 in recent years the 
IACtHR has indicated a more coherent commitment to women’s human rights and SRHRs.172 
Artavia Murillo et al v Costa Rica, which concerned Costa Rica’s de facto IVF ban,173 is the 
most significant IACtHR case with implications for abortion access thus far. In this case, the 
Court concluded that there is no absolute right to life before birth, in part because of the 
negative human rights consequences of this for women.174 The Court also highlighted this 
case as one which contributed to the development of its case-law in relation to reproductive 
rights, stating that ‘the rights to private life and to personal integrity’ are ‘directly and 
immediately linked to health care services.’175 This approach is welcome because it 
recognises the interrelated nature of various rights relevant to SRHRs and, by extension, to 
straightforward and legal access to safe abortion. It also directly references the UN definition 
of reproductive rights, demonstrating the influence of the idea of SRHRs articulated by 
feminists at the UN conferences that led to the adoption of this definition.176 Moreover, the 
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new IACtHR President Elizabeth Odio Benito has expressed her commitment to ‘a new 
stage’ in IACtHR jurisprudence dedicated to advancing gender justice and SRHRs. 177 
 
The IACtHR’s awareness of the need to advance SRHRs is evident in a survey of its recent 
annual reports. In its 2012 annual report, the Court stated that Artavia Murillo et al v Costa 
Rica represented it developing its jurisprudence on reproductive rights.178 The Court 
emphasised the importance of ‘reproductive autonomy’, ‘reproductive liberty’, the ICPD 
definition of reproductive rights, and ‘the right to the highest level of sexual and reproductive 
health.’179 In its 2016 annual report, in relation to IV v Bolivia, the IACtHR claimed that this 
case represented the Court’s recognition of how ‘historically, a woman’s liberty and 
autonomy as regards her sexual and reproductive health had been limited, restricted or 
annulled based on negative and prejudicial gender stereotypes…women have been seen, 
above all, as a reproductive entity.’180 Similar commitment to SRHRs is evident in its 2019 
annual report.181 Therefore, there is a clear commitment on the part of the IACtHR to 
advancing SRHRs, and a growing understanding of how restrictions on access to 
reproductive healthcare such as abortion represent and perpetuate gender inequality. 
 
The IACtHR also demonstrated a commitment to SRHRs when it issued provisional 
measures in relation to the case of ‘Beatriz’, discussed in Chapter 4.182 When read in 
conjunction with the IACHR’s current work on SRHRs and abortion, it can therefore be 
argued that the IAHRS’s current stance on abortion is that it should be decriminalised at a 
minimum in the case of a risk to life or health, in the case of rape or incest, and in the case of 




The IAHRS approach to SRHRs represents the influence of feminist rearticulations of the 
nature and scope of rights at the international and regional levels of the human rights system, 
i.e., a multilevel feminist citizenship project. However, as the next chapter will illustrate, 
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certain limitations arising from the Western liberal legal tradition persist and limit the full 
realisation of the transformative potential of SRHRs in inter-American jurisprudence. These 
issues are also evident in the European human rights system’s jurisprudence on SRHRs, as 
are issues arising from its structure and approach to human rights that impede the full 
realisation of this family of rights. 
 
2.3.3. SRHRs at the CoE 
 
In comparison to the UN and inter-American human rights systems, the CoE has taken a 
more conservative approach to SRHRs. This is as a result of the absence of a body such as 
the UN’s CSW and the OAS’s CIM, and the absence of economic, social and cultural rights 
from the ECHR. It is also the result of the ECtHR’s deferential approach to human rights 
protection, which is the product of the particularly historical and political context in which 
the CoE evolved: founded by Western European states at the start of the Cold War, the CoE 
was intended to set a minimum standard of human rights protection and prevent a backslide 
into authoritarianism by any Member States; provided that states met minimum requirements, 
they had significant discretion in determining domestic legislation and policy.183 In contrast 
to the UN and inter-American position that abortion should be decriminalised at a minimum 
in some circumstances in order to ensure women’s human rights are respected protected, and 
fulfilled, the ECtHR and ECSR stance is that where legal, abortion should be accessible, and 
human rights violations will only arise when this is not the case. However, the CoE 
Commissioner for Human Rights has indicated support for the UN/inter-American position, 
especially since Dunja Mijatović’s appointment to the position in 2018. This section 
considers the ECtHR, the ECSR, and the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights’ respective 
approaches to SRHRs, arguing that the ECtHR and ECSR need to adopt the more 
progressive, assertive stance articulated by the UN and inter-American human rights systems, 
as well as the CoE Commissioner, in order to ensure that women’s human rights and full 
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The ECHR and the ECtHR 
 
The absence of economic, social and cultural rights from the ECHR is because the general 
consensus among the CoE Member States in 1948 was that Western Europe required a 
Convention that would provide a minimum standard of protection for civil and political rights 
to prevent the emergence of authoritarian and Communist regimes while allowing states 
considerable discretion in determining their legislation and policy.184 The absence of 
economic, social and cultural rights from the Convention meant that these rights were not 
addressed by the CoE for the first twelve years of its existence – the European Social Charter 
(ESC) did not enter into force until 1965.185 Even then, the current CoE approach to the ESC 
continues to create a divide between civil and political rights on the one hand and economic 
and social rights on the other, with the former being accorded higher priority than the latter: 
the ESC is an optional charter that is overseen by an independent body, as opposed to being 
an obligatory treaty for CoE Member States which the Court can invoke. A more integrated 
approach – at a minimum enabling the Court to invoke, interpret, and apply the Charter when 
hearing cases – is required to ensure the genuine interdependence and indivisibility of these 
rights. 
 
The European human rights systems’ androcentric approach to human rights is evident in its 
first abortion case. Heard by the now-obsolete European Commission on Human Rights in 
1978, the applicants in Brüggemann and Scheuten v West Germany argued that the 
criminalisation of abortion except for ‘in specific situations of distress of the woman 
concerned’ interfered with their article 8 right to privacy.186 The Commission found that 
‘pregnancy cannot be said to pertain uniquely to the sphere of private life’ and that ‘not every 
regulation of abortion amounts to interference with the right to respect for private life.’187 The 
assertion that pregnancy ‘cannot be said to pertain uniquely to the sphere of private life’ 
continues to form the basis of the Court’s approach to abortion. This assertion is indicative of 
the problematic nature of traditional understandings of the right to privacy which fail to 
capture or respect the complexity of non-masculine embodied experiences. The problematic 
nature of this decision was highlighted in one dissenting and one separate opinion, both of 
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which argued that restrictive abortion legislation should be considered a violation of article 
8(2).188 The dissenting opinion highlighted that ‘over-restrictive legislation not only fails to 
prevent ‘back-street abortions’…but may even encourage recourse to them.’189 The separate 
opinion asserted that ‘the self-determination of women’ was the crux of the matter, arguing 
that ‘the laws regulating abortion ought to leave the decision to have it performed in the early 
stage of pregnancy to the woman concerned.’190 The separate opinion also highlighted that 
traditional understandings of the right to privacy ‘depended on the outlook which has been 
formed mainly by men.’191 The ideas expressed in these two opinions – that the real-world 
consequences of restrictive abortion legislation and the underlying rationale of restrictive 
abortion legislation are harmful to women – have yet to find full expression in contemporary 
ECtHR jurisprudence.  
 
In the 2000s and 2010s, the Court began to hear more cases concerning SRHR issues, such as 
forced sterilization and IVF, although it did not refer to them as such.192 In regard to abortion, 
the Court determined that states have a margin of appreciation in determining abortion 
legislation. It is only where abortion is legal and not accessible that Convention violations 
may arise.193 This position fails to acknowledge the origins and consequences of restrictive 
abortion legislation vis-à-vis the status of women. It also represents the ongoing dichotomy 
of issues deemed worthy of international legal attention and those deemed of lesser, 
domestic, importance that the ECtHR’s deferential approach to human rights protection 





The ECSR monitors state compliance with the ESC by examining national reports submitted 
by States Parties and through a collective complaints mechanism open to approved 
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organisations that has been operative since 1998.194 As will be discussed in Chapter 3, ESC 
article 11 guarantees the right to health, and the ECSR has found States responsible for 
violations of it in the context of SRHRs including abortion.195 However, as will also be 
discussed in Chapter 3, it has replicated some of the more problematic aspects of the 
ECtHR’s approach from a feminist perspective, such as the use of the margin of appreciation 
and a narrow understanding of non-discrimination. Moreover, the fact that it is a secondary 
body for the promotion of human rights compared to the ECtHR perpetuates the dichotomy 
of civil and political versus economic, social and cultural rights, with the former afforded 
higher priority than the latter. Despite this, its overall approach to SRHRs – recognising their 
legitimacy as a family of human rights, referring to and to an extent complying with UN and 
inter-American SRHR standards196 – is more in keeping with that envisaged by intersectional 
feminists than that of the ECtHR. In contrast to both the ECtHR and the ECSR, the CoE 
Commissioner for Human Rights has adopted an assertive, progressive stance on SRHRs 
including abortion. 
 
The CoE Commissioner for Human Rights 
 
Successive Commissioners have demonstrated commitment to SRHRs, particularly since 
2007. That year and again in 2011, the Commissioner criticised Ireland’s abortion legislation 
in his country visit reports, highlighting the negative, discriminatory impact of the lack of 
legislation on abortion in line with the limited constitutional guarantee of access to abortion 
in the case of a risk to the woman’s life.197 In 2017, The Commissioner published a thematic 
report on women’s sexual and reproductive rights which demonstrated an awareness of and 
commitment to challenging the structural inequalities impeding the full realisation of SRHRs 
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in Member States.198 Drawing upon UN and inter-American human rights standards, it went 
beyond the ECtHR and ECSR stance that where legal, abortion should be accessible by 
recommending that CoE Member States decriminalise abortion; ensure access to safe, 
quality, and legal abortion services; and remove legal, policy, financial, and other barriers 
that impede women’s access to abortion such as mandatory waiting periods, obligatory 
counselling, and restrictive third-party authorisation.199 This indicates a level of commitment 
to the intersectional multilevel feminist citizenship project of SRHRs that is lacking among 
other CoE bodies. 
 
The current Commissioner, Dunja Mijatović, was appointed in January 2018 and is the first 
women to assume the role.200 She has made SRHRs one of the main priorities of her mandate, 
as evidenced by statements, reports on country visits, letters to governments, submissions to 
the Committee of Ministers, and discussions with PACE.201 She conceptualises SRHRs as 
necessary to upholding ‘women’s right to self-determination’202 and as ‘an essential 
component of Council of Europe Member States’ obligations to guarantee women’s rights 
and advance gender equality.’203 In regard to abortion, she has reiterated the 2017 thematic 
paper’s stance that CoE Member States must decriminalise abortion and remove all barriers 
impeding access to safe abortion care, with a particular emphasis on addressing intersecting, 
structural forms of inequality.204 
 
A relatively new institution, the extent to which the Commissioner can effectively pressure 
Member States to comply with the CoE’s minimal SRHRs standards – let alone the approach 
called for by the UN, IAHRS and intersectional feminists –  remains to be seen. The Office of 
 
198 CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, Women’s Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights in Europe 
(Strasbourg, Council of Europe 2017) 21, 45, 47-56 
199 ibid, 11, 36-8, 59 
200 CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘The Commissioner’ (CoE, 2020) 
<https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/the-commissioner> accessed 30 November 2020 
201 CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Annual Activity Report 2019’ (CommDH(2020)7, 21 April 2020) 3, 
7, 17, 20; CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘1st Quarterly Activity Report 2020’ (CommDH(2020)12, 13 
May 2020) 13, 15-6; CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘2nd Quarterly Activity Report 2020’ 
(CommDH(2020)19, 8 September 2020) 6-7 
202 CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘We need to stand up for women’s sexual and reproductive health and 
rights’ (CoE, 7 March 2019) <https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/we-need-to-stand-up-for-women-s-
sexual-and-reproductive-health-and-rights> accessed 30 November 2020 
203 CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘COVID-19: Ensure women’s access to sexual and reproductive 
health and rights’ (CoE, 7 May 2020) <https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/covid-19-ensure-women-s-
access-to-sexual-and-reproductive-health-and-rights> accessed 30 November 2020 
204 CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘COVID-19’; CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Women’s 
sexual and reproductive rights in Europe’ (CoE, 2020) <https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/women-s-
sexual-and-reproductive-rights-in-europe> accessed 30 November 2020 
 89 
the Commissioner nevertheless represents the creation of a responsive actor and a platform 
for intersectional feminist approaches to human rights such as SRHRs that could yet prove an 
important ally to national and transnational feminist activists in their multilevel feminist 




Part 3 of this chapter set out the current stance of the UN, inter-American and European 
human rights systems vis-à-vis SRHRs, and abortion specifically. The UN and inter-
American human rights systems recognise that abortion should be decriminalised in at least 
circumstances in order to ensure that women’s human rights are respected, protected and 
fulfilled, while the European human rights system has adopted the more conservative position 
that states can determine whether or not to legalise abortion, and that violations of women’s 
rights will only arise if, where legal, abortion is not accessible. The more progressive UN and 
inter-American position represents their willingness to adopt a feminist approach to IHRL to 
some extent, a willingness which is the direct result of concerted transnational feminist 
activism to guarantee women’s right to have rights, and to determine the scope of those 
rights. This feminist activism has been successful in part because of (1) a dedicated women’s 
rights agency within both the UN and the OAS (2) the influence of feminist activism at the 
UN conferences of the 1990s and (3) the receptiveness of the inter-American human rights 
system to incorporate UN human rights developments into its own jurisprudence. In contrast, 
the CoE has no specialised women’s rights agency, and the ECtHR has been less open to 
interpreting the Convention in light of UN jurisprudence. The progressiveness and 
responsiveness of the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights vis-à-vis SRHRs may yet 
redress this. 
 
Even though the UN and inter-American human rights systems are making progress in 
recognising and promoting the legitimacy of SRHRs, conceptual inconsistencies arising from 
the persistence of the androcentric liberal legal framework are still apparent in their 
jurisprudence. These issues, issues with the ECtHR and ECSR approach to SRHRs, and the 
need for all levels of the human rights system to adopt the transformative feminist vision of 
SRHRs, will be critiqued in the next chapter. It will be argued that a transformative 
intersectional feminist approach to the law, particularly regarding SRHRs, is necessary to 
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realise women’s full citizenship through an approach to human rights that represents and 




This chapter articulated the conceptualisation of citizenship that serves as the theoretical 
framework for this research project. Citizenship is defined as the right to have rights, and the 
right to determine the scope of those rights. It is understood to be a contested process with a 
long history of excluding and oppressing women, an exclusion predicated upon their 
reproduction and sexuality. When mediated through the processes of colonisation and nation-
building in El Salvador and Ireland, the discourse of citizenship constructed women as non-
citizens, bearers of future citizens, and bearers of the nation’s honour. As a consequence of 
these combined processes, women’s sexuality and reproduction were heavily regulated by the 
law, for example through the criminalisation of abortion. Any claims by women for 
reproductive autonomy, such as through calls for the decriminalisation of abortion, are 
understood as potentially disruptive to the entire patriarchal social order because (1) these 
claims challenge women’s role in the citizenship project as non-citizens/bearers of future 
citizens and (2) these claims represent women attempting to assert their right to have rights 
and determine the scope of rights, a privilege afforded only to citizens, who can only be men. 
Applying this multilevel feminist citizenship framework contextualises and makes visible the 
fact that feminist campaigns for SRHRs at the international and domestic level are 
interrelated power struggles over the meaning of citizenship and rights. The nature of this 
struggle at the national level will be explored in Chapters 4 and 5 of this thesis in relation to 
El Salvador and Ireland. 
 
In regard to the international and regional levels of this contested feminist citizenship project, 
the creation of the modern international human rights system replicated the exclusion of 
women from citizenship at the national level, but also opened up a new space for women to 
contest this exclusion. As part 2 of this chapter demonstrated, SRHRs are best understood as 
a multilevel feminist citizenship project because their origins, evolution and increasing 
legitimacy are the direct result of feminist activism around the right to have rights and to 
determine the scope of those rights in IHRL. 
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This process is ongoing and has enjoyed considerable success within the UN and inter-
American human rights systems, as evidenced by part 3 of this chapter. In contrast, the 
European human rights system has maintained a more conservative approach to SRHRs, with 
their full realisation being circumscribed by institutional factors such as the absence of a 
dedicated women’s rights agency and the lack of economic, social and cultural rights in the 
ECHR. Regardless of progress or lack thereof, in all three systems the transformative 
feminist approach to IHRL that SRHRs require is circumscribed by the persistence of 
androcentric Western liberal legal reasoning. This will be demonstrated in the next chapter, 
which consists of a critical reading of UN, inter-American and European jurisprudence on 
abortion. It argues that the multilevel feminist citizenship project of SRHRs can only be fully 






An Intersectional Feminist Critique of SRHRs in UN, Inter-
American, and European Jurisprudence on Abortion 
 
This chapter engages in a critical feminist reading of key UN Human Rights Committee 
(HRC), IACHR/IACtHR, and ECtHR/ECSR jurisprudence on abortion. In doing so, it argues 
that while the international and regional human rights systems have made important 
contributions to advancing SRHRs in IHRL – contributions outlined in the previous chapter – 
their continued reliance on Western androcentric liberal legal reasoning is circumscribing the 
feminist aim of realising women’s full citizenship in the form of SRHRs. This chapter argues 
that the full realisation of SRHRs, including the decriminalisation of abortion, can only be 
realised if these human rights bodies employ legal reasoning that is informed by a 
transformative intersectional feminist approach to SRHRs and concepts such as rights, 
autonomy, equality, and justice. Taking such an approach to legal reasoning requires these 
human rights bodies to recognise the historical, systemic exclusion of women and other 
oppressed groups from citizenship; it also requires them to frame the harms arising from this 
exclusion and oppression as human rights violations. 
 
Part 1 discusses the two UN Human Rights Committee (HRC) Final Views pertaining to 
Ireland’s abortion legislation, Mellet v Ireland and Whelan v Ireland. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, these two Views represent the culmination of UN human rights treaty 
monitoring body ‘jurisprudence’ on SRHRs and abortion since they are the most recent, 
assertive, and coherent stance on the part of these bodies that abortion should be 
decriminalised at a minimum in the case of a risk to life or health, in the case of rape or 
incest, and in the case of fatal foetal abnormalities. Despite the importance, both symbolic 
and real, of these HRC Views for the multilevel feminist citizenship project – as will be 
demonstrated in Chapter 5, they had a bearing on Ireland’s subsequent abortion law reform – 
they are still somewhat flawed and inconsistent from an intersectional feminist perspective. 
These flaws and inconsistencies relate to the right to be free from torture and other forms of 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (CIDT), the principle of non-
discrimination, and a failure to emphasise the indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated 
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nature of human rights by not engaging with the allegations of violations of the freedom to 
seek, receive and impart information. 
 
Part 2 of this chapter considers IACHR and IACtHR jurisprudence on abortion. Through 
friendly settlements, country and thematic reports, precautionary measures, provisional 
measures, and cases on other SRHR issues such as IVF, the inter-American human rights 
system (IAHRS) has articulated the most intersectional feminist understanding of human 
rights, SRHRs, and abortion access of the three human rights institutions under discussion 
here. This part highlights the friendly settlements procedure and its commitment to 
restorative and transformative justice, the holistic understanding of a right to bodily integrity, 
and an intersectional, substantive approach to non-discrimination are the greatest strengths of 
the IAHRS in advancing the multilevel feminist citizenship project of SRHRs including 
abortion access. The IACHR 2014 friendly settlement Alba Lucía Rodríguez Cardona 
(Colombia) illustrates the strengths of the inter-American human rights system’s approach, 
while the 2012 IACtHR case Artavia Murillo v Costa Rica highlights some of the ongoing 
limitations and contradictions arising from the androcentric liberal legal framework still 
evident in inter-American jurisprudence. As with the UN and the ECtHR, the IAHRS has 
provided feminist activists campaigning for abortion access, including those in El Salvador, 
with a useful channel for articulating rights claims and contesting their exclusion from 
citizenship at the national level. This will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 4.  
 
The third and final part of this chapter concerns ECtHR and ECSR abortion jurisprudence. 
The European human rights system has taken a far more conservative approach to abortion 
than the UN and inter-American systems. This is as a direct result of the androcentric liberal 
legal framework being more deeply embedded in the CoE than the UN or OAS. As the 
previous chapter argued, this is in large part due to the absence of a dedicated women’s rights 
agency and the historical and political context informing the evolution of the European 
human rights system. The manifestation of this in narrow understandings of the right to be 
free from torture and CIDT, the right to privacy, and the principle of non-discrimination in 
their jurisprudence are discussed in relation to the ECtHR’s A, B and C v Ireland and the 
ECSR’s IPPF-EN v Italy. This part argues that the full realisation of women’s citizenship 
through the recognition of their SRHRs will be impeded rather than advanced by the 
European human rights system unless the ECtHR and ECSR adopt an approach to legal 
reasoning that is informed by a transformative intersectional feminist approach underpinning 
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SRHRs. This approach recognises the historical, systemic exclusion of women and other 
oppressed groups from citizenship, and names the harms done to them as a result of this as 
human rights violations. The ECtHR/ECSR’s abortion jurisprudence serves as an important 
reminder that human rights and the law are only one means among many to achieve a more 
just political, economic and social order; as mentioned in Chapter 1, feminists must 
simultaneously make use of and decentre the discourses and mechanisms of law and human 
rights to achieve their goals of emancipation and social justice. 
3.1. Abortion in UN human rights treaty monitoring body jurisprudence 
Introduction 
 
UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies and Special Rapporteurs have stated that abortion 
should be permitted at a minimum in the case of a risk to the pregnant person’s life or health, 
in the case of rape or incest, and in the case of lethal or fatal foetal abnormalities to ensure 
that these rights are respected, protected, and fulfilled.1 The most recent Final Views which 
evidence this position are the HRC’s 2016 Mellet v Ireland and 2017 Whelan v Ireland Final 
Views. These two Views have been chosen for close analysis since they are the most recent 
Final Views concerning abortion and since they directly address the negative human rights 
impact of Ireland’s restrictive abortion legislation. In both Mellet and Whelan, the HRC 
determined that the state was responsible for violations of article 7 (the right to be free from 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment); article 17 (the right to privacy); and article 26 (the 
right to equality before the law) of the ICCPR because it failed to provide access to abortion 
in the case of a non-viable pregnancy.2 In doing so, it recognised that restrictions on abortion 
access impede women’s full enjoyment of their right to have rights and determine the scope 
of those rights. 
 
These decisions represent a powerful assertion of the UN human rights system’s stance that 
abortion must be decriminalised at a minimum in the case of a risk to the life or health of a 
pregnant person, in the case of rape or incest, and in the case of fatal foetal abnormalities. 
They also demonstrate some awareness of the need for intersectional approaches to 
challenging the structural inequalities that inform and exacerbate restrictive abortion 
legislation, i.e., awareness of the ways in which individual identities and forms of oppression 
 
1 See Annex 3 
2 Mellet v Ireland, para 8; Whelan v Ireland, para 8 
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such as race, class, disability, gender, and socioeconomic status can interact to produce 
particular experiences of marginalisation and discrimination. However, there are still some 
limitations to its reasoning. While the HRC’s framing of the harms arising from restrictive 
abortion legislation as human rights violations is significant, it needs to advance its analysis 
further by recognising restrictive abortion legislation as a manifestation of the historical, 
systemic exclusion of women and other oppressed groups from citizenship on the basis of 
their reproductive capacity and sexuality. It is only by recognising this longstanding 
structural inequality that women’s subordination can be meaningfully challenged and their 
full citizenship and human rights can be realised. 
 
This section first presents the facts of Mellet and Whelan, before highlighting some of the 
strengths and weaknesses from an intersectional feminist perspective of the Committee’s 
reasoning in regard to freedom from torture and CIDT, the freedom to seek, receive and 
impart information, and the principle of non-discrimination. 
 
Mellet v Ireland and Whelan v Ireland 
 
Mellet and Whelan both concerned women who had to travel to the UK to obtain an abortion 
following the diagnosis of fatal foetal abnormalities, given that abortion was not legal on 
these grounds in Ireland at the time. 
 
In November 2011, Mellet received the diagnosis of the fatal foetal abnormality trisomy 18 
when in the 21st week of her pregnancy. Medical professionals told her that she could not 
obtain an abortion in Ireland but alluded to the fact that she could ‘travel.’3 The medical 
professionals did not provide any further information on what travelling would entail or on 
suitable abortion providers, with a midwife recommending that she contact a local family 
planning organisation for information and counselling. She did so, and they provided her with 
information on the procedure as well as contact information for the Liverpool Women’s 
Hospital.4 Without the support, continuity of care or referral procedure that would have been 
in place had abortion in the case of fatal foetal abnormality been legal, Mellet had to spend 
€3,000 to pay for travel to and accommodation in Liverpool, as well as the procedure itself.5 
 
3 Mellet v Ireland, para 2.2 
4 ibid, paras 2.1, 2.2 
5 ibid, para 2.4 
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She underwent a 36-hour labour to deliver a stillborn baby and had to travel back to Dublin 
only 12 hours after without her baby’s remains and while still bleeding.6 She did not receive 
aftercare or bereavement counselling at the maternity hospital, services which would have 
been made available to her had she carried the pregnancy to term; instead, she had to 
independently organise post-abortion counselling with the family planning organisation.7  
 
In January 2010, Whelan received the diagnosis of two fatal foetal abnormalities when in the 
20th week of her pregnancy.8 As with Mellet, allusions were made to the possibility of 
travelling should she decide to have an abortion, but no further information or referrals to 
support services were made by medical professionals.9 Instead, she obtained contact 
information for the Liverpool Women’s Hospital through a friend and, like Mellet, had to 
spend almost €3,000 on the procedure, travel, accommodation, and leave from work.10 In her 
application to the HRC, Whelan emphasised the disruptions and complications to her 
grieving process engendered by having to travel abroad, having to rely on friends, having to 
disclose personal information to acquaintances so that they could help her make the 
appointment in Liverpool, and the lack of follow-up care upon her return to Ireland.11 
 
Mellet and Whelan alleged that the criminalisation of abortion in Ireland subjected them to 
cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment by denying them the reproductive healthcare and 
bereavement support they required, forcing them to continue with a non-viable pregnancy, 
forcing them to seek abortion care abroad, and stigmatising the already difficult decision to 
end a wanted but unviable pregnancy.12 They also alleged that Ireland’s abortion legislation 
represented a disproportionate interference with their right to privacy by limiting their ability 
to make choices pertaining to their reproductive autonomy, and by disrupting the continuity 
of care and support from family and friends they required during an especially distressing 
time.13 In regard to their freedom to seek, receive and impart information as enshrined in 
article 19(2) ICCPR, Mellet and Whelan both argued that the 1995 Regulation of Information 
(Services Outside the State for Termination of Pregnancies) Act ‘effectively censored’ health 
 
6 ibid  
7 ibid, para 2.5 
8 Whelan v Ireland, paras 2.1, 2.2 
9 ibid, para 2.2 
10 ibid, 2.3, 2.4 
11 ibid, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6 
12 Mellet, para 3.1; Whelan, para 3.1 
13 Mellet, para 3.5; Whelan, paras 3.4, 3.5 
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care providers from providing even legal information, thus violating their right to access 
information and compounding their mental distress.14 Finally, the applicants asserted that the 
criminalisation of abortion in Ireland violated the principles of equality, non-discrimination, 
and the right to equality before the law enshrined in articles 2(1), 3 and 26 of the ICCPR by 
placing restrictions on health services that only women need, reducing women to their 
reproductive capacity, and failing to account for women’s ‘different reproductive health 
needs, thus reinforcing women’s vulnerability and inferior social status.’15 These references 
to the criminalisation of abortion ‘reinforcing women’s vulnerability and inferior social 
status’ and ‘reducing women to their reproductive capacity’ echo feminist critiques of the 
ways in which the traditional citizenship discourse excludes and oppresses women by forcing 
them to fulfil the roles of non-citizens and bearers of future citizens.16 
 
The HRC found in favour of the applicants regarding their claims under articles 7 (torture and 
CIDT), 17 (privacy) and 26 (equality before the law) of the ICCPR. In recognising these 
women’s experiences as traumatic and a violation of the right to be free from CIDT, the HRC 
effectively reconceptualised this right to include and respond to women’s lived experiences – 
the aim of feminist approaches to international human rights law in general, and SRHRs in 
particular. The HRC did so by agreeing with the women that they had been subjected to 
conditions of intense physical and mental suffering due to the lack of continuity in care; to 
the distress of having to choose between continuing their non-viable pregnancies to term or 
travelling abroad at personal expense to receive medical treatment; to the shame and stigma 
arising from the criminalisation of abortion; and to the suffering caused by having to leave 
their children’s remains in the UK, to be delivered later (and in Mellet’s case, unexpectedly) 
by courier.17 The HRC’s reasoning was informed by an empathic and nuanced understanding 
of ill-treatment as personal, cumulative, and both physical and psychological.18 The emphasis 
on the economic, social and cultural aspects of a civil and political right – the cost of travel 
and healthcare, the lack of emotional support, the delays to and disruptions of the grieving 
process –is a striking example of commitment to the indivisibility, interdependence, and 
 
14 Mellet, paras 3.8, 3.10; Whelan, paras 3.6-3.8 
15 Mellet, paras 3.15, 3.19, 3.20; Whelan, paras 3.9-3.11 
16 AM Jaggar ‘Arenas of Citizenship’, 91-110; E Jelin, ‘Engendering Human Rights’, 67; R Lister, Citizenship, 
1, 71-2; C Pateman, ‘Equality, Difference, Subordination’, 15; C Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 61; N Yuval-
Davis, ‘The ‘Multi-Layered Citizen’’, 120-1; N Yuval-Davis, P Werbner, ‘Women and the New Discourse of 
Citizenship’, 5 
17 Mellet, para 7.4; Whelan, paras 2.5, 7.5 
18 Mellet, 7.2-7.6; Whelan, 7.2-7.7 
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interrelatedness of human rights.19 The acknowledgement of shame and stigma’s profound 
effect in this context, as well as the especially vulnerable situation in which people find 
themselves when in medical settings, is also an important development, and seems to have 
been informed by the work of Special Rapporteur on Torture (SR Torture) Juan Méndez. For 
example, his 2013 and 2016 reports discuss how the stigma, vulnerability, and discrimination 
arising from restrictive abortion legislation amount to torture or ill-treatment, and that the 
‘abuse and mistreatment of women seeking reproductive health services can cause 
tremendous and lasting physical and emotional suffering, inflicted on the basis of gender.’20 
 
The HRC also effectively articulated connections between the right to be free from torture 
and CIDT, and the right to privacy. The Committee did so by affirming the applicants’ 
assertion that their ‘physical and psychological integrity and reproductive autonomy’ were 
the aspects of their private life that were disproportionately and arbitrarily interfered with by 
Irish abortion legislation.21 This represents some commitment to the indivisibility, 
interdependence, and interrelatedness of human rights – a necessary approach from a feminist 
perspective since it challenges the hierarchisation, compartmentalisation, and 
dichotomisation inherent in Western liberal thinking. The reference to ‘reproductive 
autonomy’ is welcome from an intersectional feminist perspective for two reasons. Firstly, 
this wording alludes to the understanding of reproductive autonomy/reproductive freedom 
underpinning the intersectional feminist vision of SRHRs articulated by Global South and 
BIPOC feminists discussed in Chapter 1. According to their conceptualisation, reproductive 
freedom/autonomy is ‘the right to have, or not to have, children with dignity and with all the 
necessary material conditions to make raising children a sustainable life choice’22 and 
requires ‘the full achievement and protection of women’s human rights.’23 In making use of 
the term ‘reproductive autonomy’, the HRC signalled awareness of, and potentially support 
for, this approach to SRHRs, which requires structural transformation of the current political, 
social, economic, and legal order to ensure women’s right to have rights and determine the 
 
19 ibid 
20 SR torture, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment: applying the torture and ill-treatment protection framework in health-care settings’ (A/HRC/22/53, 
1 February 2013) paras 46-50, para 90 (SR 2013 torture report); SR torture, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur 
on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment: gender perspectives on torture and 
other cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment’ (A/HRC/31/57, 5 January 2016) paras 14, 42, 43-
4, 51, 72 (SR torture 2016 report) 
21 Mellet 7.7, Whelan 7.8 
22 RP Petchesky, ‘Owning and Disowning the Body’, 255 
23 L Ross cited in K Ackerman et al ‘Every Body Has Its Own Feminism’, 6 
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scope of those rights in regard to her reproduction and sexuality. Secondly, by interpreting 
the right to privacy as including a right to reproductive autonomy, the HRC challenged 
traditional Western liberal legal understandings of the right to privacy as ‘the right to be left 
alone.’24 Instead, in keeping with feminist articulations of the right to privacy as ‘the positive 
liberty of self-determination and equal personhood’25, and in keeping with the idea of 
autonomy informed by vulnerability, relational autonomy, and dignity articulated in Chapter 
1, the HRC implicitly recognised the importance of political, economic, social and legal 
structures (in this instance, Ireland’s restrictive abortion legislation) to the realisation or 
frustration of the right to privacy, understood here as the ability to make decisions about 
one’s reproductive life (in this instance, whether or not to carry a non-viable pregnancy to 
term). Explicitly stating that the right to privacy entails ensuring the necessary conditions for 
the realisation of human dignity so that individuals ‘can determine their own destiny in areas 
of central concern.’26, and that realising these conditions requires consideration of both the 
interpersonal relationships and wider societal structures that can make us more or less 
vulnerable, would have advanced the multilevel feminist citizenship project of 
reconceptualising human rights to better represent and respond to women’s lived needs and 
realities even further. 
 
These HRC Views could also have advanced an intersectional feminist approach to legal 
reasoning even further in their consideration of the claims under article 7 (freedom from 
torture and CIDT) and by engaging with the claims made under article 19 (freedom to seek, 
receive and impart information), and by taking a more coherent approach to equality and non-
discrimination. The Committee’s Views, concurring opinions, and dissenting opinions in 
regard to article 19 and equality and non-discrimination epitomise some of the continued 
conceptual uncertainty surrounding SRHRs within IHRL. 
 
In regard to torture and CIDT, the UN human rights system has emphasised that these should 
not be understood in hierarchical terms with torture as a more severe version of CIDT, but 
rather that the distinction between torture and CIDT rests on whether or not the pain or 
suffering was inflicted with purpose or intention where a person is under the de facto control 
of another (torture), or whether the pain or suffering was inflicted without purpose or 
 
24 R Copelon, ‘Losing the Negative Right of Privacy: Building Sexual and Reproductive Freedom’ (1990) 18 
NYU Review of Law and Social Change, 41 
25 ibid 
26 ibid, 65 
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intention outside a situation where a person is under the de facto control of another.27 Reports 
by the SR Torture have also emphasised that gender-based discrimination fulfils the purpose 
element of the definition of torture, and that the intention element can be inferred if it can be 
shown that an act had a specific purpose or that serious harm was reasonably foreseeable as a 
result of the act.28 Furthermore, as mentioned above, Special Rapporteur Juan Méndez’s 2013 
and 2016 reports discuss how the stigma, vulnerability, and discrimination arising from 
restrictive abortion legislation amount to torture or ill-treatment.29 These developments 
represent engagement with and responsiveness to feminist critiques of traditional approaches 
to torture and CIDT, which drew attention to the problematic nature of hierarchies and 
dichotomies (torture/CIDT), the failure to address violations of this right in private/non-state 
contexts (e.g. domestic violence), and the need to recognise gender-based discrimination as 
both a violation of women’s rights in of itself and as leading to violations of women’s human 
rights.30 The HRC’s Mellet and Whelan Views indicate some awareness of, engagement with, 
and responsiveness to these developments of a gender-sensitive approach to interpreting 
torture and CIDT articulated by the SR torture: the Views recognised the profound effects of 
stigma, shame, and the especially vulnerable situation in which people find themselves when 
in medical settings as key elements in determining that there had been a violation of the right 
to be free from CIDT. However, the HRC could have advanced an intersectional feminist 
approach to legal reasoning even further in these Views had it engaged with the idea of 
gender-based discrimination as fulfilling the purpose and/or intent elements of the definition 
of torture. This reasoning is as follows. If the purpose element of torture includes gender-
based discrimination, and if – as recognised not only by feminists but also the SR torture in 
his 2013 report – restrictive abortion legislation is underpinned by the desire to enforce 
‘socialized gender roles and expectations’31, then restrictive abortion legislation fulfils the 
purpose criterion of torture. Furthermore, it is arguable that restrictive abortion legislation 
also fulfils the intention criterion of torture: as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, there is 
 
27 SR torture, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’ (A/HRC/13/39, 9 February 2010) para 60 (SR Torture 2010 report) 
28 SR torture, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’ (A/HRC/7/3, 15 January 2008) para 30 (SR Torture January 2008 report); SR torture 2013 report, 
paras 45-6 
29 SR torture January 2008 report, ‘Part II: Strengthening the Protection of Women from Torture’; SR torture 
2013 report, paras 46-50, para 90; SR torture 2016 report, paras 14, 42, 43-4, 51, 72 
30 SR torture 2013 report, para 37; SR torture 2016 report, para 8; See for example C Chinkin, S Wright, H 
Charlesworth ‘Feminist Approaches to International Law: Reflections from Another Century’ in D Buss, A 
Manji (eds) International Law, 25-6; A Edwards ‘The ‘Feminizing’ of Torture under International Human 
Rights Law’ 19 Leiden Journal of International law (2006) 349 
CA MacKinnon, Are Women Human? 17-18, 23 
31 SR torture 2013 report, para 43 
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extensive evidence, including from the UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies 
themselves, that restrictive abortion legislation results in higher rates of unsafe abortion, 
higher rates of maternal mortality, and negative health outcomes for women. Moreover, being 
forced to continue with a pregnancy means that an individual’s ability to pursue education, 
employment, and other forms of personal and professional fulfilment is potentially 
circumscribed.32 Therefore, rather than focusing solely on the individual experiences of 
Mellet and Whelan and the ways in which they amounted to CIDT, the HRC could also have 
undertaken a structural analysis of Ireland’s restrictive legislation to find that it was 
discriminatory, had the foreseeable consequence of causing harm, and was therefore also 
torture. While a novel and potentially controversial approach to legal reasoning, and while 
the ICCPR and the UNCAT and their respective treaty monitoring bodies may differ in their 
approach to interpreting torture and CIDT, such an approach is the logical consequence of 
drawing upon recent work by the SR torture, as well as being the logical consequence of 
applying intersectional feminist principles to legal reasoning. While the HRC advanced 
women’s citizenship by recognising the individual harms arising from Ireland’s restrictive 
abortion legislation, it could have advanced this project even further by recognising the 
structural causes of these harms, namely the fact that Ireland’s restrictive abortion legislation 
was grounded in misogynistic attitudes to women, their reproductive capacity, and their 
sexuality. The HRC’s approach in these Views to the right to seek, receive and impart 
information, and to the principle of non-discrimination, also require critique. 
 
In an individual concurring opinion to both Views, three Committee members argued that the 
Committee ‘should have also established that the State violated the author’s right to seek and 
receive information in accordance with article 19(2) of the Covenant’ rather than 
‘sidestepping’ a discussion of article 19.33 Their reasoning was that the Abortion Information 
Act placed a disproportionate and unjustifiable limit on the communication of reliable, 
transparent information.34 In what would have been a welcome finding in the Mellet and 
Whelan Views, the Committee members presenting this concurring opinion stated that: 
 
 
32 R Dixon, MC Nussbaum, ‘Abortion, Dignity, and a Capabilities Approach’ 70 
33 Mellet v Ireland, Appendix IV: Individual opinion of Committee members Víctor Rodríguez Rescia, Olivier 
de Frouville and Fabián Salvioli (concurring); Whelan v Ireland, Annex III: Individual opinion of Committee 
member Olivier de Frouville (concurring), paras 1, 6  
34 ibid, paras 5, 6 
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We believe that, when it comes to issues of health, including matters 
relating to sexual and reproductive rights, in which, moreover, 
people’s lives and well-being may be at risk, information must be 
publicly available. Access to such information must figure as part of a 
public policy of the State that sets uniform guidelines for assisting 
users in taking personal decisions with regard to such a complex issue 
as abortion.35 
 
Had the Committee supported this decision, it would have been of symbolic and substantive 
importance in demonstrating that the right to seek, receive and impart information is an 
integral component of SRHRs, and it would have been further proof of the indivisible, 
interdependent, and interrelated nature of human rights. As is also often the case with the 
ECtHR, there appears to be a belief that finding a violation of one human right provides 
sufficient redress and absolves the human rights body from adjudicating on other impugned 
rights. This represents a missed opportunity to emphasise the indivisible, interdependent, and 
interrelated nature of human rights, and it instead creates a hierarchy between rights. This 
suggests the persistence of hierarchical, dichotomous approaches to reasoning inherent in the 
androcentric Western liberal legal tradition and criticised by feminists as an impediment to 
the full realisation of women’s human rights and citizenship.36 
 
The potential to articulate a clear, unified understanding of equality and non-discrimination 
was another missed opportunity on the part of the Committee. The HRC did not consider the 
applicants’ allegations under articles 2(1) and 3 of the Covenant, reasoning that finding a 
violation of the right to equality before the law was sufficient.37 It did so by conflating a 
formal and a substantive understanding of equality. Firstly, the Committee found this right to 
have been violated because similarly-situated women (i.e. those pregnant with a non-viable 
foetus) who continued with their pregnancy were given support by the State that those who 
decided to terminate the pregnancy were not.38 It then acknowledged that Ireland’s 
criminalisation of abortion was informed by gender-based stereotypes of women’s 
reproductive role, made a passing reference to ‘similarly situated women’ without explaining 
 
35 ibid, para 3 
36 See for example H Charlesworth, C Chinkin, S Wright ‘Feminist Approaches to International Law’ 621, 625, 
634, 635 
37 Mellet, para 7.12; Whelan, para 7.13 
38 Mellet, para 7.10; Whelan, para 7.12 
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who these women were, before citing the applicant’s medical needs and socioeconomic 
circumstances as further reasons for a violation of article 26.39  
 
This muddle of promising elements reflects dissent within the Committee: two concurring 
opinions stated that the HRC should have considered the claims under articles 2(1) and 3, and 
that it should have taken the opportunity to articulate the ways in which denying women 
access to abortion is a form of gender-based discrimination with its origins in sexist 
stereotypes about women’s appropriate role in society; this represents a more 
substantive/structural approach to equality and non-discrimination that is in keeping with the 
understanding of equality set out in Chapter 1 and which would advance women’s full 
citizenship.40 Another Committee member issued a partly dissenting opinion stating the 
opposite: that the HRC should exercise caution and not extend the concept of discrimination 
to the point of it becoming meaningless.41 Such disagreement reflects the tension between 
formal and substantive understandings of equality: for Seibert-Fohr, formal equality should 
inform the Committee’s reasoning, asserting that ‘[d]ifference in treatment requires 
comparable situations in order to give rise to discrimination.’42 In contrast, Ben Achour and 
Cleveland favour a substantive approach, whereby any ‘distinction, exclusion, restriction or 
preference’ that ‘has the purpose or effect’ of inhibiting the full enjoyment of human rights 
constitutes discrimination.43 This more expansive and reflexive understanding of 
discrimination is better adapted to recognising and challenging legislation that is informed by 
and perpetuates gendered stereotypes of women’s social and biological role. It is also more in 
keeping with the transformative vision underpinning SRHRs, namely that only through 
profound systemic change in the attitudes and laws that make up our social, economic, and 
political system can the citizenship and rights of historically oppressed groups be respected, 




39 Mellet, para 7.11; Whelan, para 7.12 
40 S Fredman, Women and the Law, 179, 184-5, 192; Mellet, Appendix I: Individual opinion of Committee 
member Yadh Ben Achour (concurring), paras 3-4; Mellet, Appendix II: Individual opinion of Committee 
member Sarah Cleveland (concurring), paras 3-16; Whelan, Annex I: Individual opinion of Committee member 
Yadh Ben Achour (concurring); Whelan, Annex II: Individual opinion of Committee member Sarah H. 
Cleveland (concurring)  
41 Mellet, Appendix V: Individual opinion of Committee member Anja Seibert-Fohr (partly dissenting); Whelan, 
Annex IV: Individual opinion of Committee member Anja Seibert-Fohr (partly dissenting) 
42 Mellet, Appendix V, para 4 




The UN human rights system was the first forum in which feminists were able to articulate 
and advance the alternative understanding of citizenship and rights that SRHRs represent. As 
a result of their efforts, the UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies have recognised the 
legitimacy of this family of rights, and there are also some indications of intersectional 
feminist awareness in their reasoning. However, the tensions between traditional androcentric 
liberal legal reasoning and the transformative intersectional feminist approach required for 
the full realisation of SRHRs are evident in the dissent among Committee members as to how 
best to interpret and apply human rights. In Mellet and Whelan, this was evident in the 
Committee’s approach to torture and CIDT, its failure to engage with the claims relating to 
the freedom to seek, receive and impart information, and its somewhat incoherent approach 
to equality and non-discrimination. It was argued that these issues arose from the persistence 
of the liberal legal framework, although there are indications that legal reasoning that is 
informed by intersectional feminist thinking is beginning to influence the Committee. 
 
Nevertheless, the Mellet and Whelan Views represent the importance and utility of feminist 
engagement with the language and mechanisms of human rights to advance women’s full 
citizenship. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, national and transnational feminist activists 
filed this petition with the HRC – representing feminist engagement with the international 
level of the human rights system – and the HRC’s finding of violations in these two Views 
created greater pressure on the Irish government to respond to demands by the international 
human rights system and feminist civil society activists to repeal the 8th Amendment and 
implement less restrictive abortion legislation. 
 
As such, these Views represent both the positive real-world change that can be made within 
and through IHRL, and the ongoing limitations in the legal reasoning employed by human 
rights bodies. This speaks to the ongoing and contested nature of the multilevel feminist 
citizenship project that is SRHRs: engaging with the language and mechanisms of human 
rights is vital for the advancement of SRHRs and therefore women’s full citizenship, but the 
process of engaging with the international level of the human rights system is not without its 
limits. Similar challenges are apparent in inter-American jurisprudence on abortion, but so 
too are means to overcome them. 
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3.2. Abortion in the inter-American human rights system’s jurisprudence 
Introduction 
 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, both the IACHR and the IACtHR have made use of 
a progressive and reflexive approach to the interpretation of human rights, one which is often 
informed by an intersectional feminist understanding of the structural barriers impeding the 
realisation of women’s citizenship. The current stance of the inter-American human rights 
system on abortion is that it should be legal at a minimum where there is a risk to the 
pregnant person’s life or health, in the case of rape, and in the case of fatal foetal 
abnormality. The first section undertakes a critical reading of the IACHR’s 2014 friendly 
settlement Alba Lucía Rodríguez Cardona (Colombia). It argues that the nature of the 
friendly settlements procedure and the Commission’s intersectional, substantive approach to 
non-discrimination contribute to this human rights body being the most committed of all 
those under consideration to the transformative feminist rationale underpinning the 
advancement of SRHRs and, by extension, women’s full citizenship. The second section will 
discuss the IACtHR’s Artavia v Murillo case, reflecting on the positive contributions it has 
made to advancing SRHRs in the inter-American human rights system. It will also reflect on 
its shortcomings, particularly in relation to its inaccurate understanding of intersectionality, 
and its approach to the principle of non-discrimination, and how these need to be addressed 




As discussed in the previous chapter, the IACHR has demonstrated a commitment to the 
respect, protection and fulfilment of SRHRs including abortion access in its reports and 
jurisprudence. Its approach, which focuses on restorative and transformative justice through 
the friendly settlements procedure, and which demonstrates an understanding of 
intersectionality and substantive equality that converges with that called for by the 
transnational feminist movement, is especially effective for guaranteeing women’s right to 
have rights and to determine the scope of those rights. In fact, it is not the Commission’s 
reasoning but rather the challenges of ensuring state compliance and managing its caseload 
that represent the greatest impediment to the IACHR’s protection and promotion of SRHRs 
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in the region.44 The aspects of the Commission’s approach to legal reasoning conducive to 
advancing an intersectional feminist approach to human rights will now be considered in 
relation to the friendly settlement Alba Lucía Rodríguez Cardona (Colombia). This friendly 
settlement has been chosen for close analysis because the facts of the case bear remarkable 
similarities to those of the women in El Salvador who were prosecuted and incarcerated for 
having had an abortion, as Chapter 4 will demonstrate. 
 
First filed in 2000 by the Center for Justice and International Law (CEJIL) and la Red 
Colombiana de Mujeres por los Derechos Sexuales y Reproductivos (the Colombian Network 
of Women for Sexual and Reproductive Rights), the Cardona petition alleged violations of 
article 5 (right to humane treatment), article 8 (fair trial), article 11 (privacy), article 24 
(equal protection), and article 25 (judicial protection) of the ACHR.45 These violations arose 
from the 1997 sentencing of Alba Lucía to 42 years and 5 months in prison for the alleged 
murder of her newborn baby; she had become pregnant as the result of rape and given birth to 
a stillborn baby girl in the toilet of her home.46 Accused by her attending physician of having 
murdered the baby, Cardona served almost five years of the sentence before it was overturned 
by the Supreme Court in 2002 on the grounds that offensive and discriminatory attitudes 
toward Alba Lucía informed the collection of evidence, the conduct of the trial, and her 
sentencing.47 Nine years later, in 2011, the two parties agreed to a friendly settlement.48 This 
settlement supported the petitioners’ assertion that ‘the victim’s status as an economically 
disadvantaged peasant woman and unmarried pregnant woman led to the violation of her 
fundamental rights’49 by including the following statement in the Friendly Settlement 
Agreement: 
 
Alba Lucía Rodríguez Cardona…was subjected to discriminatory prosecution based 
on gender and social status. The court proceedings in her case were plagued by 
irregularities as a consequence of the stigmas attached to her situation and the 
prejudices of public servants of the State and other key actors in the development of 
 
44 D Shelton ‘The Rules and the Reality of Petition Procedures in the Inter-American Human Rights System’ 
(2015) 5 Notre Dame Journal of International and Comparative Law, 26-8 
45 IACHR, Alba Lucía Rodríguez Cardona (Colombia). Friendly Settlement (Report No. 59/14, Case 12.376, 24 
July 2014), para 2 
46 ibid para 2 
47 ibid, paras 18-25 
48 ibid, para 4 
49 ibid, para 3 
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the case. Therefore, through its state agents, the Colombian State violated the rights of 
Alba Lucia Rodriguez Cardona enshrined in Articles 1, 5, 8 11, 24, and 25 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights, and Article 7(a), (b), (f), and (g) of the 
Convention of Belém do Pará.50 
 
By adopting the language and argumentation of the petitioners – two feminist organisations – 
and by including violations of the Belém do Pará Convention in addition to the alleged 
violations of the ACHR, the IACHR demonstrated its commitment to an intersectional 
feminist approach to IHRL. In keeping with the intersectional approach to legal reasoning 
articulated in Chapter 1, the IACHR framed of Cardona’s experiences as violations of human 
rights with their origins in deep-rooted patriarchal, misogynistic assumptions about women’s 
reproduction and sexuality. Its reasoning also represents an awareness of the ways in which 
these misogynistic assumptions interact with the discourses of race and class to result in 
disproportionate surveillance and punishment of poor, indigenous/mestiza/campesina women. 
In naming and challenging these issues, the IACHR is challenging the colonial and 
patriarchal discourses that hold that women are non-citizens and in need of regulation and 
control, instead asserting women’s right to have rights and determine the scope of those 
rights as full citizens. 
 
The awareness of a need for structural change to provide redress and prevent repeat 
violations is also evident in the measures of reparation that the IACHR obliged the 
Colombian government to undertake: not only was Colombia to provide medical, 
psychological, sexual and reproductive healthcare to Cardona and her partner, and to finance 
her education or employment training to help her ‘rebuild her life plan’,51 the state was also 
required to design and implement national training courses for civil service, as well as 
medical, psychological and psychiatric personnel, on gender perspective and professional 
privilege, with a special emphasis on gender and human rights, and overcoming stereotypes 
on the social role of women.52 This friendly settlement therefore illustrates the IACHR’s 
commitment to an intersectional feminist approach to legal reasoning which challenges 
structural inequalities that undermine human dignity and exacerbate vulnerability, and 
provides guidance on how to dismantle these structures of oppression.  
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However, there are some ways in which it could develop its non-repetition methods further 
and so improve the likelihood of state compliance. According to O’Connell, these include 
even more effective remedy design and requiring states to cooperate with civil society in 
implementing the non-repetition measures.53 For example, the Commission should provide 
details of and guidance on the ‘the quality, duration, and content’ of the required national 
training courses, and it should also require the state to report on the provision and outcomes 
of these courses.54 In regard to civil society cooperation and participation in the 
implementation of non-repetition measures, the Commission should explicitly require this in 
its friendly settlements on SRHRs, and it should require states to submit reports that outline 
its collaboration with civil society.55 Given the ongoing development of IACHR 
jurisprudence on SRHRs, and given its longstanding responsiveness to civil society 
engagement, it is likely that these recommendations will feature in future friendly 
settlements.  
 
The Cardona friendly settlement illustrates the IACHR’s awareness of structural, intersecting 
inequalities and the systemic change required to address them, and its responsiveness to 
feminist activists and their interpretation of human rights. The dynamic, progressive approach 
of the IACHR to human rights protection, an approach which is informed by an awareness of 
the historical, structural causes of human rights issues in the region, is the product of the 
historical and political context in which the IAHRS evolved, the commitment of the 
numerous Commissioners to intersectional feminism, and the responsiveness of the IACHR 
to feminist actors both within the IAHRS, such as CIM, and outside of it, such as national 
and transnational feminist organisations. The importance and utility of this for advancing the 
multilevel feminist citizenship project of SRHRs at the regional level is thus evident. The 
importance and utility of the inter-American human rights system for advancing women’s 
full citizenship at the national level is discussed in detail in the next chapter in regard to El 
Salvador. The next section considers the growing awareness within the IACtHR of 
intersectionality and the gendered nature of human rights violations, albeit at a slightly 
slower and more conservative pace than that of the IACHR. 
 
 
53 C O’Connell, ‘Litigating Reproductive Health Rights In The Inter-American System: What Does A Winning 
Case Look Like?’ (2014) 16 Health and Human Rights Journal, 125 
54 ibid, 123-4 




As mentioned in the previous chapter, the IACtHR has yet to hear a case on abortion 
specifically. However, the Court has clarified its current understanding of the right to life 
(guaranteed from the moment of conception by article 4 of the ACHR and article I of the 
American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man) in a way that has important 
implications for abortion access. In Artavia Murillo v Costa Rica, the IACtHR found that the 
State’s complete prohibition on IVF violated the 18 complainants’ rights to personal 
integrity, personal freedom, privacy, and rights of the family in relation to the equality and 
non-discrimination provision of the ACHR.56 This judgment is significant for several reasons: 
it articulated the inter-American human rights system’s commitment to SRHRs as defined 
and developed by the UN human rights system and therefore by extension by intersectional 
transnational feminists; it undertook a dynamic approach to treaty interpretation to clarify the 
meaning of ‘from the moment of conception’ in relation to the right to life; and it made some 
attempt at an intersectional approach to recognising human rights violations. However, its 
failure to engage with IACHR jurisprudence on SRHRs, a problematic understanding of 
motherhood as integral to women’s identity, and an incomplete understanding of 
intersectionality all require critique. 
 
In articulating its understanding of the right to privacy as it pertained to the case, the Court 
emphasised the interrelatedness of this right with the right to life, the right to family, the right 
to physical and mental integrity, the right to health, and the right to enjoy the benefits of 
scientific progress. In a similar fashion to the HRC’s Mellet and Whelan Views, The Court 
emphasised the centrality of ‘the reproductive rights of the individual’, as well as of 
‘reproductive autonomy’, ‘access to reproductive health services’, and ‘reproductive 
freedom’57, thus indicating awareness of and potentially support for the understanding of 
SRHRs articulated by intersectional feminists. The IACtHR also directly quoted the 
definitions of SRHRs articulated by the 1994 ICPD Programme of Action, 1995 Beijing 
Declaration and Platform for Action, and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in its judgment. This commitment to the interrelated nature of human rights of 
relevance to SRHRs, to reproductive autonomy and reproductive freedom, and its references 
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to the ICPD and Beijing PFAs indicate the IACtHR’s commitment to feminist understandings 
of IHRL that centre women’s right to have rights and to determine the scope of those rights.  
 
The Court’s dynamic interpretation of the Convention in light of other international and 
regional human rights bodies’ jurisprudence, specifically the right to life as enshrined in 
article 4(1) ACHR, is one of the major developments this case made to its jurisprudence. Its 
analysis of this article was in response to the fact that the de facto ban on IVF in Costa Rica 
arose from the 2000 ruling by the Costa Rican Supreme Court’s Constitutional Chamber that 
article 4(1) ACHR accorded ‘full recognition of the legal and real personality of the unborn 
child and its rights’ and that the voluntary or involuntary ‘elimination or destruction of 
embryos’ during IVF treatment violated this.58 To counter this assertion, the IACtHR 
interpreted ‘conception’ as occurring at the moment of implantation, and interpreted any right 
to life of embryos as ‘gradual and incremental according to its development.’59 Moreover, 
since the Costa Rican Court claimed that the UDHR, ICCPR, Convention on the Rights of the 
Child, and 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the Child also guaranteed an absolute right to 
life from the moment of conception, the Inter-American Court analysed them to demonstrate 
that such a conclusion was mistaken and would jeopardise the human rights of pregnant 
people.60 In doing so, it drew attention to General Comments, Concluding Observations and 
Views issued by the UN Human Rights Committee and the CEDAW Committee that a ‘total 
ban on abortion, as well as its criminalization under certain circumstances’ violates the 
CEDAW Convention and could also violate women’s right to life as enshrined in the 
ICCPR.61 It also referred to regional human rights standards, specifically the ‘non-absolute 
scope of the protection of prenatal life in the context of cases of abortion and medical 
treatments related to in vitro fertilization’ in the European system, and the provisions on 
sexual and reproductive rights in the African system’s Maputo Protocol.62 As such, it is clear 
that feminist interpretations of international human rights standards on SRHRs are exerting 
an influence on the Court’s reasoning. This represents the Court’s openness to developments 
in other human rights systems, as well as an understanding of human rights that is influenced 
by feminist approaches. Despite these significant gains, there are limits to the Court’s 
approach, however: these are its failure to engage with IACHR jurisprudence on SRHRs, a 
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problematic understanding of motherhood as integral to women’s identity, and an incomplete 
understanding of intersectionality. 
 
Firstly, the Court did not allude to the work of the IACHR on SRHRs in its discussion of the 
inter-American system.63 This oversight is surprising, given the extensive work on the topic 
that the IACHR has undertaken, and given that the IACHR refers cases to the IACtHR. 
Indeed, the rules of procedure for both bodies set out a close working relationship between 
the two.64 In future jurisprudence, it is hoped that the Court will make direct references to the 
IACHR’s work on SRHRs in the interests of demonstrating a unified inter-American human 
rights system position on SRHRs, and in the interests of advancing the intersectional feminist 
approach that the IACHR has embraced vis-à-vis SRHRs. 
 
Secondly, the Court reiterated its problematic stance from Gelman v Uruguay that 
‘motherhood is an essential part of the free development of a woman’s personality.’65 This 
phrasing is reminiscent of the discourses of women-as-mothers and women-as-non-citizens 
that actively work against women’s right to have rights and to determine the scope of those 
rights. By stating that motherhood is ‘essential’ to ‘a woman’s personality’, the Court fails to 
recognise that not all women want to become mothers and also fails to recognise that women 
who are mothers are not reduced to or defined by that one aspect of their identity. By using 
the ‘essential’ nature of motherhood as the basis for including the decision of whether or not 
to become a parent within the scope of the right to privacy, the Court perpetuated the 
public/private dichotomy of reproduction/politics and also perpetuated the discourses of 
women-as-mothers and women-as-non-citizens as explained in Chapters 1 and 2. Had the 
Court phrased this assertion in a more nuanced fashion – for example by recognising that for 
those wish to become parents (not just mothers), the ability to do so is of vital importance to 
their wellbeing and autonomy – it could have challenged these discourses which work to 
impede women’s full citizenship. 
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Thirdly, the Court’s attempt at an intersectional approach, while a welcome step in the right 
direction, did not always represent an accurate understanding of the concept. The Court 
discussed intersectionality in relation to the ways in which the ban on IVF differentially 
impacted the complainants according to disability, gender, and socioeconomic situation, 
emphasising the importance of the principle of non-discrimination and the importance of 
challenging both direct and indirect discrimination.66 While this is a welcome development 
for the multilevel feminist citizenship project, the Court’s presentation of its analysis and its 
failure to fully develop certain aspects of it indicate that the Court still needs to refine its 
understanding the concept and practice of intersectionality. Firstly, its presentation of its 
analysis – discussing each of the three categories of gender, class and disability under 
separate sub-headings – makes it seem as though these categories are separate and additive, 
rather than interrelated and interacting in complex ways; emphasising the interrelated nature 
of these identities and power structures in its analysis would have gone some way to address 
this.67 Secondly, although its attention to the social model of disability and its understanding 
of involuntary fertility as a disability are progressive and reasonably nuanced, it failed to 
reflect on the fact that one of the petitioners was paraplegic and so might have experienced 
specific barriers and prejudices in accessing IVF.68 Discussing this particular issue in greater 
depth would have made for a more complete engagement with an intersectional feminist 
approach to legal reasoning. 
 
Despite these shortcomings, Artavia Murillo sets an important precedent for SRHR cases in 
relation to the right to life, and it also suggests that the Court is slowly adapting a more 
intersectional approach to judicial reasoning. Ongoing engagement with UN SRHR 
standards, further engagement with the IACHR’s work on SRHRs, and a more 
comprehensive understanding of intersectionality will improve further on these promising 




The inter-American human rights system, particularly the IACHR, has demonstrated a firm 
commitment to the respect, protection, and fulfilment of SRHRs including abortion access. 
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This is the result of its openness to developments in other human rights systems, the 
particular approach to human rights protection it has developed as a result of the specific 
political and historical context in the region, and (as discussed in Chapter 2) the existence of 
an organisation dedicated to women’s human rights in the form of CIM. The Cardona 
petition illustrated the IACHR’s commitment to SRHRs and intersectional feminist legal 
reasoning through adopting the language and argumentation of the two feminist organisation 
petitioners, through a focus on restorative and transformative justice, and through an 
approach to legal reasoning that is clearly informed by intersectional feminist understandings 
of the structural causes of inequality and the need for structural change to address them. 
While the IACtHR’s approach to SRHRs and intersectional feminist legal reasoning in 
Artavia Murillo was somewhat less effective due to a failure to engage with IACHR 
jurisprudence on SRHRs, a problematic understanding of motherhood as integral to women’s 
identity, and an incomplete understanding of intersectionality, it nevertheless indicated 
awareness of and commitment to SRHRs. The IACtHR did so by articulating the inter-
American human rights system’s commitment to SRHRs as defined and developed by the UN 
human rights system and therefore by extension by intersectional transnational feminists; 
undertaking a dynamic approach to treaty interpretation to clarify the meaning of ‘from the 
moment of conception’ in relation to the right to life; and making some attempt at an 
intersectional approach to recognising human rights violations. Overall, then, the inter-
American human rights system is proving to be a responsive actor and important site for the 
realisation of the multilevel feminist citizenship project that is SRHRs. This is in marked 
contrast to the ECtHR, which has taken a deferential and conservative approach to SRHRs. 
3.3. Abortion in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR and ECSR 
Introduction 
 
Of the three human rights systems under consideration here, the European system has heard 
the most cases concerning abortion.69 It has also taken the most conservative approach to the 
human rights implications of restrictive abortion legislation: rather than acknowledging the 
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discriminatory intent underlying restrictive abortion legislation or the negative human rights 
impact of restrictive abortion legislation and ruling accordingly, the European human rights 
system maintains that states are entitled to determine the scope of abortion legislation, and 
that violations of the Convention will only arise if abortion is not accessible in the 
circumstances where it has been legalised.70 As will be demonstrated, this has resulted in the 
European human rights system perpetuating the androcentric biases in legal reasoning that 
were highlighted in the previous chapters: taking male experience as the normative standard, 
perpetuating the public/private dichotomy of international/domestic law, and perpetuating the 
public/private dichotomy of civil and political/economic, social and cultural rights.71  
 
Three ways in which this androcentric approach to legal reasoning is evident in the structure 
and jurisprudence of the ECtHR and ECSR are discussed in this section. Firstly, the fact that 
the Court is responsible for civil and political rights and the Committee is responsible for 
economic, social and cultural rights – and the fact that the Court is the main body for the 
protection and promotion of human rights in CoE Member States – represents the 
perpetuation of the civil and political/economic, social and cultural rights dichotomy 
highlighted by feminists as detrimental to the full realisation of women’s human rights.72 
Human rights issues of particular concern to women, such as access to reproductive 
healthcare, have to be juxtaposed onto a rights framework that neither represents nor 
responds to their needs and realities, a framework that is based on narrow understandings of 
civil and political rights that take men to be the normative standard.73 Secondly, the ECtHR’s 
androcentric approach to legal reasoning is evident in its narrow and inaccurate approach to 
interpreting both the right to privacy and the right to be free from torture/CIDT. Thirdly, an 
androcentric approach to legal reasoning is evident in the jurisprudence of both the ECtHR 
and the ECSR in their formal rather than substantive approach to equality. It is also evident in 
their stance that the legality of abortion can be determined by states: the European human 
rights systems’ deferential approach to human rights protection as expressed through the 
doctrines of the margin of appreciation and European consensus – and the ways in which the 
Court interpreted these doctrines in relation to A, B and C v Ireland – resulted in the Court 
according unjust state practice greater precedence than women’s human rights. As the below 
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case analyses demonstrate, as a result of the interaction of these three issues, the European 
human rights system has failed to represent or respond to the real human rights issues that 
result from restrictive abortion legislation, namely the ongoing subordination of women and 
their exclusion from full citizenship. While the previous chapter highlighted that the 
European human rights system has articulated a commitment to SRHRs in recent years, this 
commitment exists in name only since the real meaning and transformative goal of SRHRs 




As discussed in the previous chapter, the ECtHR (and until 1998 its associated Commission) 
has heard cases on abortion since the late 1970s.74 Its most recent jurisprudence on the 
subject dates from the 2000s and 2010s.75 While the Court has on occasion found in favour of 
the applicants, ruling that there had been a violation of Convention rights as a result of their 
experiences when attempting to obtain an abortion to which they were legally required, the 
legal reasoning employed to come to this conclusion is fundamentally flawed. The Court’s 
stance is that states have a margin of appreciation in determining the scope of domestic 
abortion legislation, and simply have to ensure that where legal, abortion should be 
accessible.76 This means that states are under a positive obligation to implement a clear legal 
and procedural framework under which women can establish whether they are legally entitled 
to an abortion, and they should also have access to an appeals mechanism if they are refused 
access to an abortion.77  
 
Such an approach fails to address the real-world human rights issues arising from restrictive 
abortion legislation: that restrictive abortion legislation negates women’s and girls’ ability to 
make decisions about their own bodies and lives, and that such legislation has its origins in 
the desire to control women’s reproductive ability in the service of a patriarchal social order 
which requires the negation of women’s status as rights-bearers/citizens. In essence, the 
Court is asking the wrong questions when cases concerning alleged human rights violations 
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arising from restrictive abortion legislation come before it:78 rather than considering the 
rationale and impact of restrictive abortion legislation – legislation most likely passed by 
predominately male legislatures – vis-à-vis women’s human rights, the Court limits itself to 
determining whether or not such legislation passes a proportionality test that also fails to 
represent or respond to the women’s lived realities. The Grand Chamber ruling in A, B and C 
v Ireland represents these issues, as well as the problematic approach of the Court to defining 
the nature and scope of the right to privacy, the right to be free from torture and CIDT, and 
the right to equality and non-discrimination. 
 
A, B and C v Ireland concerned three applicants who had to travel to the UK for abortions: A 
for personal, socioeconomic and mental health reasons; B because she did not want to 
become a single parent; and C because continuing with the pregnancy would likely cause her 
cancer to return.79 A and B’s experiences highlighted the financial difficulties engendered by 
having to organise travel and treatment abroad, as well as the sense of shame and need for 
secrecy, and the fear of seeking medical care on return to Ireland.80 C’s experience 
highlighted the lack of guidance and information available to women in Ireland considering 
an abortion.81 All three women’s experiences demonstrated the ways in which having to 
travel to England resulted in delays, complications, and disruptions to care, such as by having 
to have a surgical rather than medical abortion, feeling unable to tell their regular GP that 
they had had an abortion, and the lack of follow-up physical or mental healthcare on return to 
Ireland.82 All three experienced complications following the procedure once back in Ireland, 
with A having to be taken to hospital by ambulance for emergency care, B ‘passing blood 
clots’, and C experiencing ‘prolonged bleeding and infection.’83 A and B alleged that the 
prohibition of abortion in Ireland violated their right to be free from torture and CIDT (article 
3), their right to privacy (article 8), and the right to an effective remedy (article 13) in 
conjunction with the prohibition of discrimination (article 14).84 C alleged that her inability to 
establish her right to a lawful abortion in Ireland on the grounds of a risk to her life violated 
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these rights as well as her right to life (article 2).85 Despite considering the ICPD and Beijing 
PFAs – and despite acknowledging concerns about Ireland’s restrictive abortion legislation 
raised by the CoE’s Commissioner for Human Rights, the CEDAW Committee and the UN 
Human Rights Committee – the Court found that there had been no violation of the 
applicants’ rights, with the exception of C’s right to privacy.86 The Court’s reasoning in 
relation to torture/CIDT, privacy, and non-discrimination will be now discussed in turn. 
 
In regard to torture/CIDT, the Court continued to foreground an understanding of experiences 
amounting to torture grounded in the male embodied experience. In contrast to the UN 
HRC’s findings in Mellet and Whelan and in contrast to developments in the understanding 
of torture and CIDT articulated by the UN human rights system, the ECtHR ruled that the 
psychological and financial burden of having to travel abroad for an abortion, the disruption 
in continuity of care, and the negative psychological and physical health impacts of this ‘did 
not disclose a level of severity falling within the scope of Article 3.’87 This marked a 
divergence in the Court’s jurisprudence on abortion: in both RR v Poland and P and S v 
Poland, the ECtHR found there to have been a violation of this right as a result of the 
applicants’ vulnerability and their experiences.88 While the facts of the Polish abortion cases 
differ from those in A, B and C v Ireland, the applicants’ physical, psychological and 
socioeconomic vulnerability, the medical complications they experienced following their 
abortions, and the profound sense of shame and humiliation they felt as a result of Ireland’s 
ban on abortion could and should have been interpreted as meeting the minimum threshold of 
severity.89 The Court’s ruling could and should have recognised these women’s experiences 
as amounting to torture/CIDT by recognising the discriminatory and stigmatising rationale 
and impact of Ireland’s abortion legislation, and by recognising the physical, psychological, 
and emotional toll of these women’s experiences as meeting the minimal threshold of 
severity. 
 
The Court’s androcentric liberal legal reasoning was also apparent in its finding that the 
interference with A and B’s right to privacy was justified.90 In contrast to the UN and inter-
American human rights systems’ approaches, the Court did not recognise reproductive 
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autonomy as falling within the scope of this right. Instead, it reiterated the problematic 
Brüggemann v Scheuten precedent that ‘pregnancy cannot be said to pertain uniquely to the 
sphere of private life’ and that ‘not every regulation of abortion amounts to interference with 
the right to respect for private life.’91 In light of this, the Court found that Ireland had not 
exceeded the margin of appreciation afforded to it in enacting restrictive abortion legislation 
supposedly based on the ‘profound moral views of the Irish people as to the nature of life.’92 
That these supposedly ‘profound moral views’ could override European consensus (the 
majority of CoE Member States permit access to abortion in at least some circumstances) and 
widen the margin of appreciation afforded to Ireland was in marked contrast to the rest of the 
Court’s jurisprudence, and it was rightly criticised as ‘a real and dangerous new departure in 
the Court’s case-law’ by the joint partly dissenting opinion of six of the Court’s judges and 
numerous case commentaries.93 
 
The Court’s reasoning was that since the applicants had had access to information and 
medical care in Ireland, and since they were legally permitted to travel abroad for an 
abortion, the state had struck the appropriate balance between their right to privacy and the 
‘legitimate’ aim of protecting these profound moral views on the right to life of the unborn.94 
In coming to its conclusion that the Irish people still held the ‘profound moral views’ that had 
informed the introduction of Article 40.3.3o to the Constitution through a referendum 
characterised by low turnout almost thirty years previously, the Court dismissed evidence 
indicating popular support for liberalisation of Irish abortion legislation.95 Moreover, the 
Court failed to acknowledge the financial, psychological and – for migrant and asylum-
seeking women – legal difficulties in being forced to travel abroad for a time-sensitive 
medical procedure that often requires physical and psychological aftercare. It also failed to 
acknowledge that the many high-profile cases and controversies arising from Ireland’s 
restrictive abortion legislation – discussed in Chapter 5 – that had demonstrated the negative 
human rights implications of Ireland’s abortion legislation. Instead of taking these important 
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considerations into account, the Court validated the specious arguments of successive Irish 
governments that Article 40.3.3o of the Irish Constitution reflected ‘the deeply held and 
profound moral position of the Irish people when it comes to abortion’ to such an extent that 
even entertaining the idea of a referendum and legislative reform would be too sensitive and 
complex.96 Despite IHRL’s established stance at this point that restrictions on reproductive 
healthcare services including abortion could result in human rights violations, despite clear 
evidence that Ireland’s abortion legislation had resulted in harms to multiple women (not 
least among them A, B and C), and despite the majority of other CoE Member States having 
far less restrictive abortion legislation, the Court evaded its responsibility to adjudicate by 
finding that abortion was ‘quite simply, for the national polity to decide.’97 Deciding that 
abortion was a matter for domestic rather than international law perpetuated the 
public/private dichotomy of international/domestic law and concerns that feminists have 
criticised as a major impediment to the realisation of women’s rights and citizenship.98 As 
well as perpetuating this false dichotomy, the Court’s approach to privacy does not situate 
individual agency within the context of wider power relations, as a feminist approach to the 
right to privacy informed by reproductive autonomy or relational autonomy would have.99 In 
other words, the Court’s liberal legal understanding of the individual failed to recognise that 
just because these women could exercise a degree of free will and agency by travelling to the 
UK for an abortion did not mean that they were not harmed by the structural inequalities of 
gender and socioeconomic disadvantage informing their experiences of Ireland’s restrictive 
legislation. The ECtHR’s approach to the right to privacy in this case represents the Court’s 
unwillingness and inability to recognise the inherently discriminatory nature of restrictive 
abortion legislation and the human rights violations which it causes. Its unquestioning 
acceptance of the Irish government’s arguments regarding “profound moral values” and its 
excessive deference to them represents at best an unwillingness to challenge female 
subordination before the law, and, at worst, tacit support for it. 
 
While the Court decided that C’s right to privacy had been violated, the basis for this finding 
was fundamentally flawed. Rather than highlighting the ways in which such a restrictive 
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legislative context was counter to the full realisation of women’s human rights and 
citizenship, the Court found that a violation of the right to privacy had occurred because the 
State failed to implement a legislative or regulatory regime providing an accessible and 
effective procedure by which she could have established whether she qualified for a lawful 
abortion in Ireland.100 Again, as a result of its liberal legal reasoning and its focus on 
proportionality, the Court failed to recognise the lived experiences of women when 
considering human rights issues arising from restrictive abortion legislation. 
 
As for violations of the prohibition on discrimination and the right to an effective remedy, the 
Court decided that there was no need to examine complaints separately under article 14, and 
that no separate issues arose under article 13.101 This is because of the subsidiary nature of 
article 14, whereby a violation of article 14 will not be examined by the Court when it has 
already found a violation of other Convention rights.102 Rather than a commitment to equality 
and non-discrimination being the cornerstone of human rights interpretation, the Court 
considers this principle an add-on. This means that the opportunity for adjudication to name, 
make visible, and address human rights violations arising from structural inequalities such as 
sexism is foreclosed. As with the failure to discuss the right to information in the Mellet and 
Whelan Views, the structure of the Convention and the Court’s interpretation of it represents 
a missed opportunity to emphasise the supposedly interrelated and indivisible nature of 
human rights and instead creates a hierarchy between rights. Again, the hierarchical, 
dichotomous nature of androcentric Western liberal legal reasoning is evident. 
 
The persistence of formal equality approaches to legal reasoning and their reliance on the 
male as normative standard is evident in the Court’s approach to non-discrimination in this 
case. As has been noted by scholars and even Court judges themselves, the Court has yet to 
fully develop a substantive conception of equality.103 While there has been some 
development in the ECtHR’s anti-discrimination jurisprudence in recent years through an 
increase in cases in which article 14 has been invoked, the development of the concept of 
vulnerable groups, and the adoption of Protocol 12 on non-discrimination, there is still ‘a 
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regrettable lack of overall coherence’, a dilution of the ‘special protection’ supposed to be 
afforded to recognised minority groups through the margin of appreciation, and considerable 
‘evidentiary hurdles’ to proving discriminatory intent in its article 14 and Protocol 12 
jurisprudence.104 Furthermore, even though scholars have noted a shift towards substantive 
equality approaches in the Court’s recent jurisprudence through the introduction of the 
concept of vulnerable groups,105 the Court’s conceptualisation of vulnerable groups has not 
sufficiently acknowledged that this vulnerability is the result of historic and ongoing unequal 
power relations that require structural change to remedy, i.e., the understanding of 
vulnerability that was articulated in Chapter 1 of this thesis. The Court also persists in using a 
comparator in its supposed substantive equality reasoning, even though substantive equality 
reasoning should not require a comparator since it considers whether provisions are 
inherently discriminatory in that they deny the full enjoyment of an individual or group’s 
human rights.106 As such, while the Court’s jurisprudence indicates movement in a more 
progressive direction, it still falls short of the intersectional feminist approach that SRHRs 
and by extension women’s full citizenship require. These issues were apparent in the A, B 
and C case. 
 
In A, B and C, the Court did not engage with the applicants’ allegations that ‘the 
criminalisation of abortion was discriminatory’ and that ‘the stigma and taboo effect of the 
criminalisation of abortion’ amounted to degrading treatment.107  Since the Court favours a 
formal equality approach, and there was no available comparator (i.e. no cisgender man can 
experience being forced to travel abroad for an abortion), the Court was unwilling or unable 
to recognise the structural nature of discrimination that restrictive abortion legislation caused. 
As noted by O’Connell, the Court’s adherence to formal equality approaches at this time, 
with their focus on comparator requirements and grounds for distinction mean the Court did 
not meaningfully consider ‘central questions in substantive equality inquiries.’108 
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The Court’s commitment to non-discrimination and equality is further weakened by its 
prioritisation of civil and political over economic, social and cultural rights.109 Since the 
Convention does not protect social, economic and cultural rights of potential relevance to 
SRHRs, and since the Court has taken such a narrow approach to interpreting freedom from 
torture/CIDT and privacy, the ability of women to articulate rights claims relating to SRHRs 
such as abortion is circumscribed. While there are some indications that the Court is 
increasingly considering socioeconomic factors in its analysis of potential human rights 
violations, and while Protocol 12 opens up the possibility of the ECtHR having to interpret 
the ESC,110 in regard to abortion it is only in certain, exceptional circumstances that women’s 
inability to access a medical procedure in a straightforward, safe, and timely manner will be 
framed as a violation of human rights in light of the Court’s current jurisprudence. Therefore, 
the ways in which women are excluded from exercising their human rights through restrictive 
abortion legislation cannot be recognised by the European human rights system as it currently 
stands because of its indebtedness to the androcentric liberal legal tradition. As a result, 
experiences that cannot be accounted for by the male as normative standard or by a 
dichotomous, hierarchical understanding of rights will not be named as subjects of human 




Whereas the IAHRS and the UN have asserted that abortion should be decriminalised at least 
in some circumstances in order to prevent violations of women’s human rights, the ECtHR 
still maintains that states have a margin of appreciation in determining the legislation on 
abortion. It is only where abortion is legal and not accessible that violations of the 
Convention may arise. This stance fails to acknowledge the origins and consequences of 
restrictive abortion legislation vis-à-vis the status of women – something the dissenting and 
separate opinions in Brüggemann and Scheuten recognised over forty years ago when they 
highlighted the fact that ‘over-restrictive legislation not only fails to prevent ‘back-street 
abortions’…but may even encourage recourse to them’111 and asserted that ‘the self-
determination of women’ was the crux of the matter in adjudicating on restrictive abortion 
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legislation.112 The Court’s current approach to cases concerning access to abortion is based in 
an adherence to androcentric liberal legal reasoning that fails to represent or respond to the 
lived realities of women. This is impeding the full realisation of women’s citizenship, 
understood as their right to have rights and to determine the scope of those rights. As will be 
discussed in Chapter 5, its conservative, deferential approach to human rights protection may 
have resulted in partial advances for women’s human rights in Ireland, but it consistently 
failed to consider the underlying discriminatory rationale and real-world impact of Ireland’s 




As mentioned in the previous chapter, the ECSR is responsible for examining State 
compliance with the European Social Charter (ESC) through examining national reports 
submitted by States Parties, and through a collective complaints procedure open to approved 
organisations. While it has recognised the legitimacy of SRHRs as a family of human rights, 
and while it has been drawn upon UN SRHR standards in making some of its decisions, it has 
also replicated some of the more problematic aspects of the ECtHR’s approach from a 
feminist perspective, such as the deferential approach to states’ abortion legislation, the 
failure to recognise the real human rights issues at play in abortion cases, and a narrow 
understanding of non-discrimination.  
 
The ECSR has considered three cases concerning abortion, all of which have found that 
abortion access falls within the scope of article 11 (the rights to health) and article E (non-
discrimination) of the ECSR, and two of which found that disproportionate restrictions on 
abortion access result in violations of these rights.113 In IPPF-EN v Italy, the ECSR found 
there to be a violation of article 11(1) and article E due to the overly-broad nature of domestic 
conscientious objection provisions relating to abortion.114 In its survey of relevant law, the 
Committee referred to ICESCR, ICCPR, CEDAW, the CESCR’s General Comment No. 14 
and its discussion of non-discrimination in the provision of healthcare to women, CEDAW’s 
General Recommendation No. 24 on Women and Health, and WHO’s technical and policy 
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guidance of health systems on access to abortion and conscientious objection.115 This 
indicates some engagement with UN SRHR standards on the part of this body, which is to be 
commended because it represents a responsiveness to the intersectional feminist ideal of 
SRHRs that influenced this UN SRHR jurisprudence. 
 
The Committee’s assertion that ‘the right to protection of health guaranteed in Article 11 of 
the Charter’ complements ‘the protection afforded to the principle of human dignity by 
Articles 2 and 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights’ is also welcome, given that it 
recognises the interdependent, interrelated, and indivisible nature of these rights and thus 
goes some way to overcome the divide between civil and political rights on the one hand and 
economic, social and cultural rights on the other.116 Moreover, the Committee goes on to state 
that there is a positive obligation upon States to ‘provide appropriate and timely health care 
on a non-discriminatory basis, including services relating to sexual and reproductive health’ 
to ensure that the principles of human dignity and non-discrimination, and the right to health 
are respected, protected and fulfilled.117 This too represents the Committee’s commitment to 
the legitimacy of SRHRs, as well as awareness of the fact that SRHRs encompass a number 
of core human rights and their underlying principles. 
 
Despite these indications that the ECSR is aware of and committed to the holistic nature of 
SRHRs, the ECSR also replicates some of the more problematic elements of androcentric 
liberal legal reasoning apparent in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. Firstly, the Committee 
claimed that the issue which it had been asked to rule on was how Italy’s organisation of 
sexual and reproductive healthcare impacted upon the enjoyment of the right to protection of 
health, and not ‘whether individuals enjoy a right to obtain an abortion.’118 In reality, these 
two issues are not separate, as the Committee claimed, but in fact one and the same: as has 
been recognised by the UN and inter-American human rights systems, ensuring that 
individuals can access abortion care in at least some circumstances is integral to the right to 
health and to the full realisation of SRHRs, and ensuring access to abortion care is directly 
impacted upon by how a state organises and regulates sexual and reproductive healthcare. To 
make such a distinction is specious, and it contradicts the ECSR’s own assertion that ‘States 
must provide appropriate and timely health care on a non-discriminatory basis, including 
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services relating to sexual and reproductive health’ and that ‘a health care system which does 
not provide for the specific health needs of women will not be in conformity with Article 11, 
or with Article E of the Charter taken together with Article 11.’119  
 
Along with this inaccurate distinction between SRHRs on the one hand and abortion access 
on the other, the Committee reiterates the ECtHR’s stance that the legality of abortion can be 
determined by states and that therefore the only issue is that where legal, abortion should be 
accessible.120 As already discussed, this approach to abortion falls short of the intersectional 
feminist, UN, and inter-American stance that abortion should be decriminalised in some, if 
not all, circumstances to prevent violations of women’s human rights. Therefore, even though 
the Committee did find a violation of Article 11 and Article E,121 the basis of its legal 
reasoning was far narrower than that which is required to guarantee the full and meaningful 
realisation of women’s human rights. Italy was found responsible for violations of this right 
because it was not ensuring the effective implementation of existing legislation, and not 
because restrictions on abortion access violate, among others, the right to health and the 
principle of non-discrimination.122 
 
Finally, the ECSR also replicates the ECtHR’s problematic equality reasoning. Rather than 
taking the substantive equality approach of considering whether the legislation in question 
had the purpose or effect or inhibiting women’s full human rights, the Committee made use 
of the formal equality approach of comparators to determine whether there had been a breach 
of the principle of non-discrimination. Therefore, rather than the inability to access legal 
abortion care being framed as inherently discriminatory and as having a direct bearing on 
women’s ability to enjoy the full range of their human rights, the Committee framed 
inequality as something which only occurs when ‘similarly situated individuals’ are not 
afforded identical treatment.123 This perpetuates the idea that there is some kind of neutral, 
normative standard against which behaviour and experience must be measured; given that 
this neutral, normative standard is in fact value-laden and based on the heterosexual, middle-
class, non-disabled, white male experience, such an approach is unable to represent or 
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respond to the complexities of lived experiences that fall outside their scope. As a result, the 
Committee created the constructs of ‘discrimination on the grounds of territorial and/or 
socio-economic status between women who have relatively unimpeded access to lawful 
abortion facilities and those who do not’ and ‘discrimination on the grounds of gender and/or 
health status between women seeking access to lawful termination procedures and men and 
women seeking access to other lawful forms of medical procedures’,124 both of which only 
partly capture the human rights issues at stake in this case, namely the ways in which 
restrictive abortion legislation has the purpose and effect of restricting women’s human 
rights.  
 
However, as with the concurring opinions in the HRC’s Mellet and Whelan, there is evidence 
that the ECSR may yet adopt a different approach, one which employs a more expansive 
understanding of discrimination that better serves the systemic change that the realisation of 
SRHRs requires. In his concurring opinion to the IPPF v Italy decision, Committee member 
Stangos took a more structural and discursive approach, arguing that ‘the fundamental 
structure’ of Italy’s abortion legislation resulted in violations of Article 11 of the Charter.125 
He argued that ‘women’s freedom and independence and their control over their bodies and 
personalities are at risk of being seriously undermined’ by the Italian abortion legislation, 
which, in his words, put in place ‘a whole set of institutional and operational machinery’ that 
operates to dissuade women from having an abortion and instead forces them to ‘ultimately 
“choos[e]” to give birth.’126 In effect, Stangos recognised that the origins and rationale of 
Italy’s abortion legislation was to deny women’s right to have rights and determine the scope 
of those rights and to ensure that they fulfil their role of women-as-mothers and women-as-
non-citizens. Moreover, he also highlighted the problematic nature of the Committee’s 
reasoning, stating that it was ‘not fully in tune with the real issues raised by this complaint’, 
which as intersectional feminist approaches to SRHRs attest, centre on ‘women’s right to 
abortion as a right stemming from, and forming part of every human being’s right to self-
determination.’127 In articulating such a position, Stangos recognised that the Committee 
should have engaged in a more in-depth critique of Italy’s abortion legislation. Such a 
critique of the legislation could and should have recognised that the legislation’s intention is 
the regulation of women’s reproduction in the service of a patriarchal social order predicated 
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upon women’s exclusion from citizenship and rights. As with the other jurisprudence 
analysed in this chapter, then, IPPF v Italy provides insight into the tensions between the 
transformative approach SRHRs require and the traditional androcentric liberal legal 




In 1975, one of the key players in the drawing up of the ECHR stated that ‘the Convention is 
not designed to promote social reform.’128 The above review of A, B and C v Ireland suggests 
that such an understanding persists in key ECtHR jurisprudence on SRHRs. In contrast to 
intersectional feminist understandings of IHRL as a means to advance social change and 
contest women’s exclusion from and oppression by the traditional citizenship discourse, the 
ECtHR still understands the ECHR as offering a minimal standard of human rights protection 
under which CoE Member States should not fall. Given that the Court’s mandate is ‘to 
effectively protect fundamental rights’, in reality ‘the scope of application of fundamental 
rights should be interpreted broadly, and limitations restrictively.’129 Therefore, the Court 
should adopt the more progressive, dynamic approach to human rights interpretation of the 
UN and Inter-American human rights system. The doctrine of the Convention as a living 
instrument, first articulated in 1978,130 may provide the Court with a basis for doing so, and 
so this is an area deserving further consideration from a feminist standpoint. For the present, 
the Court’s deferential approach to human rights protection as epitomised by the margin of 
appreciation and European consensus doctrines, the persistence of formal equality approaches 
in its reasoning, and the lack of attention to economic, social and cultural rights, makes it an 
actor that has impeded, rather than advanced, the intersectional feminist understanding of 
SRHRs necessary for their full realisation and, by extension, women’s full citizenship. 
 
The Court’s increasing attention to substantive equality issues through its conceptualisation 
of vulnerable groups and its potential new obligation to interpret the ESC as a result of 
Protocol 12, may yet go some way to addressing these issues. The more progressive approach 
of the ECSR, and the strong commitment to SRHRs including the decriminalisation of 
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abortion on the part of the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, might also exert an 
influence on the Court in the coming years. Until then, the jurisprudence of the European 
human rights system will be unable to represent and respond to women’s lived realities, 
therefore circumscribing their right to have rights and determine the scope of those rights and 
instead perpetuating the legal constructs of women as divergent from the male norm and of 




This chapter undertook a critical feminist reading of sample UN human rights treaty 
monitoring body, IACHR/IACtHR, and ECtHR/ECSR jurisprudence on abortion. In doing 
so, it demonstrated that the feminist aim of realising women’s full citizenship in the form of 
advancing SRHRs is an ongoing and contested process because of the persistence of liberal 
legal reasoning in these bodies’ jurisprudence. As indicated by certain aspects of the 
judgements, as well as concurring and dissenting opinions, there is some evidence that these 
bodies are moving toward legal reasoning that is more in keeping an intersectional feminist 
approach that recognises systemic inequality and the specific steps required to represent and 
respond to women’s lived realities. Of the three systems, the inter-American seems to have 
advanced the legitimacy of SRHRs and their transformative intersectional feminist core to 
greatest effect, closely followed by the UN system and with the European system lagging 
behind. 
 
Part one analysed the HRC Views Mellet v Ireland and Whelan v Ireland, finding that this 
UN human rights treaty monitoring body has to a considerable extent adopted an 
intersectional feminist approach to legal reasoning. While it articulated an understanding of 
freedom from CIDT and the right to privacy that represented and responded to the lived 
realities of these women, and while it named the harms they experienced as human rights 
violations, it could have advanced an intersectional feminist approach even further by 
considering the intent and purpose elements of torture; engaging with the freedom to seek, 




Part two discussed sample jurisprudence of the IACHR and the IACtHR, arguing that the 
IACHR’s approach – particularly its emphasis on restorative/transformative justice and a 
commitment to an intersectional and substantive understanding of equality – is most in 
keeping with that envisaged by intersectional feminists in relation to the full realisation of 
SRHRs and, by extension, women’s citizenship. While the IACtHR has also demonstrated a 
commitment to SRHRs in its jurisprudence, its legal reasoning continues to be inhibited by 
essentialist notions of women and their reproduction, as well as a partial understanding of 
intersectionality and substantive equality. 
 
Part three considered the ECtHR and ECSR’s abortion jurisprudence, and it came to the 
conclusion that these bodies still employ androcentric liberal legal reasoning that cannot 
adequately represent or respond to women’s lived realities. These limitations are especially 
apparent in regard to the conceptualisation of non-discrimination, the right to privacy, the 
right to be free from torture/CIDT, and the system’s deferential approach to human rights 
protection as epitomised by its margin of appreciation and European consensus doctrines. A 
clear understanding of and commitment to substantive understandings of inequality, a more 
nuanced understanding of the right to privacy than current dichotomous approaches, and a 
more holistic understanding of freedom from torture/CIDT in light of developments within 
the UN human rights system would go some way to address these issues. So too would a 
revised approach to the margin of appreciation and European consensus doctrines, one which 
recognises that applying such doctrines in the case of the systemic exclusion and oppression 
of the Court’s ‘vulnerable groups’ is inappropriate and counter to the respect, protection, and 
fulfilment of their human rights.  
 
While the development of IHRL by international and regional human rights bodies is a vital 
space for ongoing feminist engagement, human rights are only meaningful if they are 
respected, protected and fulfilled at the national level. These spaces – international, regional 
and domestic – are interrelated. As such, the next two chapters consider the ways in which 
feminist activists in El Salvador and Ireland have made use of the language and mechanisms 
of human rights at the domestic, regional and international level of the human rights system 







This chapter argues that feminist activism for abortion access in El Salvador can be 
understood as a multilevel feminist citizenship project. Feminists are working at the 
interconnected domestic, regional, international, and transnational levels of the human rights 
system to contest their exclusion from and oppression by the traditional discourse of 
citizenship as represented by the complete criminalisation of abortion. They are doing so 
through a ‘multidimensional’ strategy which involves gathering research and evidence, 
campaigning and raising awareness, alliance-building with actors who share their aims, and 
strategic litigation.1  
 
Part 1 provides a general overview of the situation in El Salvador. This overview is necessary 
since, as mentioned in Chapter 1 of this thesis, El Salvador is ‘Latin America’s least 
researched nation-state.’2 In order to understand the rationale and impact of the state’s current 
abortion legislation, and in order to understand the actors and power dynamics involved in 
the multilevel citizenship project under discussion, some historical, political, economic, and 
social context is required. 
 
Following on from this, parts 2, 3, and 4 explore the ways in which feminists are engaging 
with the language and mechanisms of human rights nationally, regionally, internationally, 
and transnationally in order to advance their claims for straightforward, safe, and legal access 
to abortion in El Salvador. Part 2 provides context for these processes by providing an 
overview the Salvadoran feminist movement. It then analyses some of the key cases arising 
from the complete criminalisation of abortion, and the ways in which Salvadoran and 
transnational feminist organisations – along with national human rights institutions and 
certain legislators – are campaigning for legislative reform and the release of women who 
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have been incarcerated. Part 3 considers Salvadoran and transnational feminist engagement 
with the inter-American human rights system (IAHRS). It contends that the IACHR, 
IACtHR, and CIM are being responsive to and supportive of feminist calls for change in El 
Salvador by advocating for the decriminalisation of abortion in El Salvador, justice for the 
women imprisoned, and the advancement of SRHRs in IHRL. Part 4 discusses the 
responsiveness of the UN human rights system to Salvadoran and transnational feminist 
campaigns for the decriminalisation of abortion in El Salvador. It does so by highlighting the 
ways in which national and transnational feminist and human rights organisations have 
influenced the UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies’ Concluding Observations, as well 
as Special Rapporteurs’ country visit reports and the UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights. This chapter argues that these interrelated processes of national, regional, 
international and transnational contestation of El Salvador’s complete criminalisation of 
abortion represent a multilevel feminist citizenship project. 
 
At the time of writing, abortion remains completely illegal in El Salvador, and women 
continue to be prosecuted and imprisoned for suspected abortions. Nevertheless, there is hope 
that the situation may yet change since national, regional, international and transnational 
actors are increasingly vocal and unified in their calls for the Government to reform 
Salvadoran abortion legislation to ensure compliance with IHRL. The current situation in El 
Salvador demonstrates that feminists’ contestation of women’s exclusion from and 
oppression by the traditional citizenship discourse as it manifests in the criminalisation of 
abortion is an ongoing and contested process whose outcome is yet to be determined. 
4.1. El Salvador: General Overview 
Chapter 2 illustrated the ways in which colonialism created a context of profound ethnic and 
socioeconomic inequalities, violence, and conservative, patriarchal norms in El Salvador, 
interrelated issues which directly influenced the drawing up and implementation of the state’s 
abortion legislation. Since 1998, abortion is completely illegal: a person who performs an 
abortion with the woman's consent, or a woman who self-induces or consents to someone 
else inducing her abortion, can be imprisoned for two to eight years.3 A person who performs 
an abortion to which the woman has not consented can be sentenced to between four and ten 
years’ imprisonment; if the person is a healthcare worker, they can be sentenced to between 
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six and twelve years in prison.4 To ensure that these provisions’ constitutionality, the 
Constitution defines life as beginning at the moment of conception.5  
 
Not only is abortion completely criminalised in El Salvador, those suspected of having had 
the procedure are actively prosecuted.6 Moreover, many women have had the charge of 
abortion increased to that of aggravated homicide – the murder of a close family member – 
which carries a sentence of up to 40 years in prison.7 The women who have been charged, 
prosecuted, and imprisoned are mostly poor, rural, and indigenous/mestiza, representing a 
continuation of the disproportionate surveillance of these women’s sexuality since colonial 
times.8 The concept of aggravated homicide also represents the continuity of colonial-era 
attitudes and legislation since colonial Spanish legislation classed abortion and infanticide as 
parricide, the murder of any persons related by consanguinity.9 The complete criminalisation 
of abortion in El Salvador therefore represents the denial of women’s citizenship and the 
control of their sexuality and reproduction in the service of a patriarchal social order. It has 
been repeatedly criticised by feminist and human rights organisations, the inter-American 
human rights system, and the UN human rights system for causing multiple violations of 
women’s and girls’ human rights.10 They have called for a moratorium on prosecutions, and 
they have urged the state to decriminalise abortion in at least some circumstances.11 
 
These bodies and organisations have highlighted that the complete criminalisation in El 
Salvador and the prosecution of women suspected of having had the procedure is situated in a 
wider context of ‘the highly unequal distribution of wealth’;12 a general climate of violence 
and insecurity, largely as the result of gang activity;13 deep-rooted patriarchal stereotypes and 
 
4 ibid 
5 Constitución de la República de El Salvador, art 1 
6 Agrupación Ciudadana, Del hospital a la cárcel, 8, 10; Amnesty, On the Brink of Death, 36, 38 
7 ibid 
8 Agrupación Ciudadana, Del hospital a la cárcel, 16-26; Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, Persecuted, 
46-51; MT Ochoa, S García, ¿Por qué me pasó esto a mí?, 7-8, 41 
9 NE Jaffery, ‘Reconceiving Motherhood’, 5 
10 See Annex 1 and Agrupación Ciudadana, Del hospital a la cárcel; Amnesty International, On the Brink of 
Death; Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2020: El Salvador’ (Freedom House, 2020) 
<https://freedomhouse.org/country/el-salvador/freedom-world/2020>  accessed 22 November 2020; Human 
Rights Watch, ‘El Salvador: Events of 2019’ (Human Rights Watch, 2020) <https://www.hrw.org/world-
report/2020/country-chapters/el-salvador> accessed 22 November 2020; IACHR 2018 El Salvador Country 
Visit, 7-8; IACHR 2019 El Salvador Country Visit, 19, 12-3 
11 ibid 
12 CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on the combined third, fourth and fifth periodic reports of El Salvador’ 
(E/C.12/SLV/CO/3-5, 19 June 2014) para 19 (CESCR 2014 Concluding Observations) 
13 CEDAW Committee ‘Concluding Observations on the combined eighth and ninth periodic reports of El 
Salvador’ (CEDAW/C/SLV/CO/8-9, 9 March 2017) paras 24-6 (CEDAW 2017 Concluding Observations); 
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gender-based discrimination leading to widespread gender-based, homophobic, transphobic 
violence, exploitation, and abuse;14 high rates of child and adolescent pregnancy as the result 
of rape, incest, and the social acceptability of girls entering sexual relationships at a young 
age, often with much older men;15 barriers to women and girls’ access to education, including 
comprehensive sexuality education;16 gender inequality in the labour force;17 low levels of 
women’s political participation and representation;18 inadequate healthcare provision, 
particularly in the area of sexual and reproductive healthcare;19 weaknesses in the 
independence and competence of the judiciary, and poor pre-trial and prison conditions.20 
They have highlighted the specific, disproportionate impacts of these issues on rural women 
and girls,21 LGBTQ* people,22 indigenous and Afro-descendant women and girls,23 women 
 
CRC Committee, ‘Concluding Observations on the combined fifth and sixth periodic reports of El Salvador’ 
(CRC/C/SLV/CO/5-6, 29 November 2018) paras 22-4 (CRC 2018 Concluding Observations); HRC, 
‘Concluding Observations on the seventh periodic report of El Salvador’ (CCPR/C/SLV/CO/7, 9 May 2018) 
paras 22-3 (HRC 2018 Concluding Observations); Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery, 
including its causes and consequences (SR slavery), ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms 
of slavery, including its causes and consequences, on her mission to El Salvador’ (A/HRC/33/46/Add.1, 3 
August 2016) paras 24, 26, 33, 34 (SR slavery 2016 Report); IACHR 2018 El Salvador Country Visit, 1-3; 
IACHR 2019 El Salvador Country Visit, 2-4, 9 
14 CEDAW 2017 Concluding Observations, paras 22-29; CESCR 2014 Concluding Observations, para 17; CRC 
Committee 2018 Concluding Observations, paras 13, 25-28; HRC 2018 Concluding Observations, paras 13-4; 
IACHR 2019 El Salvador Country Visit, 9; Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and 
consequences (SR VAW), ‘Mission to El Salvador’ (E/CN.4/2005/72/Add.2, 20 December 2004) paras 28-32, 
40-2 (SR VAW 2004 Report); SR VAW, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its 
causes and consequences, on her follow-up mission to El Salvador (17-19 March 2010)’ (A/HRC/17/26/Add.2, 
14 February 2011) paras 17-21, 76 (SR VAW Report 2011); SR Slavery Report 2016, paras 24, 26, 33, 34, 47, 
48, 57, 62 
15 CEDAW Committee 2017 Concluding Observations, paras 32(a), 36, 50-1; CRC Committee 2018 
Concluding Observations, paras 29, 35; HRC 2018 Concluding Observations, paras 15-6; IACHR 2018 El 
Salvador Country Visit, 3-6; IACHR 2019 El Salvador Country Visit, 12; SR VAW 2004 Report paras 31-2; SR 
VAW 2011 Report, paras 66-7 
16 CEDAW 2017 Concluding Observations, paras 32-3; CERD Committee, ‘Concluding observations on the 
combined eighteenth and nineteenth periodic reports of El Salvador’ (CERD/C/SLV/CO/18-19, 13 September 
2019) paras 26-7, 34-5 (CERD 2019 Concluding Observations); CESCR 2014 Concluding Observations, paras 
24-6; CRC Committee 2018 Concluding Observations, paras 42-5; HRC 2018 Concluding Observations, paras 
9-10; IACHR 2019 El Salvador Country Visit, 12-3,15, 19 
17 CEDAW 2017 Concluding Observations, paras 34-5, 40-1; CESCR 2014 Concluding Observations, paras 10-
12; HRC 2018 Concluding Observations, paras 11-12; IACHR 2019 El Salvador Country Visit, 10 
18 CEDAW 2017 Concluding Observations, paras 20-1, 23(b), 30-1; CESCR 2014 Concluding Observations, 
paras 10-1; HRC 2018 Concluding Observations, paras 11-12 
19 CEDAW 2017 Concluding Observations, paras 36-8; CESCR 2014 Concluding Observations, paras 21-3; 
CRC 2018 Concluding Observations, para 34; HRC 2018 Concluding Observations, paras 9-10, 15-6; IACHR 
2018 El Salvador Country Visit, 3-6, IACHR 2019 El Salvador Country Visit, 9, 12 
20 CEDAW 2017 Concluding Observations, paras 48-9; HRC 2018 Concluding Observations, paras 27-30 35; 
Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers (SR judiciary), ‘Mission to El Salvador’ 
(A/HRC/23/43/Add.1, 24 May 2013); Working Group on arbitrary detention (WG arbitrary detention), ‘Mission 
to El Salvador’ (A/HRC/22/44/Add.2, 11 January 2013); IACHR 2019 El Salvador Country Visit, 4-6, 11-13 
21 CEDAW 2017 Concluding Observations, paras 42-3 CERD 2019 Concluding Observations, paras 20-1, 26-7; 
CESCR 2014 Concluding Observations, paras 16, 18-20, 23-6; CRC 2018 Concluding Observations, paras 40-1, 
48; HRC 2018 Concluding Observations, paras 13-4; IACHR 2018 El Salvador Country Visit, 3-6, IACHR 
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human rights defenders (HRDs) and journalists,24 disabled women and girls,25 and internally 
displaced, migrant and refugee women and girls.26 
 
In response to these issues, and despite the opposition, intimidation, harassment, and violence 
they face for doing so, feminists in El Salvador campaign for abortion law reform, an end to 
gender-based violence and sexual abuse, and the systemic political, economic, and social 
change required for the realisation of all women’s full citizenship and human rights. The next 
part of this chapter argues that Salvadoran feminist contestation of the complete 
criminalisation of abortion is part of a multilevel feminist citizenship project. 
 
4.2. Domestic Struggle 
 
This part explores the ways in which feminists in El Salvador are contesting women’s 
exclusion from and oppression by the traditional citizenship discourse as it manifests in the 
complete criminalisation of abortion and the prosecution of women suspected of having had 
abortions. It first provides a brief overview of the Salvadoran feminist movement, illustrating 
that there is a long history of feminists contesting women’s exclusion from and oppression by 
the traditional citizenship discourse. It then discusses the key abortion cases and how they 
 
22 CEDAW 2017 Concluding Observations, paras 44-5; HRC 2018 Concluding Observations, paras 9-10; 
IACHR 2018 El Salvador Country Visit, 3-6, IACHR 2019 El Salvador Country Visit, 9-12, 19; IACHR, 
‘Recognition of the Rights of LGBTI Persons’ (OEA/Ser.L/V/II.170/Doc. 184, 7 December 2018) paras 178, 
247; IACHR, ‘Violence against LGBTI Persons’ (OAS/Ser.L/II.rev.1/Doc. 36, 12 November 2015) paras 102, 
184, 279, 281, 286, 295, 346-7 
23 CEDAW 2017 Concluding Observations, paras 46-7; CERD 2019 Concluding Observations, paras 26-7; CRC 
2018 Concluding Observations, para 13, 41, 47, 48; HRC 2018 Concluding Observations, paras 9-10, 41-2; 
IACHR 2019 El Salvador Country Visit, 10, 11, 17; Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples (SR 
indigenous rights), ‘The situation of indigenous peoples in El Salvador’ (A/HRC/24/41/Add.2, 25 June 2013) 
24 CEDAW 2017 Concluding Observations, paras 16-7; HRC 2018 Concluding Observations, paras 37-8; 
IACHR 2018 El Salvador Country Visit, 3-6, IACHR 2019 El Salvador Country Visit, 9, 17; IACHR, 
‘Criminalization of the Work of Human Rights Defenders’ (OEA/Ser.L/V/II. Doc. 49/15, 31 December 2015) 
paras 52-3; IACHR, ‘Second Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in the Americas’ 
(OEA/Ser,L/V/II. Doc. 66, 31 December 2011) paras 30, 33, 38, 271, 287 
25 CRC 2018 Concluding Observations para 33; HRC 2018 Concluding Observations paras 9-10; CRPD 
‘Concluding observations on the combined second and third periodic reports of El Salvador’ 
(CRPD/C/SLV/CO/2-3, 1 October 2019) paras 8-19, 12, 20-1, 32-3, 34-5, 48-9, 50-1, 52-3 (CRPD 2019 
Concluding Observations); IACHR 2018 El Salvador Country Visit, 3-6; IACHR 2019 El Salvador Country 
Visit, 11, 20 
26 CEDAW 2017 Concluding Observations, paras 24(f), 25(f); CERD 2019 Concluding Observations, paras 14, 
28-9; CRC Committee 2018 Concluding Observations, para 42(g); CRPD 2019 Concluding Observations, para 
53(b); HRC 2018 Concluding Observations, paras 31-4; Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally 
displaced persons (SR IDPs), ‘ Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of internally displaced 
persons on her visit to El Salvador’ (A/HRC/38/39/Add.1, 23 April 2018) paras 22, 24, 27, 28-9, 40; IACHR 
2018 El Salvador Country Visit, 3-6; IACHR 2019 El Salvador Country Visit, 13-15 
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represent (1) the persistence of the oppressive, exclusionary citizenship discourse and (2) 
feminist contestation of this oppression and exclusion through the language and mechanisms 
of human rights.  
 
4.1.1. Feminism in El Salvador 
 
In order to understand the contemporary Salvadoran feminist movement, it is necessary to 
chart its origins in the late-19th and early-20th century, and the emergence in the 1970s and 
1980s of some of the main feminist organisations working today. This is because the 
particular intellectual and political dynamics of these periods shaped feminist thinking and 
activism in El Salvador, informing the inherently intersectional approach of the contemporary 
feminist movement to its campaigns for abortion law reform. 
 
Since its emergence at the turn of the 19th century, the modern Latin American and 
Salvadoran feminist movement has had a close relationship with democratic opposition, 
labour rights, indigenous, and campesino27 movements.28 These relationships informed the 
proto-intersectional feminist awareness of the need to address the interconnected challenges 
of sexism, socioeconomic inequality, racial and ethnic discrimination, and the urban/rural 
divide.29 Women in the opposition, campesino, labour rights, and feminist movements began 
to develop closer connections and an awareness of the interrelated nature of their struggles 
from the late 1950s to the 1970s. 
 
During this period, the emergence of liberal and left-wing democratic opposition movements 
created links between the various rural and urban political organisations, as well as links with 
 
27 Campesino is usually translated as ‘a poor Latin American farmer or farm labourer.’ It emerged as a political 
identity and movement in the mid-19th century. The Salvadoran campesino movement of the 19th and 20th 
century consisted of indigenous, ladino, and mestizo labourers who campaigned for decent pay and conditions, 
land rights, and indigenous rights to collective land ownership. This heterogenous movement was influenced by 
left-wing and Marxist thinking, as well as indigenous and pan-Mayan philosophy and political practices. See JL 
Gould, AA Lauria-Santiago, To Rise in Darkness, 99-101; RT Alexander ‘Landscape change in the Maya 
Region 1450-1910 AD’ in DL Nichols (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Mesoamerican Archaeology (OUP, 2012), 
941-2 
28 S Migden Socolow, The Women of Colonial Latin America, 180; B Potthast, Madres, obreras, amantes, 229 
29 SR Berruz, ‘Latin American Feminism’; CD Deere, M León, Empowering Women, 41-3; JL Gould, AA 
Lauria-Santiago, To Rise in Darkness, 128-9; F Martínez Castro, ‘Historia del feminismo en El Salvador’; R 
Morgan, ‘El Salvador’ in R Morgan (ed), Sisterhood is Global: The International Women’s Movement 
Anthology (New York, The Feminist Press at the City University of New York 1996), 209; L Stephen, K Ready, 
S Cosgrove ‘Women's Organizations in El Salvador’, 185; UN ECLAC, ‘Women’s Contribution to Equality in 
Latin America and the Caribbean’ (LC/L.2738(CRM.10/3) August 2007) 21 
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similar movements in other Latin American countries.30 Transnational, left-wing, and anti-
imperial theory and praxis influenced contemporary Salvadoran feminism in terms of a 
structural understanding of the socioeconomic and racial inequality of Salvadoran society.31 
During the increasingly violent and politically divided 1970s, known as el tiempo de locura 
(the time of madness), women’s and feminist groups grew in number and visibility.32 One of 
the most famous, CoMadres, sought justice for relatives who had been disappeared by the 
state security and paramilitary forces.33 Members saw themselves as ‘citizens and mothers 
too’, representing an alternative understanding of citizenship which sets up citizenship and 
motherhood as mutually exclusive.34 While their activism initially revolved around justice for 
their relatives, their organising, campaigning, and discussing of their individual and shared 
experiences ‘led CoMadres to question the social and sexual role assigned to Salvadoran 
women.’35 Women in the left-wing political and guerrilla movements during and after the 
civil war had a similar experience of becoming aware of the fact that their partners, fellow 
trade union members, and fellow guerrilleros were often less than supportive of their efforts 
to challenge gender-based inequality.36 
 
During the civil war, women made up around 30% of FMLN combatants and 36% of 
political personnel.37 Despite the ‘strikingly gendered system of stratification in the guerrilla 
camps’, these women gained an education, training, and a sense of confidence and 
independence as a result of their time in the FMLN.38 Their experiences also led to a growing 
awareness among girls and women within the left’s guerrilla forces that gender equality was 
a secondary concern for, or even opposed by, many of their male comrades; as a result, they 
began to form feminist committees and organisations within their political parties, trade 
unions, and local areas.39 There was a further proliferation of feminist organisations between 
 
30 R Crandall, The Salvador Option, 23; P Hipsher, ‘Right and Left-Wing Women in Post-Revolutionary El 
Salvador: Feminist Autonomy and Cross-Political Alliance Building for Gender Equality’ in V González, K 
Kampwirth (eds), Radical Women in Latin America, 137; J Viterna, Women in War, 23-4, 28 
31 JL Gould, AA Lauria-Santiago, To Rise in Darkness, 50, 52; UN ECLAC, ‘Women’s Contribution to 
Equality’, 21 
32 P Hipsher, ‘Right and Left-Wing Women’, 137-8; L Stephen, ‘Maria’s compañeras: women’s grassroots 
organizing in El Salvador, 1970-1991’ in MT Tula, Hear My Testimony, 206-7 
33 CL Bejarano ‘Las Super Madres de Latino America: Transforming Motherhood by Challenging Violence in 
Mexico, Argentina, and El Salvador’ (2002) 23 Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies, 133 
34 MT Tula, Hear My Testimony, 58-9 
35 ibid, 3-4, 69  
36 ibid; V González, K Kampwirth ‘Introduction’ in V González, K Kampwirth (eds), Radical Women in Latin 
America, 13 
37 P Hipsher, ‘Right and Left-Wing Women’, 138; IC Silber, J Viterna, ‘Women in El Salvador’, 331 
38 J Viterna, Women in War, 118, 168 
39 P Hipsher, ‘Right and Left-Wing Women’, 138; M Thomson, Women of El Salvador, 94-9 
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1986 and the end of the civil war in 1992, such as ORMUSA (Organización de Mujeres 
Salvadoreñas por la Paz, Organisation of Salvadoran Women for Peace), CEMUJER 
(Instituto de Estudios de la Mujer “Norma Virginia Guirola de Herrera”, Norma Virginia 
Guirola de Herrera Institute for Women’s Studies), Las Dignas, and Las Mélidas, all of 
which are still active today and involved in campaigns for the decriminalisation of abortion.40  
 
Following the end of the civil war, many feminist and women’s group members felt 
disillusioned due to ‘ongoing poverty, organising fatigue, and memories of violence and 
loss’; the failure of foreign donor-driven projects to recognise their extensive experience in 
community organising and activism; and the exclusion of women and their specific needs 
from the peace process.41 Human rights institutes including la Procuraduría para la Defensa 
de los Derechos Humanos (Office of the Ombudsman for Human Rights, hereafter la 
Procuraduría) and el Instituto Salvadoreño para el Desarrollo de la Mujer (Salvadoran 
Institute for Women’s Development, hereafter ISDEMU) were established in the early and 
mid-1990s, but a lack of funding and independence impeded their work.42 Despite these 
issues, many feminists continued with or became involved in feminist activism through 
community-level politics and local NGOs.43 For example, the feminist organisation Las 
Dignas was formed in 1990 during the peace negotiations in response to their failure to 
include women or address their issues.44 One of its founders, Morena Herrera, founded 
Agrupación ciudadana por la despenalización del aborto en El Salvador (Citizens’ 
Group/Collective for the decriminalisation of abortion in El Salvador, hereafter Agrupación 
Ciudadana) in 2009, one of the main organisations campaigning for the decriminalisation of 
abortion. Las Mélidas was founded in 1992 and is also one of the key civil society 
 
40 Alianza por la Salud Sexual y Reproductiva en El Salvador, which campaigns for the decriminalisation of 
abortion, includes CEMUJER, ORMUSA and Las Mélidas among its members. See Alianza por la Salud Sexual 
y Reproductiva en El Salvador, Compromisos internacionales suscritos por El Salvador y su vinculación con 
los derechos sexuales y derechos reproductivos (San Salvador, Alianza por la Salud Sexual y Reproductiva en 
El Salvador 2011); P Hipsher, ‘Right and Left-Wing Women’, 140; L Stephen, ‘Maria’s compañeras’, 206-208 
41 IC Silber, J Viterna, ‘Women in El Salvador’, 333 
42 CEDAW Committee ‘Concluding Observations on the combined third, fourth, fifth and sixth periodic reports 
of El Salvador’ in ‘Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women’ (A/58/38, 
2003) paras 246, 253-5; HRC, ‘Concluding observations on the second periodic report of El Salvador’ 
(CCPR/C/79/Add.34, 18 April 1994) para 13; K Kampwirth, Feminism and the Legacy of Revolution, 92-5; Ley 
de la Procuraduría para la Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, Decreto Legislativo No. 183, 20 febrero 1992, 
Diario Oficial No. 45, Tomo No. 314, 6 marzo 1992; Ley del Instituto Salvadoreño para el Desarrollo de la 
Mujer, Decreto Legislativo No. 644, 29 febrero 1996, Diario Oficial No. 43, Tomo No. 330, 1 marzo 1996 
43 IC Silber, J Viterna, ‘Women in El Salvador’, 333 
44 Las Dignas, ‘Quienes somos’ (Las Dignas, 2020) <http://www.lasdignas.org.sv/quienes-somos/> accessed 19 
November 2020; S Pinto, ‘Desafiando la prohibicion total del aborto en El Salvador’ (Amnesty, London, 21 
January 2015) <https://www.amnesty.org/es/latest/campaigns/2015/01/defying-el-salvador-s-total-ban-on-
abortion/> accessed 19 November 2020 
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organisations campaigning for the decriminalisation of abortion.45 Therefore, feminist 
activists from the left-wing opposition and revolutionary movement, and the structural, 
intersectional approach to inequality that they have developed as a result of their experiences, 
is central to the contemporary Salvadoran feminist movement and its campaigns for the 
decriminalisation of abortion. 
 
Transnationalism is another important characteristic of the contemporary Salvadoran feminist 
movement. From the 1970s onwards, women’s involvement in the opposition, human rights, 
and/or left-wing revolutionary movements provided them with the opportunity to travel 
abroad and build connections with the wider Latin American feminist movement.46 
Following the end of the civil war in 1993, over 1,500 women from across Latin America and 
the Caribbean participated in the sixth feminist encuentro in El Salvador in 1993.47 Held 
every two years since 1981, the feminist encuentros provide a forum for feminists from 
across the region to meet, share experiences, and develop strategies for realising liberation.48 
Participants in the encuentros often also attend UN human rights conferences. In the 1980s 
and 1990s, Latin American and Caribbean feminists – including Salvadoran feminists – used 
the encuentros, the UN World Conferences on Women in Copenhagen and Nairobi, and 
regional forums held in preparation for the UN human rights conferences of the 1990s to 
advance women’s human rights issues, including SRHRs.49 Therefore, the connections 
between the Salvadoran feminist movement, the Latin American feminist movement, and the 
international human rights movement, are clear. Salvadoran feminists’ activism domestically, 
transnationally, and internationally represents their involvement in the multilevel citizenship 
project of contesting women’s exclusion from and oppression by the traditional citizenship 
discourse through their engagement with the language and mechanisms of human rights to 
campaign for the decriminalisation of abortion in El Salvador. 
 
Although the 1990s and early 2000s was largely characterised by new and ongoing 
challenges to women’s human rights and full citizenship in the form of violence, inequality, 
and the complete criminalisation of abortion, the feminist movement continued its 
 
45 Las Mélidas, ‘Historia’ (Las Mélidas, 2020) <https://www.lasmelidas.org.sv/index.php/historia> accessed 19 
November 2020 
46 P Hipsher, ‘Right and Left-Wing Women’, 140 
47 ibid, 90-1; IC Silber, J Viterna, ‘Women in El Salvador’, 342; L Stephen, ‘Maria’s compañeras’, 219 
48 N Saporta Sternbach et al, ‘Feminisms in Latin America: From Bogotá to San Bernardo’ (1992) 17 Signs, 395 
49 L Stephen, ‘Maria’s compañeras’, 217-8; N Saporta Sternbach et al, ‘Feminisms in Latin America’, 405; M 
Thomson, Women of El Salvador, 102-3 
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contestation of women’s exclusion from and oppression by the traditional citizenship 
discourse. They did so through campaigns against domestic violence, campaigns for 
increasing women’s political participation, and improving the child support system.50 As 
mentioned above, Agrupación Ciudadana was formed in 2009. It promotes awareness among 
the general public about the current legal situation concerning abortion, campaigns for 
legislative change, and provides legal aid to women accused of having had abortions or 
having committed aggravated homicide following an obstetric emergency.51 As will be 
highlighted in parts 3 and 4, it has extensively engaged with both the inter-American and the 
UN human rights system as part of its strategy for change. Agrupación Ciudadana’s activism 
within El Salvador and the human rights system is an example of feminists contesting unfair 
laws and practices that deny women full enjoyment of their rights, and as such is a feminist 
citizenship project. Their work gained increasing attention and momentum following the case 
of Beatriz in 2013 which, along with several other key cases, is the subject of the next 
section. 
 
4.1.2. Abortion in El Salvador: key cases 
 
This section provides a chronological overview of the main cases concerning El Salvador’s 
complete criminalisation of abortion and active prosecution of women suspected of having 
one. It argues that these cases represent a manifestation of the oppressive, exclusionary 
citizenship discourse which denies women’s right to have rights and to determine the scope 
of their rights on the basis of their reproduction and sexuality. It also argues that feminists 
contest this exclusion and oppression through the language and mechanisms of human rights. 
At the domestic level, national and transnational feminist organisations, la Procuraduría and 
ISDEMU, and certain legislators and medical professionals are engaged in awareness raising, 
campaigns for legal reform, and support for women on trial or incarcerated as a result of the 
abortion legislation. At the regional level, they engage with the IAHRS’s emergency 
procedures, individual complaints procedure, ordinary sessions, and research for thematic, 
annual, and country reports. At the international level, they submit information for the UN 
human rights treaty monitoring bodies’ periodic review sessions and meet with Special 
Rapporteurs during their country visits. Parts 3 and 4 focus on their regional and international 
 
50 P Hipsher, ‘Right and Left-Wing Women’, 133, 146-7, 150; K Ready, ‘Feminist Reconstruction of 
Parenthood Within Neoliberal Constraints: La Asociación de Madres Demandantes in El Salvador’ in V 
González, K Kampwirth (eds), Radical Women in Latin America, Left and Right, 169-72 
51 ibid 
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engagement in depth, while this part will allude to the importance of this engagement and the 
responsiveness of these human rights bodies in its discussion of the domestic situation. 
 
This part’s first section considers the period between 2001 and 2013, when evidence was 
emerging that women’s human rights were being violated by El Salvador’s abortion 
legislation, but the situation was not yet receiving considerable attention at the national, 
regional or international level. The second section, concerning 2013 to the present, discusses 
the case of Beatriz and how it brought increased national, regional, and international attention 
to the situation in El Salvador. It asserts that this increased attention provided momentum for 
national and transnational feminist organisations campaigning for reform, and that it 
prompted the inter-American and UN human rights systems to voice increasingly coherent 
and assertive calls for the decriminalisation of abortion and the release of women 
incarcerated for abortion and aggravated homicide. This process of feminist engagement with 





The first major criticism of El Salvador’s abortion legislation was a 2001 report by the Center 
for Reproductive Law and Policy (now the Center for Reproductive Rights, CRR). The 
evidence that CRR collected in conjunction with the Salvadoran feminist organisation 
CEMUJER indicated that El Salvador’s complete criminalisation of abortion was being 
actively implemented and disproportionately impacting the most marginalised. 46 women 
and girls were prosecuted for having abortions between April 1998 and October 1999.52 The 
majority were young, unmarried, with little education, and living in poverty.53 The report 
alleged violations of human rights enshrined in the Salvadoran Constitution, as well as ‘the 
right to life, to liberty and to physical integrity; the right to reproductive freedom and 
autonomy; the right to health, to reproductive health and family planning; and the right to 
privacy’ enshrined in international and regional human rights treaties to which El Salvador is 
a State Party.54 It recommended far-reaching legislative and policy changes in education, 
public health, and social assistance to ensure the recognition and promotion of women’s 
 
52 The Center for Reproductive Law and Policy, Persecuted, 5, 7-8, 46-8 
53 ibid 
54 ibid, 57-8, 61-69 
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SRHRs.55 The 2005 case of eighteen-year-old Isabel Cristina Quintanilla and the 2008 case 
of ‘Manuela’ typified the issues raised in this report, namely the multiple human rights 
violations arising from El Salvador’s complete criminalisation of abortion, and its 
disproportionate impact on poor, young, unmarried women and girls who have had little 
access to education.  
 
In August 2005, Quintanilla was sentenced to 30 years in prison for aggravated homicide 
following a stillbirth in the seventh month of her pregnancy.56 Her initial interrogation took 
place without a lawyer present, while she was handcuffed to her hospital bed, and while she 
was still under the effects of anaesthesia.57 As soon as she was released from hospital, she 
was kept in an overcrowded pre-trial detention cell for three days; she was not provided with 
medical care even though she was still bleeding.58 She was tried for the crime of aggravated 
homicide. 59 Quintanilla’s due process rights were violated in three ways. Firstly, her public 
defence lawyer was inadequately prepared, failing to revise documents pertaining to the 
case.60 Secondly, her sentencing was based on insufficient evidence: the main evidence relied 
upon by the judge to convict Quintanilla was the autopsy report, despite the fact that the 
autopsy concluded that the baby’s cause of death could not be determined, and that the baby 
most likely died during or very shortly after birth as a result of complications during labour.61 
The judge’s reasoning was that since this was Quintanilla’s second pregnancy, she should 
have realised that the pains she was experiencing throughout the day were labour pains and 
not stomach or lower back pains as Quintanilla claimed, and therefore she should have told 
her mother and stepfather that she was in labour and sought medical attention to ensure safe 
delivery of her baby.62 The judge considered suspicious Quintanilla’s failure to tell her 
mother and stepfather about her physical discomfort, and heavily implied that she attempted 
to hide the fact that she was in labour from them so that she could murder the baby.63 Even if 
she did not intend to murder her baby, the judge reasoned that Quintanilla’s failure to seek 
 
55 ibid, 79-85 
56 Tribunal Segundo de Sentencia, Proceso Penal 102-2005-3, Isabel Cristina Quintanilla, 23 August 2005 
57 CRR, Agrupación Ciudadana, Excluidas, perseguidas, encarceladas, 12 
58 ibid 
59 ibid 
60 ibid, 32; IACHR, ‘Situación de derechos humanos de mujeres privadas de libertad por emergencias 
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medical attention amounted to aggravated homicide by omission.64 This reasoning is flawed 
on several grounds: firstly, it failed to recognise that each pregnancy and labour experience 
can vary widely, including for those who have previously experienced pregnancy and labour. 
Secondly, it disregarded the fact that Quintanilla had been prone to back and stomach pain 
since the birth of her first child and an appendectomy shortly after; it is not implausible that 
she would misattribute early signs of labour to these chronic issues, or that she would not tell 
her family about every time she experienced discomfort. Thirdly, it sets the alarming 
precedent that failing to seek medical attention when in labour amounts to a crime for which 
a woman can be prosecuted if her baby is injured or dies during labour. Finally, there are 
strong indications that her sentencing was informed by prejudiced, stereotypical attitudes to 
what the judge called her ‘economic, social, and cultural’ background.65 There are numerous 
allusions throughout the judgment to the fact that Quintanilla was unmarried, working-class, 
and an early-school leaver who had had her first child at a young age, and who was again 
pregnant at a young age,66 as though these factors immediately rendered her behaviour 
suspect and in need of greater scrutiny. Despite equally or more plausible explanations being 
available as to what happened – that she had genuinely misidentified the pain she was 
experiencing, that she was unable to seek medical attention once the situation became critical 
because by then she had lost consciousness – the judge decided that her failure to seek 
medical attention amounted to aggravated homicide by omission. This ruling and the 
reasoning behind it represent the ways in which the legal gaze operates in postcolonial El 
Salvador to surveil, discipline, and punish young, working-class women. Any indication, 
however unsubstantiated, that they are resisting or contravening their prescribed role of 
mothering non-citizen in the patriarchal social order is met with serious reprisals. Feminist 
responses to the ruling represent resistance to this traditional patriarchal discourse. 
 
Between 2007 and 2009, Salvadoran feminist organisations campaigned for Quintanilla’s 
release by requesting a repeal, a pardon, and finally a commutation of her sentence on the 
grounds that her trial had been characterised by multiple due process violations.67 In July 
2009, the Supreme Court commuted her sentence, finding that her sentencing had been 
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August; since then, she has campaigned for the decriminalisation of abortion and the release 
of women incarcerated for having had an abortion by sharing her testimony nationally, before 
the IACHR, and before the CEDAW Committee.69 As such, she is participating in the 
multilevel citizenship project of contesting women’s exclusion from and oppression by the 
traditional citizenship discourse as it manifests in the criminalisation of abortion. 
 
Quintanilla’s case represents how El Salvador’s abortion legislation – which as Chapter 2 
argued is informed by the belief that women’s bodies, reproduction, and sexuality must be 
controlled to ensure the stability of the patriarchal social order –  results in violations of 
women’s rights to due process, health, physical and mental integrity, freedom from CIDT, 
non-discrimination, privacy, the right to decent treatment when deprived of liberty, and the 
right to a life free from violence.70 Prejudiced attitudes among the police, medical staff, and 
judiciary against women informed her treatment in hospital, pre-trial detention, and her 
sentencing: the assumption throughout was that as a young, unmarried, working-class woman 
she must be guilty.71 Similar discriminatory attitudes to women and girls informed the 
treatment of ‘Manuela.’ 
 
On 26 February 2008, 32-year-old single mother of two Manuela experienced severe pelvic 
bleeding and fainted following a fall.72 She was taken to hospital and, since she was 
experiencing heavy vaginal bleeding, hospital staff called the police because they suspected 
that she had self-induced an abortion.73 The following day, much like Quintanilla, the police 
interrogated her while she was still in poor health and without a lawyer present.74 On 28 
February, police officers questioned her parents in an aggressive and intimidating manner.75 
They accused them of covering up the alleged crime, and they threatened to investigate them 
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as accomplices.76 They forced her father to sign a document he could not read due to being 
illiterate, and which they did not explain to him; this document, a formal accusation against 
Manuela, was later used as a key piece of evidence against her.77 Like Quintanilla, Manuela 
was represented by a poorly-prepared defence lawyer, and insufficient evidence, including 
the document her father was forced to sign, was used against her.78 On the basis of this 
evidence, and on the basis of discriminatory attitudes against poor, rural, illiterate single 
mothers, Manuela was sentenced to 30 years for aggravated homicide.79 
 
Manuela spent two years in prison, during which time she was diagnosed with Hodgkin’s 
lymphoma.80 Despite being in seriously poor health, and despite this diagnosis, she was not 
provided with consistent chemotherapy treatment and so she died in April 2010.81 In 2012, 
CRR and Agrupación Ciudadana filed an individual petition on her behalf with the IACHR.82 
It alleges violations of Manuela’s rights to health, life, physical and mental integrity, freedom 
from torture and CIDT, and due process.83 The IACHR has yet to consider the petition, but in 
light of its previous friendly settlements, periodic sessions, country visits, and thematic 
reports, it is likely that it will find El Salvador responsible for multiple human rights 
violations due to its abortion legislation. Therefore, Salvadoran and transnational feminists 
are making use of the language and mechanisms of IHRL to contest women’s exclusion from 
and oppression by the traditional citizenship discourse as it manifests in the criminalisation of 
abortion. 
 
Quintanilla and Manuela’s cases, among others,84 highlight the multiple negative human 
rights impacts of El Salvador’s legislation. The cases also demonstrate the ways in which this 
legislation requires medical professionals to deny women and girls healthcare, and which 
encourages medical and legal professionals to treat women – particularly young, poor, rural, 
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indigenous/mestiza women – with suspicion if they are experiencing pregnancy loss.85 
Research conducted by Agrupación Ciudadana found that, in addition to the 46 women and 
girls prosecuted for having abortions between April 1998 and October 1999, a further 129 
women and girls were tried for abortion or aggravate homicide between 2000 and 2011.86 49 
of them were found guilty, 23 for abortion and 26 for various grades of homicide.87 As with 
the cases highlighted by CRR’s 2001 report and as illustrated by the cases of Quintanilla and 
Manuela, the majority were young, single, had received little to no education, and lived in 
poverty.88 The complete criminalisation of abortion in El Salvador, the active prosecution of 
women and girls suspected of having had one, and the disproportionate impact of this 
legislation on women and girls experiencing other, intersecting forms of oppression, 
represents the exclusionary, oppressive nature of the traditional citizenship discourse that 
requires the strict regulation of women’s reproduction, bodies, and sexuality. National and 
transnational feminist organisations’ contestation of this exclusion and oppression was 
intensifying at the national, regional and international levels of the human rights system when 
the case of ‘Beatriz’ in April 2013 brought worldwide attention to the multiple human rights 




In March 2013 – a few months after the death of Savita Halappanavar galvanised the Irish 
abortion rights campaign – Beatriz, a 22-year-old woman with lupus who was pregnant with 
an anencephalic foetus, was forced to continue with her pregnancy, despite medical 
consensus that this posed a grave risk to her health and life, and despite anencephaly being 
incompatible with life outside the womb.89 While her health team recognised that she needed 
an abortion to save her life and protect her health, both they and Beatriz would face legal 
action if they carried out the procedure and so they had to file an amparo (an appeal alleging 
that the abortion legislation was unconstitutional since it violated Beatriz’s rights) with the 
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Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court.90 The amparo was filed on 11 April and the 
Court took six days to agree to hear the case despite Beatriz’s rapidly deteriorating health.91  
 
National, regional, and transnational feminist and human rights organisations, as well as the 
inter-American and UN human rights systems, intervened in the controversy. On 26 April, 
four UN human rights experts issued a statement calling on the government to permit the 
abortion and so protect Beatriz’s rights to life, health, and freedom from cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment.92 Throughout April and May, her case received attention from national 
and international media outlets, and individuals contacted the Salvadoran government and 
organised demonstrations outside Salvadoran embassies to voice their support for Beatriz.93 
Even still, the Court did not make progress in its deliberations. In response to the Supreme 
Court’s procrastination, three organisations including Agrupación Ciudadana and la 
Colectiva Feminista para el Desarrollo Local (Feminist Collective for Local Development, 
hereafter la Colectiva Feminista) requested that the IACHR intervene in the case.94 The 
IACHR did so, issuing precautionary measures on 29 April 2013 calling on El Salvador ‘to 
protect the life, personal integrity and health’ of Beatriz by permitting the abortion.95 Since 
these were ignored, the IACHR requested that the IACtHR issue provisional measures.96 The 
IACtHR issued provisional measures on 29 May 2013 that required El Salvador to urgently 
‘adopt and guarantee’ measures permitting Beatriz’s doctors to provide the medical treatment 
that they ‘considered opportune and appropriate to ensure due protection’ of her rights to life, 
health, and physical, mental, and moral integrity.97 Despite clear evidence that Beatriz 
urgently required an abortion, and despite these interventions by the international and 
regional human rights systems, the Constitutional Bench of the Supreme Court ruled by a 4-1 
majority on 29 May that ‘the rights of the mother cannot take precedence over those of the 
“nasciturus” or vice versa’ and that permitting the abortion would contravene the 
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constitutional right to life understood as beginning at the moment of conception.98 To further 
ensure no new legal precedent was set with regard to the complete ban on abortion, the 
Supreme Court’s protracted deliberations meant that Beatriz’s pregnancy passed the 20th 
week of pregnancy, at which point its termination was considered to be ‘induced labour’ 
rather than abortion.99 Beatriz’s daughter was delivered via Caesarean section on 3 June and 
lived for only five hours.100 Beatriz spent a period of time in intensive care and one of her 
kidneys was permanently damaged.101 Agrupación Ciudadana, la Colectiva Feminista, 
CEJIL, and Ipas filed a petition on her behalf with the IACHR in November 2013, which was 
accepted in April 2015.102 The IACHR declared the petition admissible in 2017 in relation to 
ACHR article 4 (right to life), article 5 (humane treatment), article 8 (fair trial), article 9 
(freedom from ex post facto laws), article 11 (privacy), article 24 (equal protection), article 
25 (judicial protection), and article 26 (progressive development) in conjunction with article 
1(1) (non-discrimination) and article 2 (domestic legal effects).103 It also declared the petition 
admissible in relation to Belém do Pará Convention article 7 (state obligation to prevent, 
punish and eradicate violence against women), and in relation to article 1 (obligation to 
prevent and punish torture), article 6 (effective measures to prevent and punish torture and 
CIDT), and article 8 (right to an impartial examination of allegations of torture) of the Inter-
American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture.104 The IACHR has yet to publish its 
Decision on the Merits, but it is likely that it will find El Salvador responsible for violations 
of these rights given the inter-American human rights system’s current position on abortion 
indicated in Chapters 2 and 3. The case of Beatriz represents the profound harms arising from 
the complete criminalisation of abortion, the obstacles facing the full realisation of SRHRs at 
the national level, and the efforts of national, regional and transnational feminist and human 
rights actors to address this situation. This multilevel feminist process of contestation has 
continued and intensified in recent years. 
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Capitalising upon the increased attention to and debate about El Salvador’s abortion 
legislation and its impact, Agrupación Ciudadana and la Colectiva Feminista launched its 
campaign for las 17 in April 2014.105 The two groups filed a request for pardons for 17 
women convicted of abortion-related crimes and sentenced to up to 40 years in prison.106 
Since then, they have been engaged in a range of campaigning and awareness-raising 
activities within El Salvador and at the inter-American and UN human rights systems in order 
to seek justice for las 17 y otras – not just these 17 women, but also the many others who 
have since been prosecuted, convicted and sentenced.107 Like Quintanilla, Beatriz, and 
Manuela, las 17 y otras were poor, in precarious or low-paying employment, and had 
received little or no schooling.108 After miscarrying and subsequent complications such as 
heavy bleeding, they were brought to public hospitals where they were reported to the 
police.109 Many were interrogated while still undergoing medical treatment or semi-conscious 
and without a lawyer present.110 According to observers, the women received inadequate 
court representation by poorly-prepared public defence lawyers, and were sentenced to an 
average of 30 years in prison on the basis of inconsistent, unreliable evidence and in 
judgments characterised by discriminatory pronouncements by the presiding judges.111 
Furthermore, pre-trial detention and prison conditions have resulted in violations of the right 
to be free from torture and CIDT. Similar to Quintanilla and ‘Manuela’, las 17 y otras were 
denied the medical treatment they required while being held before trial, or were held in 
unsanitary conditions while recovering from an obstetric emergency.112 The Ilopango 
Women’s Prison, where most of those convicted are held, is severely overcrowded.113 Those 
who are jailed for having had abortions are subject to intimidation and assault by prison staff 
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and other prisoners.114 This contravenes international human rights standards regarding basic 
prison conditions and prisoner safety; it also goes against the importance of considering 
alternatives to imprisonment if the accused is a parent, with women routinely being separated 
from their young children to serve prison sentences of 30 to 40 years’ duration.115 A strong 
argument can therefore be made on the basis of international human rights standards 
articulated by the inter-American and UN human rights system that there have been 
violations of the right to health, the right to privacy, the right to be free from torture and 
CIDT, and the right to a fair trial, and the principle of non-discrimination on the basis of 
ethnicity, class, and gender. These cases also demonstrate how restrictive abortion legislation 
impacts upon the most vulnerable by intersecting with and exacerbating existing inequalities: 
middle-class or wealthy women, and women living in urban areas, are subject to less scrutiny 
and are more likely to be able to afford black market “abortion pills”, access to private clinics 
in El Salvador, or travel abroad for an abortion and so circumvent the criminalisation of 
abortion in ways that poor and working-class women and girls living in small towns or 
remote areas cannot.116 
 
The negative health and human rights consequences of El Salvador’s abortion ban, 
inadequate healthcare system, and near-total lack of supports for disabled people and their 
families were thrown into even starker relief by the outbreak of the Zika virus in the country 
in 2015.117 A mosquito-borne virus, Zika can cause pregnancy complications including 
preterm birth, miscarriage, and congenital Zika syndrome, which is characterised by physical 
and intellectual disabilities that can range from mild to severe.118 In response to the rapid 
spread of the virus, in January 2016 the Ministry of Health advised women to avoid 
pregnancy for two years, without implementing effective measures to improve access to 
contraception or abortion, or to address other drivers of high pregnancy rates such as 
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widespread rape, incest, and sexual violence.119 Moreover, while the Zika outbreak prompted 
some awareness and discussion within government on the need to improve disability services 
and access to them, concrete measures were not taken to do so.120 This lack of a disability 
rights and women’s rights perspective in the government’s response to Zika represented its 
continued inability or unwillingness to address the multiple issues impeding the full 
realisation of women’s SRHRs and citizenship.121 
 
Despite increasing international attention from the media, human rights systems, and human 
rights and feminist organisations, and despite the Zika virus outbreak providing further 
evidence that El Salvador needed to address a range of issues impeding the full realisation of 
SRHRs in the country, the government instead took steps to further punish women and girls 
suspected of having had abortions. In July 2016, ARENA proposed increasing sentences for 
those convicted of performing or having had abortions to 50 years in prison.122 The IACHR 
criticised the proposal, and urged ‘the countries of the region that criminalise abortion 
regardless of the circumstances to amend their laws’ to ensure that women’s human rights 
would be protected.123  In response to the ARENA proposal, in October 2016 the FMLN 
drew up a reform bill in conjunction with Agrupación Ciudadana and other feminist 
organisations that proposed the decriminalisation of abortion in the case of rape, incest, non-
viability of the foetus, and where the woman’s life is at risk.124 Following the bill’s limited 
progress, in August 2017 a cross-party group of 41 Legislative Assembly deputies worked to 
gain support for a legislative bill that proposes decriminalising abortion in the case of a risk 
to the woman’s life or health, and in the case of rape or statutory rape of a minor.125 These 
developments were welcomed by both the CEDAW Committee and the IACHR, particularly 
in the context of the Zika epidemic.126 However, the bills have not progressed through the 
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Assembly since,127 and the extent of President Nayib Bukele’s commitment to abortion law 
reform is unclear: he has said that he is anti-abortion, but during his presidential campaign he 
pledged to legalise abortion where the pregnant person’s life is at risk and has since stated 
that no woman should be jailed for an obstetric emergency.128 These legislative proposals 
relating to El Salvador’s abortion ban represent the contested, ongoing nature of the 
multilevel citizenship project that is the advancement of SRHRs including abortion access. 
Conservative and progressive legislators – in collaboration with domestic, transnational, 
regional, and international actors – are setting out competing notions of how women and girls 
should be conceptualised: as subordinate non-citizens whose only role is motherhood 
regardless of the consequences, or as full citizens with the ability to determine their right to 
have rights and the scope of those rights. The tensions between these two competing 
understandings of women’s place in the citizenship project are also apparent in the release of 
some women, and the ongoing prosecution of others, by the judiciary. 
 
Since 2016, several women imprisoned for having had an abortion have been released, 
potentially indicating some change in the political climate and some responsiveness to the 
Agrupación Ciudadana-led campaign for las 17 y otras.129 However, these women often 
continue to face ostracisation and the threat of renewed prosecution. For example, in May 
2016, one of las 17 y otras, Maria Teresa Rivera, had her conviction annulled; however, a 
few months later prosecutors appealed for the original verdict of aggravated homicide to be 
reinstated.130 Fearful that they would be successful, and unable to find work or otherwise 
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continue on with her life due to intense public opprobrium, Rivera moved to Sweden with her 
son in October 2016.131 She was granted asylum there in March 2017, with Sweden finding 
that she had been subject to gender-based persecution by the Salvadoran state.132 
 
Along with the ongoing ostracisation and harassment that women released from prison face, 
women and girls continue to be prosecuted for crimes related to suspected abortions. Their 
experiences highlight other, interrelated human rights issues in El Salvador such as high rates 
of rape and incest, the gendered nature of gang violence, and, as ever, the deep-seated 
discriminatory attitudes against women and girls from poor, working-class, and/or 
indigenous/mestiza backgrounds. In December 2018, 20-year-old Imelda Cortez was found 
not guilty of attempted murder following the birth of her baby in April 2017; she had not 
known she was pregnant as a result of sexual abuse by her stepfather, and although her baby 
survived she was still convicted and forced to spend eighteen months in pre-trial detention 
because prosecutors claimed that her failure to tell anyone about the pregnancy and seek 
medical assistance during birth amounted to attempted murder.133 In July 2017 Evelyn 
Beatriz Hernández Cruz was sentenced to 30 years in jail for aggravated homicide after 
giving birth to a stillborn baby in a toilet in April 2016.134 She also did not realise that she 
was pregnant as the result of being ‘raped by a gang member over several months as part of a 
forced sexual relationship.’135 She lost consciousness, and so her mother took her to hospital 
where she was detained on suspicion of having had an abortion.136 Medical experts were 
unable to determine whether the baby was born dead or died shortly after, but the judge 
decided that Cruz did in fact know she was pregnant, failed to seek antenatal care because she 
did not want a baby, and intentionally threw the baby in the toilet to kill him.137 In February 
2019, having served nearly three years of her sentence and in response to multiple appeals, 
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the Supreme Court annulled her sentence and ordered a retrial.138 In July 2019, a new trial for 
manslaughter commenced.139 Hernández was acquitted on the basis of insufficient evidence 
in August 2019,140 but the following month prosecutors announced their intention to appeal 
the ruling and have Cruz face a third trial.141 Whether El Salvador will decriminalise abortion 
in the near feature, and whether it will cease prosecutions against women and girls suspected 
of having had one, therefore remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that feminist and 
human rights activists at all levels of the human rights systems are contesting this situation 
and advocating for the full realisation of women’s and girls’ human rights and citizenship. 
The ways in which they do are the subject of the next two parts of this chapter. 
 
Part 2: Summary 
 
While the situation remains uncertain in terms of the potential for legislative reform, release 
of women currently imprisoned, and the outcome of ongoing cases against those suspected of 
having had abortions, the strength of the Salvadoran and Latin American feminist 
movements, and their influence on the regional and international human rights system’s 
evolving position on SRHRs, is more certain. Along with their contribution to the 2016 
legislative proposals, Salvadoran feminists have continued to participate in the feminist 
encuentros, which focus on SRHRs including abortion access.142 In 2019, Agrupación 
Ciudadana member Sara Garcia Gross was awarded the Simone de Beauvoir human rights 
prize, which recognises individuals who ‘mobilise international solidarity, reaffirm women’s 
rights’, support HRDs and ‘defend the ideals of equality and peace.’143 Campaigning and 
awareness-raising by feminist human rights defenders like Gross is also influencing public 
opinion: a slight majority of Salvadorans are in favour of the current legislation being 
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relaxed, with 57% being in favour of decriminalising abortion in the case of a risk to life or 
fatal foetal abnormalities.144  
 
The ongoing, contested process of campaigns for reform of El Salvador’s abortion legislation 
and justice for those affected by it form part of a multilevel feminist citizenship project. 
National and transnational feminist and human rights organisations such as Agrupación 
Ciudadana, Amnesty, and CRR are consciously engaging in a multidimensional strategy of 
researching, awareness-raising, campaigning, alliance-building, and strategic litigation in 
relation to the complete criminalisation of abortion in El Salvador and its negative human 
rights impact.145 They are engaging with the legislature, judiciary, general public, and media 
to raise awareness about the situation in El Salvador and so pressure the state to reform its 
legislation and provide redress to women and girls who have been subjected to unfair trials 
and imprisonment. As a result of their work, between 30 and 41 women have been freed,146 
proposals for the liberalisation of the current abortion legislation have been tabled in the 
Legislative Assembly, and the human rights system has been increasingly assertive in its calls 
for the full realisation of SRHRs in El Salvador. The next two parts will demonstrate that 
national and transnational feminist engagement with the inter-American and the UN human 
rights systems is proving to be an especially effective part of their multidimensional strategy 
to realise women’s full citizenship in the form of SRHRs such as straightforward, safe, and 
legal access to abortion. 
4.2. Regional Struggle (OAS) 
Introduction 
 
As Chapters 2 and 3 illustrated, the inter-American human rights system (IAHRS) has 
expressed a strong commitment to SRHRs and an increasing understanding of the 
intersectional feminist approach necessary for their full realisation. The IAHRS’s 
commitment to SRHRs, and its attention to the negative human rights impact of El Salvador’s 
abortion legislation, has intensified in the past decade and especially since the case of Beatriz 
in 2013. As previously stated, the IAHRS’s current position on abortion is that it should be 
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decriminalised at a minimum in the case of a risk to the pregnant person’s life or health, in 
the case of rape or incest, and in the case of fatal foetal abnormalities. Developments in the 
IAHRS regarding SRHRs and abortion represent the importance and effectiveness of feminist 
engagement with the language and mechanisms of human rights in order to contest women’s 
exclusion from and oppression by the traditional discourse of citizenship and rights. 
 
This part first highlights the IAHRS’s growing commitment to SRHRs and abortion law 
reform in El Salvador through a survey of the IACHR’s annual, country, and thematic 
reports. It argues that the IAHRS has been responsive to and supportive of Salvadoran and 
transnational feminists’ contestation of El Salvador’s abortion legislation. This is evidenced 
by the fact that feminist engagement with the IACHR’s sessions resulted in the IACHR 
conducting a country visit to El Salvador which focused on El Salvador’s abortion legislation 
and its negative human rights impact. This part focuses on the work of the IACHR, rather 
than the IACtHR or CIM, because it is the IAHRS body which has engaged the most with the 
situation in El Salvador specifically, rather than SRHRs and abortion access in general. 
 
The IACHR’s annual, country, and thematic reports 
 
Chapter 2 highlighted that the IACHR has dedicated increasing attention to women’s human 
rights and SRHRs since the 1990s in its annual, country, and thematic reports. The IACHR 
first discussed El Salvador’s abortion legislation in 2011 in its thematic reports on sexual 
violence in Mesoamerica and on women’s human rights defenders. In these reports, the 
IACHR expressed concern regarding the complete criminalisation of abortion in Nicaragua 
and El Salvador, as well as the intimidation that activists campaigning for reform were 
subjected to in these countries.147  Following the case of ‘Beatriz’ in 2013, the IACHR 
dedicated increasing attention to the criminalisation of abortion in El Salvador and the active 
prosecution of women accused of having had one. For example, the IACHR mentioned the 
negative impact of the criminalisation of abortion on women’s human rights in its annual 
report for the first time in 2013, the same year that it issued precautionary measures 
concerning the case of Beatriz.148 This demonstrates that actors within the IAHRS are 
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committed to addressing issues related to SRHRs in OAS Member States. This commitment 
to the multilevel feminist citizenship project of advancing SRHRs is also evident in the 
IACHR’s engagement with civil society actors through its periodic sessions. 
 
The IACHR’s periodic sessions 
 
From 2014 to the present, the IACHR dedicated increasing attention to SRHRs in its periodic 
sessions.149 As a result, it provided a platform for feminist organisations campaigning for 
SRHRs, including feminist organisations campaigning for the decriminalisation of abortion in 
El Salvador. The IACHR also proved responsive to these feminist organisations’ requests that 
the IACHR discuss issues relating to SRHRs such as abortion with national governments. At 
the 156th period of sessions in October 2015, the IACHR held a session on women deprived 
of liberty for experiencing obstetric emergencies in El Salvador, during which Quintanilla 
presented her personal testimony.150 The rights to health, to a life free from violence, and to 
privacy were highlighted as main issues by participating organisations, namely CRR, 
Agrupación Ciudadana, and la Colectiva Feminista. They requested that the IACHR conduct 
a country visit, and the IACHR expressed its grave concern regarding the facts presented.151 
The requested country visit took place in 2018, but prior to that the IACHR demonstrated its 
responsiveness to this feminist engagement with the IAHRS in two thematic reports 
published in 2015. The thematic report on legal standards related to gender equality used ‘the 
alarming impact of the criminalisation of abortion in all circumstances on women in El 
Salvador’152 and the prosecution for the crimes of abortion or aggravated homicide as an 
example of laws, policies, and practices impeding the full realisation of SRHRs in the 
region.153 Taking an intersectional approach, it emphasised the disproportionate and specific 
impact of such legislation on girls and women ‘affected by poverty’ with ‘low levels of 
education’ and living in rural areas.154 It called on states to review and eliminate legislation 
and policy restricting access to sexual and reproductive healthcare including abortion in order 
to ensure their compliance with IHRL standards.155 The IACHR’s 2015 thematic report on 
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human rights defenders highlighted the ‘stigmatization, accusations, and harassment’ facing 
Agrupación Ciudadana following the launch of its campaign for las 17.156 Therefore, the 
IACHR’s responsiveness to the concerns raised by these Salvadoran and transnational 
feminist activists, and by extension its commitment to the multilevel feminist citizenship 
project of SRHRs, is apparent. This responsiveness and commitment were also apparent in 
the 2018 country visit requested by the Salvadoran and transnational feminist activists. 
 
The country visit took place in January 2018. In its subsequent report, the IACHR urged a 
moratorium on prosecutions for the crime of abortion, and the reform of abortion legislation 
so as to avoid ‘violations of the fundamental rights of women, girls, and adolescents.’157 It 
criticised the ban as a violation of ‘the State’s international obligations to respect, protect and 
guarantee women’s rights to life, to health, and to integrity’, as well as the failure to respect 
due process rights, the right to medical privacy, and non-discrimination due to ‘negative 
stereotypes’ about women in judgments.158 It stated that 27 women were currently in prison 
on charges of aggravated homicide.159 It reiterated its concerns with the total criminalisation 
of abortion’s impact on ‘fundamental rights’ in its 2018 annual report, and the need for 
access to abortion at a minimum in the case of a risk to life or health, in the case of rape, and 
in the case of foetal non-viability.160 Following its 2019 country visit to El Salvador, the 
IACHR again emphasised the government’s obligation ‘to comply with inter-American 
standards on the sexual and reproductive rights of women and girls’ (i.e. decriminalising 
abortion at a minimum in certain circumstances), and urged it to implement a moratorium on 
the application of Criminal Code article 133, review sentences in cases involving obstetric 
emergencies, and prioritise requests to commute sentences.161 As a result of the IAHRS’ 
commitment to SRHRs and its responsiveness to civil society actors, the IACHR, Salvadoran 
feminists, and transnational feminists are cooperating across the national, regional, and 
transnational levels of the human rights system to advance SRHRs through their efforts to 
realise straightforward, safe, and legal access to abortion in El Salvador. This process 
represents the multilevel feminist citizenship project articulated in Chapter 2: these actors are 
contesting women’s historical exclusion from and oppression by the traditional citizenship 
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discourse which, through restrictive abortion legislation, seeks to maintain women’s 
subordinate position as non-citizens and bearers of future citizens. 
 
Part 3: Summary 
 
As a result of the commitment to intersectional feminism among individuals within the 
IAHRS and their responsiveness to domestic and transnational feminist actors outside of it, 
the IAHRS has been and continues to be a vital site and actor in the multilevel feminist 
citizenship project of decriminalising abortion in El Salvador and so advancing SRHRs. This 
is evident in its attention to SRHRs including abortion in annual, thematic, and country 
reports, and it is also evident in its engagement with and support for feminist activists in El 
Salvador who are campaigning for the decriminalisation of abortion and justice for those 
prosecuted and incarcerated for having had or alleged to have had one. This commitment to 
SRHRs and responsiveness to feminist actors from the national and transnational levels is 
also apparent at the international level of the human rights system. Numerous UN human 
rights bodies have criticised the negative human rights impact of El Salvador’s abortion 
legislation, and these criticisms are often the direct result of Salvadoran and transnational 
feminist and human rights organisations bringing these issues to their attention. The fourth 
and final part of this chapter considers this aspect of the multilevel feminist citizenship 
project. 
4.3. International Struggle (UN) 
Introduction 
 
As Chapters 2 and 3 indicated, the UN human rights system has been the prime site for the 
advancement of SRHRs in IHRL, and it has demonstrated a firm commitment to the respect, 
protection, and fulfilment of SRHRs. In regard to El Salvador, six of the nine core human 
rights treaty monitoring bodies, the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes 
and consequences (SR VAW), and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights have 
criticised the negative human rights impact of El Salvador’s complete criminalisation of 
abortion and the active prosecution of women and girls suspected of having had one. The UN 
human rights system’s awareness of the situation is the result of Salvadoran and transnational 
feminist and human rights organisations engaging with the UN human rights system as part 
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of their campaign for the decriminalisation of abortion in El Salvador. Their engagement with 
the UN human rights system consists of submitting information to the human rights treaty 
monitoring bodies during their periodic report review sessions, and meeting with UN Special 
Rapporteurs and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights during country visits. Not 
only has this feminist engagement contributed to the UN human rights system’s awareness of 
the situation in El Salvador, the UN human rights system is proving responsive to this 
feminist activism. This section argues that there is clear evidence that the information 
provided by these domestic and transnational feminist organisations is influencing the treaty 
monitoring bodies’ Concluding Observations, the recommendations adopted by Special 
Rapporteurs following country visits, and statements by the UN High Commissioner. 
Therefore, the multilevel feminist citizenship project of advancing SRHRs is proving 
successful at the international level of the human rights system.  
 
This section first discusses the HRC, CESCR, CEDAW, CAT, CRC, and CERD Concluding 
Observations from 2008 to the present. It demonstrates that their criticisms of El Salvador’s 
abortion legislation are the direct result of Salvadoran and transnational feminist 
organisations submitting information highlighting its negative human rights impact. This 
section then discusses the 2004 and 2011 SR VAW country reports, and the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights’ statement following his 2017 country visit, highlighting 
the ways in which information provided by Salvadoran feminist and human rights 
organisations informed their condemnation of El Salvador’s abortion legislation. This 
feminist engagement with the UN human rights system, and the UN human rights system’s 
responsiveness to it, represents the utility of feminists engaging with the international layer of 
the multilevel citizenship project. 
 
Treaty monitoring bodies 
 
The first criticism of El Salvador’s abortion legislation by the UN human rights system came 
from the HRC in its 2003 Concluding Observations, which expressed ‘concern at the severity 
of the current law against abortion.’162 The 2007 CESCR Concluding Observations went 
further, urging the state ‘to reform its abortion legislation and to consider exceptions…in the 
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cases of therapeutic abortion and pregnancy resulting from rape or incest.’163 The first 
available example of feminist organisations submitting information concerning the complete 
criminalisation of abortion in El Salvador is a joint submission by feminist NGOs to the 
CEDAW Committee in the lead-up to its 2008 Concluding Observations. Co-written by 
ORMUSA, CEMUJER, and Las Mélidas among others, the report highlighted the high rate 
of teenage pregnancy, the negative health impact of unsafe, illegal abortion, and the 
consequences of this for the full enjoyment of the right to health as set out in article 12 of 
CEDAW. 164 They requested that the CEDAW Committee reiterate CESCR’s 2007 
recommendation that El Salvador reform its abortion legislation to permit therapeutic 
abortions.165 In response to this shadow report, CEDAW’s 2008 Concluding Observations 
expressed alarm at ‘the high incidence of births among adolescents, as well as the high 
number of illegal abortions, including very young women, which have a negative impact on 
women’s physical and mental health.’166 Its recommendations included holding ‘a national 
dialogue on women’s right to reproductive health, including on the consequences of 
restrictive abortion laws.’167 Therefore, transnational and national feminist organisations 
successfully drew attention to the negative human rights impact of the criminalisation 
abortion in El Salvador through its engagement with the UN human rights system, and their 
report directly resulted in the CEDAW Committee calling on El Salvador to address the 
human rights issues arising from its abortion legislation. 
 
A similar responsiveness is evident in CAT’s 2009 Concluding Observations. The Committee 
expressed concern with the complete criminalisation of abortion and how it had ‘resulted in 
serious harm to women, including death’ in contravention of the State Party’s obligations to 
prevent torture and CIDT.168 This was in response to a submission by la Procuraduría which 
framed the complete criminalisation of abortion in this manner.169 
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This process of feminist engagement with the treaty monitoring bodies – and the treaty 
monitoring bodies being responsive to this engagement – has continued since then. National 
and transnational feminist and human rights organisations including Agrupación Ciudadana, 
CRR, and la Procuraduría submitted information for the HRC’s 2010 and 2018 Concluding 
Observations, CESCR’s 2014 Concluding Observations, and CEDAW’s 2017 Concluding 
Observations. In each instance, their submissions influenced the Concluding Observations. 
 
In 2010, Agrupación Ciudadana and three other organisations submitted a joint shadow 
report to the HRC in the lead up to El Salvador’s sixth periodic review. The report asserted 
that the complete criminalisation of abortion and the active prosecution of women suspected 
of having had abortions violated women’s and girls’ rights to equality, life, liberty, health, 
privacy, and freedom from torture.170 In light of this, the HRC’s Concluding Observations 
expressed concern over the complete criminalisation of abortion and the prosecution and 
imprisonment of women suspected of having had the procedure.171 The Committee reiterated 
its 2003 recommendation that El Salvador amend its legislation ‘to bring it into line with the 
Covenant’; it also called for the suspension of prosecutions and ‘a national dialogue on the 
rights of women to sexual and reproductive health.’172 Between 2015 and 2018, numerous 
civil society organisations including Agrupación Ciudadana and la Colectiva Feminista 
submitted information to the HRC in relation to its periodic review of El Salvador’s seventh 
periodic report.173 The HRC drew on these contributions, its previous Concluding 
Observations, and the work of UN human rights procedures to urge El Salvador ‘to suspend 
immediately the criminalization of women for the offence of abortion’, to ‘review all cases of 
women who have been imprisoned for abortion-related offences, with the aim of ensuring 
their release’, and to ‘ensure unimpeded access to high-quality sexual and reproductive health 
 
170 Agrupación Ciudadana et al ‘Report on Violations of Women’s Human Rights due to the Complete 
Criminalisation of Abortion’ (October 2010) 
<https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/TBSearch.aspx> accessed 2 December 2020 
171 HRC, ‘Concluding Observations on the sixth periodic report of El Salvador’ (CCPR/C/SLV/CO/6, 18 
November 2010) para 10 
172 ibid 
173 The Advocates for Human Rights, ‘Submission to the Human Rights Committee for the 114th Session, 29 
June-24 July 2015’ (2015) para 5; Espacio de Mujeres Lesbianas Salvadoreñas por la Diversidad (ESMULES), 
‘Human Rights Situation for Lesbian, Bisexual and Trans Women in El Salvador’ (9 February 2018); Fundación 
Red Nacional de Derechos Humanos (RENADDHH), Consejo Nacional para la Defensa del Derecho Humano 
de la Salud, ‘Aportes para el VII informe periódico del Estado del Salvador 122o Sesión del Comité de Derechos 
Humanos’ (January 2018); Women’s Link Worldwide, ‘El Salvador’s Compliance with the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ (2018) all available at 
<https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/TBSearch.aspx> accessed 2 December 2020 
 162 
services nationwide’.174 It also called on El Salvador to ‘guarantee safe, legal and effective 
access’ to abortion in the case of a risk to life or health, in the case of rape or incest, and in 
the case of the pregnancy’s non-viability.175 
 
CESCR’s 2014 Concluding Observations reiterated the Committee’s previous calls for 
legislative reform permitting abortion for therapeutic reasons and in the case of rape or incest, 
stating that such reform was required to ensure respect for women’s rights to health, life, and 
dignity.176 This recommendation was informed not only by its previous Concluding 
Observations, but also by Agrupación Ciudadana and CRR submissions which highlighted 
the ongoing negative human rights impact of the complete criminalisation of abortion and the 
prosecution and incarceration of women for abortion and homicide.177 
 
In its 2017 Concluding Observations, CEDAW expressed concern with the complete 
criminalisation of abortion and the prosecution, lengthy pretrial detention, and 
disproportionate criminal penalties facing women for having an abortion or miscarriage.178 
Reiterating its previous Concluding Observations, it called on El Salvador to introduce a 
moratorium on the enforcement of the current law, review the detention of women for 
abortion-related offences, and decriminalise abortion at a minimum in the cases of rape, 
incest, threats to the life and/or health of the pregnant person or severe foetal impairment.179 
In doing so, it reflected the concerns raised in submissions by la Procuraduría, CRR, and 
Agrupación Ciudadana, among others.180 
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The two most recent Concluding Observations issued by treaty monitoring bodies in relation 
to El Salvador also speak to this ongoing process of feminist engagement and treaty 
monitoring body responsiveness. In 2018, the CRC called on El Salvador ‘decriminalize 
abortion and ensure access to safe abortion and post-abortion care services for adolescent 
girls.’181 In doing so, it echoed feminist and human rights organisations’ submissions on the 
human rights impact of El Salvador’s abortion legislation.182 CERD’s 2019 Concluding 
Observations called on El Salvador to ‘guarantee access to sexual and reproductive health for 
indigenous women and women of African descent’, and to ‘review legislation on abortion in 
order to ensure that it is consistent with other human rights such as women’s right to life and 
right to physical and mental health.’183 While documents were unavailable to determine 
whether or not civil society organisations submitted information on this topic to CERD 
during the review process, CERD’s most recent Concluding Observations represent 
convergence within the UN human rights system that El Salvador’s abortion legislation needs 
to be reformed in order to guarantee the respect, protection, and fulfilment of women’s 
human rights. This convergence is the result of feminist engagement with the UN human 
rights system, beginning with their articulation of the concept of SRHRs during UN human 
rights conferences, and continuing with their participation in the periodic review process. 
Effective feminist engagement with the UN human rights system by Salvadoran and 
transnational organisations is also evident in their influence on SR VAW country reports and 
a recent statement by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
 
SR VAW and the UN High Commissioner  
 
The SR VAW’s engagement with and responsiveness to national actors campaigning for 
abortion law reform in El Salvador can be seen in the SR VAW’s 2004 and 2011 country 
visit reports. During both of these country visits, the SR VAW met with feminist 
 
periodic report of El Salvador’ (2017); Procuraduría, ‘List of Issues and Difficulties for the Implementation of 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, from the perspective of the 
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<https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/TBSearch.aspx> accessed 2 December 2020 
181 CRC Committee 2018 Concluding Observations, para 36(d) 
182 Human Rights Watch, ‘Submission by Human Rights Watch to the Committee on the Rights of the Child on 
El Salvador, 79th session, 2018’ (2018); Women’s Link Worldwide, ‘El Salvador’s Compliance with the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child: Women’s and Girls’ Rights. 79th session of the Committee on the Rights 
of the Child’ (2018) 3-5, 14-5, both available at 
<https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/TBSearch.aspx> (accessed 2 December 2020) 
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organisations campaigning for abortion law reform and her conclusions and 
recommendations were informed by the evidence with which they provided her. For example, 
during the SR VAW’s 2004 country visit to El Salvador, she met with feminist organisations 
campaigning for abortion law reform including CEMUJER and Las Dignas.184 Her report 
reflects their concerns: she criticised El Salvador’s abortion legislation for prioritising ‘the 
rights of the foetus…over a woman’s right to life, health and well-being’ and for denying all 
women and girls ‘the right to control their bodies and their lives.’185 She highlighted its 
disproportionate impact on women and girls who were pregnant as the result of rape or 
incest, on poor women and girls, and on teenagers.186 She called on El Salvador to consider 
permitting abortion in at least certain circumstances.187 The 2011 country report reiterated 
these concerns and recommendations, and it refers to meetings with la Procuraduría, 
feminist groups, and women detained in Ilopango Prison to discuss the negative human rights 
impact of El Salvador’s abortion legislation.188 It also commends the ‘laudable efforts’ of 
women’s rights organisations to contest the complete criminalisation of abortion and active 
prosecution of women suspected of having had one.189 Therefore, the SR VAW’s 
engagement with and support for national actors campaigning for abortion law reform in 
order to realise women’s full citizenship in El Salvador is evident. This engagement and 
support are also apparent in The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ recent work. 
 
In 2017, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights conducted a country visit to El 
Salvador. He stated that he was ‘appalled’ by the consequences of the country’s total 
criminalisation of abortion, and he urged the government ‘to lift the absolute prohibition on 
abortion’, ‘to launch a moratorium on the application of article 133 of the Penal Code’, and 
‘to review all cases where women have been detained for abortion-related offences’ to ensure 
State compliance with its obligations under IHRL.190 This statement indicates the 
Commissioner’s support for the position of national and transnational feminist and human 
rights organisations, as well as other UN human rights bodies, that El Salvador’s abortion 
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legislation needs to be reformed to ensure that women’s human rights and full citizenship are 
realised. 
 
Therefore, in light of this review of Concluding Observations, country visit reports, and 
statements it is clear that multiple important actors within the UN human rights system are 
committed to the multilevel citizenship project of SRHRs as it manifests in calls for 
straightforward, safe, and legal access to abortion in El Salvador. They are responsive to 
Salvadoran and transnational feminist and human rights organisations campaigning for the 
decriminalisation of abortion and an end to the prosecution of women suspected of having 
had one, as indicated by their incorporation of these organisations’ evidence into their own 
work. Therefore, feminist and human rights organisations should continue to meet with and 
submit information to these UN actors to ensure ongoing pressure on the Salvadoran 
government to address the multiple human rights violations arising from the current 
legislative context. They should also consider engaging with the individual complaints 
procedures of the UN human rights treaty bodies as part of this multilevel feminist 
citizenship process. 
 
The individual complaints procedure 
 
Salvadoran and transnational feminist engagement with the UN human rights system 
represents several aspects of the ‘multidimensional strategy’ employed by feminists to 
advance SRHRs.191 In writing and submitting reports to the UN human rights system, 
Salvadoran and transnational feminist organisations are engaging in ‘research and evidence 
generation’, the ‘dissemination of information’ and the ‘forging’ of alliances with actors who 
share their aims.192 However, the fourth aspect of this multidimensional strategy, strategic 
litigation, has not yet been pursued by national or transnational feminist organisations within 
the UN human rights system. This is curious, since El Salvador has accepted the individual 
complaints procedure of five UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies – HRC, CESCR, 
CERD, CRC, and CRPD – and therefore filing a complaint with one of these bodies is an 
option.193 Perhaps Salvadoran and transnational feminist organisations are focusing on the 
 
191 X Casas, ‘They are girls not mothers’,163 
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IACHR’s individual complaints procedure instead, having filed petitions with the IACHR 
concerning the cases of Manuela and Beatriz. Given the UN human rights system’s 
responsiveness to campaigns for the decriminalisation of abortion in El Salvador, and given 
the HRC’s multiple Final Views finding states responsible for violations of the ICCPR due to 
restrictive abortion legislation, filing an individual complaint relating to the complete 
criminalisation of abortion in El Salvador may yet be a strategy worth pursuing in order to 
advance the full realisation of women’s and girls’ SRHRs and citizenship in El Salvador.194 
 
Part 4: Summary 
 
There is clear evidence that Salvadoran and transnational feminist organisations are engaging 
with the UN human rights system to advance SRHRs, including abortion access, within El 
Salvador. There is also clear evidence that the UN human rights system is responsive to their 
engagement through its incorporation of their submissions into Concluding Observations, 
final reports on country visits, and statements. This represents convergence between the 
national, international, and transnational levels of the multilevel feminist citizenship project 
of SRHRs: feminist actors, and actors who are responsive to feminist approaches, are 
working within and across these levels to contest women’s exclusion from and oppression by 
the traditional discourse of citizenship and rights as it manifests in the criminalisation of 
abortion in El Salvador. Translating this success into change at the national level through the 
decriminalisation of abortion and the release of women imprisoned for obstetric emergencies 




This chapter considered the ways in which feminists are making use of the language and 
mechanisms of human rights at the domestic, regional, international, and transnational levels 
of the human rights system to campaign for the decriminalisation of abortion in El Salvador 
and so realise women’s full citizenship. It first provided a general overview of the human 
rights situation in El Salvador, and the ways in which systemic inequality exacerbates the 
impact of the criminalisation of abortion and informs the active prosecution of those 
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suspected of having had one. It then detailed the origins and evolution of the Salvadoran 
feminist movement, emphasising its intersectional and transnational nature. Following on 
from this discussion, it demonstrated that the criminalisation of abortion and the prosecution 
of women and girls suspected of having had one is a manifestation of the patriarchal, 
oppressive, exclusionary citizenship discourse that requires the strict regulation of women’s 
reproduction and sexuality in the service of the continuity and stability of a patriarchal social 
order. Part 2 also demonstrated that feminists are contesting this exclusion and oppression 
through awareness-raising, campaigns for legislative reform and justice, and engagement 
with the regional and international human rights system, and that this contestation should be 
understood as a multilevel citizenship project. 
 
The importance of feminist engagement with the inter-American and UN human rights 
systems, and the responsiveness of these systems to this engagement, was the subject of parts 
3 and 4. They highlighted the growing assertiveness of the inter-American and UN human 
rights’ statements vis-à-vis the need for the decriminalisation of abortion in El Salvador, and 
it argued that this is the direct result of Salvadoran and transnational feminist and human 
rights organisations bringing the issue to their attention. It noted that these organisations have 
yet to file an individual complaint with a UN human rights treaty monitoring body, and it 
suggested that this might be a useful avenue to pursue in their attempts to provide redress for, 
and advance the human rights of, women and girls in El Salvador who are affected by the 
complete criminalisation of abortion. 
 
Although abortion remains illegal in El Salvador, and although women and girls continue to 
be prosecuted for it, there is increasing pressure upon the government from national, regional, 
international and transnational actors to enact reforms and so ensure that women’s and girls’ 
human rights are respected, protected, and fulfilled. This represents the contested, ongoing 
nature of the multilevel feminist citizenship project that is SRHRs. The success of the Irish 
feminist movement in realising abortion law reform, the subject of the next chapter, may 
provide some inspiration to the Salvadoran feminist movement to continue its struggle. This 
success, as well as ongoing challenges and the lessons that the Irish feminist movement could 
learn from the Salvadoran feminist movement in terms of intersectionality and 






This chapter argues that feminist activism for abortion access and SRHRs in Ireland 
represents a multilevel feminist citizenship project. It demonstrates that feminists’ 
engagement with the interconnected domestic, regional, international, and transnational 
levels of the human rights system resulted in the repeal of the 8th Amendment and the 
introduction of partial access to abortion in 2018-9. While this was a major success for the 
multilevel feminist citizenship project of SRHRs and abortion access, the contestation of 
women’s historical exclusion from and oppression by the traditional citizenship discourse is 
ongoing, given ongoing restrictions on straightforward access to abortion in Ireland. As with 
their Salvadoran-based counterparts, Irish feminists are continuing their multilevel feminist 
citizenship activism through a ‘multidimensional’ strategy which involves gathering research 
and evidence, campaigning and raising awareness, alliance-building with actors who share 
their aims, and strategic litigation.1  
 
Part 1 provides a brief overview of the main human rights issues in Ireland and their 
interrelationship with its abortion legislation past and present. Part 2 discusses the origins and 
evolution of the Irish feminist movement, and their engagement with the key cases arising 
from Ireland’s restrictive abortion legislation from the 1980s to the 2010s. Part 3 analyses 
feminist engagement with the European human rights system. It reflects on the ways in which 
the absence of bodies like the IACHR and CIM, as well as the conservative, deferential 
approach of the ECtHR to human rights protection, has in some ways limited the 
advancement of the multilevel feminist citizenship project of realising abortion access and 
SRHRs. In contrast, part 4 highlights the responsiveness of the UN human rights system to 
Irish and transnational feminist and human rights organisations’ engagement, as evidenced by 
their influence on Concluding Observations and Final Views. Throughout, the ways in which 
feminists successfully engaged with the language and mechanisms of human rights 
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nationally, regionally, internationally, and transnationally in order to realise access to 
abortion in Ireland through the repeal of the 8th Amendment and the introduction of The 
Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act in 2018 (hereafter the 2018 Act), are 
highlighted. The ongoing challenges facing the full realisation of abortion access and SRHRs 
in Ireland, including issues with the 2018 Act itself and the Irish feminist movement, are also 
considered. 
5.1. General Context  
From 1922 until 2019, abortion was illegal in the Republic of Ireland except when there was 
a risk to the life, as distinct from the health, of the mother. As Chapter 2 argued, abortion’s 
continued criminalisation following independence through the maintenance of Sections 58 
and 59 of the 1861 Offences Against the Person Act (hereafter, the 1861 Act) was part of 
wider societal and legal measures to deny women’s citizenship in the name of upholding a 
conservative, patriarchal, Catholic social and moral order. In 1983, the 8th Amendment to the 
Constitution resulted in additional restrictions on women’s access to abortion. This 
Amendment added Article 40.3.3o to the Constitution, which enshrined ‘the right to life of the 
unborn’ on an equal footing with the ‘right to life of the mother.’2 Chapter 2 demonstrated 
that the anti-choice campaign for the 8th Amendment was a direct response to the 
liberalisation of social mores and modest advancements of women’s rights, which 
conservative actors understood as a threat to the continuity and stability of the conservative, 
Catholic, patriarchal Irish nation.  
 
In the 1992 ‘X case’ (discussed in greater detail below), the Supreme Court ruled that 
abortion could be permitted where there was a risk to a woman’s life, as distinct from her 
health, including when the risk to her life was through suicide. However, successive 
governments failed to implement legislation allowing for this exception to Ireland’s 
criminalisation of abortion, creating ongoing uncertainty for women and medical 
professionals as to whether they could legally access or provide abortion care in a life-
threatening situation. These restrictions and this sense of uncertainty were further 
compounded by the 1995 Regulation of Information Act, which placed extensive restrictions 
on the nature of information on abortion services abroad that could be published or 
advertised, as well as the information and advice that healthcare professionals could provide, 
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even if patients explicitly requested it.3 Despite numerous domestic cases and controversies, 
widespread awareness of the fact that thousands of women were travelling abroad every year 
to access abortion care, extensive civil society activism, and international condemnation, the 
1861 Act and the 8th Amendment remained the basis of Ireland’s abortion legislation until 
2013. That year, in response to the controversy caused by the death of Savita Halappanavar in 
October 2012, the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act (PLDPA) was signed into law. A 
highly restrictive law which punished the intentional ‘destruction of unborn human life’ with 
14 years in prison, an unlimited fine, or both, it merely legislated for the ‘X Case’ ruling, 
permitting abortion where there was a risk to the woman’s life (including from suicide), as 
distinct from her health, due to the pregnancy.4 The feminist campaign for straightforward 
access to safe, legal abortion had by then gathered momentum and, in response to this 
activism, the recommendations of the Citizens’ Assembly, and pressure from the UN human 
rights system, the government agreed to a referendum on the 8th Amendment. On the 25th of 
May 2018, the proposal to repeal the 8th Amendment was approved by a two-to-one margin, 
and the Oireachtas (parliament) was able to legislate on abortion. The Health (Regulation of 
Termination of Pregnancy) Act 2018 came into force on the 1st of January 2019. It permits 
abortion up to twelve weeks without restriction as to reasons, and, after twelve weeks it 
permits abortion in the case of a risk to the woman’s life or health, or in the case of fatal 
foetal abnormality.5 This represented a major success for the feminist movement: through 
their multilevel engagement with the language and mechanisms of human rights, Ireland’s 
abortion legislation was brought in line with IHRL standards. 
 
Although Ireland’s abortion legislation is now broadly in line with the minimum IHRL 
standards established by the UN human rights system, there are numerous issues limiting the 
full respect, protection, and fulfilment of pregnant peoples’ SRHRs that are inherent in the 
Act and that arise from the wider Irish socioeconomic and political context. As such, the 
multilevel feminist citizenship project of realising women’s right to have rights and 
determine those rights through facilitating their access to straightforward, safe, and legal 
abortion is ongoing. Some of the issues feminists face in realising this will be discussed in 
part 2 of this chapter. First, a brief overview of some of the main human rights issues in 
Ireland will be provided. 
 
3 Regulation of Information (Services Outside the state for Termination of Pregnancies) Act Number 5 of 1995, 
secs 3, 4, 5, 6, 10 
4 Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013, Number 35 of 2013, secs 7, 8, 9, 22(1), 22(2)   
5 Health (Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Act 2018, secs 9, 10, 11, 12 (2018 Act) 
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While Ireland  is far wealthier and far less violent than El Salvador – it is ranked 3rd in the 
world according to the Human Development Index Ranking6 – it nonetheless has human 
rights issues. These human rights issues represent a particular, country-specific manifestation 
of the same systemic inequalities impeding the full realisation of women’s and girls’ 
citizenship in El Salvador, namely sexism, racism, ableism, class inequality, homophobia, 
and transphobia. 
 
Prior to the liberalisation of Ireland’s abortion legislation, national and transnational feminist 
and human rights organisations, as well UN human rights bodies, repeatedly criticised 
Ireland’s restrictive abortion legislation.7 UN human rights bodies also drew – and continue 
to draw – attention to other, interrelated issues such as the persistence of gender-based 
discrimination in attitudes, legislation, and policy;8 gender inequality in the labour force;9 
lack of women’s representation in politics and decision-making;10 barriers to young people 
obtaining access to quality, impartial reproductive and sexual health information and 
services;11 failure to conduct prompt, independent, thorough and effective investigations into 
the historical abuse of women and children in Magdalene laundries and similar Church/state 
institutions;12 and the prevalence of domestic and gender-based violence in the state.13 These 
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10 CEDAW 1999 Concluding Observations, paras 189-90; CEDAW 2005 Concluding Observations, paras 24, 
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12 CAT, ‘Concluding Observations on the initial report of Ireland’ (CAT/C/IRL/CO/1, 17 June 2011) paras 20-1 
(CAT 2011 Concluding Observations); CAT, ‘Concluding Observations on the second periodic report of 
Ireland’, (CAT/C/IRL/CO/2, 31 August 2017) paras 23-30 (CAT 2017 Concluding Observations); CEDAW 
2017 Concluding Observations, paras 14-5; CESCR, ‘Concluding Observations on the third periodic report of 
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Observations on the fourth periodic report of Ireland’ (CCPR/C/IRL/CO/4, 19 August 2014) para 10 (HRC 
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organisations and bodies have also been critical of other, interrelated issues, such as systemic 
discrimination against Travellers and other ethnic and racial minorities;14 the multiple human 
rights violations arising from the direct provision system for asylum seekers;15 high rates of 
income inequality and relative poverty, particularly since the implementation of austerity 
measures following the 2008 recession;16 a longstanding housing crisis characterised by 
inadequate provision of social housing and resulting in increasing rates of homelessness and 
substandard housing conditions;17 and the erosion of social security, the healthcare system, 
and public service provision.18 This particular social, political, economic and cultural context 
informed the implementation of Ireland’s restrictive abortion legislation, and it also 
influenced the emergence and development of the Irish feminist movement. The next part of 
this chapter explores the ways in which the Irish feminist movement contested women’s 
exclusion from and oppression by the traditional patriarchal citizenship discourse as it 
manifested in restrictions on women’s political, economic, and reproductive autonomy. 
5.2. Domestic Struggle  
Introduction 
 
This part discusses the national level of the multilevel feminist citizenship project, exploring 
how the particularities of the Irish context shaped women’s exclusion from and oppression by 
citizenship, as well as feminist responses to this exclusion and oppression. It first provides a 
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brief overview of the Irish feminist movement, before discussing the key cases and 
controversies relating to Ireland’s abortion legislation. In doing so, it argues that the disparate 
and largely liberal nature of the Irish feminist movement, the strength of conservative actors, 
and government unwillingness to meaningfully address the issue of abortion all 
circumscribed the advancement of women’s citizenship in the form of SRHRs well into the 
2010s. In contrast to El Salvador, it was only in 2013 that explicitly intersectional feminist 
organisations emerged in Ireland. As will be demonstrated, their structural understanding of 
inequality, and of the need for transformation rather than reform to ensure the full realisation 
of SRHRs in Ireland, has to some extent permeated feminist discourse in Ireland. 
Intersectional feminist activism at the national and international levels of the human rights 
system certainly contributed to the repeal of the 8th Amendment and the introduction of 
access to abortion in certain circumstances, representing success for the multilevel feminist 
citizenship project of SRHRs. However, this process of feminist contestation is as yet 
ongoing: abortion is still technically a criminal offence, and it is not fully accessible even in 
the circumstances permitted under the 2018 Act. Furthermore, systemic legislative, policy, 
and societal changes are still necessary to ensure that all historically oppressed and 
marginalised groups in Ireland have the right to have rights and determine the scope of those 
rights. 
 
5.2.1. The Irish feminist movement 
 
This section considers the first and second waves of the Irish feminist movement, arguing 
that they achieved some advances in women’s rights, but that the generally liberal and diffuse 
nature of the movement, and the introduction of the 8th Amendment, impeded the realisation 
of women’s full citizenship. 
 
At the turn of the 20th century, feminists campaigned for Irish independence, for the right to 
vote and stand for election, and for married women’s legal capacity and property rights. They 
were also active in the labour rights movement, which was less robust in Ireland than in other 
countries.19 Whereas the feminist movement in El Salvador was enriched by connections with 
other political and intellectual movements, the weakness of the Left, the lack of strong 
connections between the Irish feminist movement and left-wing movements, and the 
 
19 E Crawford, The Women’s Suffrage Movement, 252-276; M Luddy, ‘Feminism’ in R Bourke, I McBride (eds) 
The Princeton History of Modern Ireland 474-477, 480 
 174 
indifference or opposition to women’s rights issues within the Irish independence movement 
all impeded the development of a strong Irish feminist movement with an awareness of 
intersecting forms of oppression.20 
 
Despite these limitations, Irish feminists mounted concerted protest against legislation and 
constitutional provisions excluding women from full citizenship.21 These feminists 
articulated the idea of a female citizen, one who had earned her right to participate in the new 
state given her active role in the independence movements.22 However, these organisations 
and individuals largely remained silent on the issues of contraception and abortion, as they 
were seen as too controversial and divisive.23 This reluctance diminished only slightly in 
subsequent decades, as will be demonstrated below. 
 
The conditions necessary for women to contest their exclusion from and oppression by the 
Irish citizenship discourse came about towards the end of the 1940s, and intensified during 
the 1960s.24 The emergence of the modern international human rights system and the advent 
of second-wave feminism were also integral to this process. In 1949 Ireland became one of 
the founding members of the CoE, and in 1955 it was admitted to the UN.25 Irish women 
delegates and trade unionists attended UN and CoE meetings and conferences, sharing 
knowledge and experience with other women’s and feminist organisations, and participating 
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in the growing post-war discussion of ‘equality between the sexes.’26 In 1967, the UN 
Commission on the Status of Women issued a directive to collect data on gender-based 
discrimination; this ultimately resulted in the establishment of the Council for the Status of 
Women (CSW) in 1973. 27 The CSW is now known as the National Women’s Council 
(NWC), and it is the national representative organisation for women’s and feminist groups in 
Ireland.28 It was one of the main members of the Together for Yes campaign to repeal the 8th 
Amendment in 2018.29 The NWC has only recently begun to incorporate an intersectional 
approach to its work30 and it was and still is largely ‘liberal/reformist in both its ideology and 
its tactics.’31 Therefore, as will be argued below in regard to the 2018 repeal campaign, much 
of their language and strategy focuses on building consensus around modest reforms to 
existing power structures so as to accommodate women. This forecloses more radical, 
intersectional feminist approaches which demand structural transformation, such as those 
articulated by the Abortion Rights Campaign (ARC) and Migrants and Ethnic-Minorities for 
Reproductive Justice (MERJ). Nevertheless, the NWC has been an important player in the 
Irish feminist movement, one which originated in Irish feminist groups making use of human 
rights system to challenge women’s exclusion from citizenship. 
 
Along with feminist activism within and around the human rights system, international and 
transnational activism around birth control, voluntary motherhood, and reproductive rights 
was also influential on feminists in Ireland. For example, in 1969 the Fertility Guidance 
Company, now known as the Irish Family Planning Association (IFPA), was established to 
circumvent the criminalisation of contraceptives by providing them to its members.32 The 
IFPA joined the International Planned Parenthood Federation in 1975, and it has long 
campaigned for abortion access in Ireland.33 As the origins and evolution of both the NWC 
and IFPA demonstrate, Irish feminists engaged in multilevel citizenship practices through 
their involvement with the UN human rights system and transnational feminist organisations. 
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In the coming decades, the language and mechanisms of human rights became increasingly 
important in their attempts to advance women’s full citizenship.  
 
Although the ‘sexual revolution’ of the 1960s did not occur in Ireland with the same intensity 
as in other Western countries, an evolution in attitudes and the influence of the American and 
European women’s liberation movement was discernible in 1970s Ireland.34 From 1971 to 
1977, grassroots feminist organisations such as the Irish Women’s Liberation Movement 
(IWLN) and Irishwomen United (IU) broke the taboos around gender inequality in Ireland 
through media appearances and public actions.35 While many of their demands were in reality 
modest and informed by liberal rather than radical feminism, their activism represented a 
powerful challenge to the status quo given the conservative cultural context in which they 
operated.36 During this period, single-issue feminist organisations that are still active today 
such as Women’s Aid and the Dublin Rape Crisis Centre were also founded.37 The Council 
for the Status of Women (today’s NWC) was also established during this period. 
 
The CSW/NWC’s structure and ideology, and the short-lived or single-issue nature of the 
main grassroots Irish feminist organisations, circumscribed the development of a coherent, 
intersectional feminist movement, with ongoing repercussions for feminist activism in Ireland 
into the present.38 Nonetheless, these feminist organisations contributed to important 
legislative and policy changes, often through engagement with the CoE and EEC: these 
changes included the abolition of the public-sector marriage bar in 1973; the criminalisation 
of gender discrimination in employment in 1977; the provision of paid maternity leave; 
improvements in access to legal aid; social welfare benefits for widows, “deserted wives” and 
single mothers; and the lifting of the ban on women serving on juries.39  
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These feminist organisations also contested women’s exclusion and oppression by the 
traditional citizenship discourse through activism in opposition to Ireland’s criminalisation of 
contraception. In contrast to feminist activism elsewhere in Europe and the US, abortion was 
not a main focus of Irish feminist organisations for fear that it would alienate people and for 
want of a unified commitment to decriminalising abortion within the Irish feminist 
movement.40 Therefore, contraception was the central reproductive rights issue during the 
1970s.41 Feminists staged public actions such as the May 1971 contraceptive train and made 
use of the legal system to advance contraceptive access in Ireland. 42 FPS Ltd. and  
the lawyers Seán McBride, Dudley Potter, and Donal Barrington brought the case of Mary 
McGee to the High Court and from there to the Supreme Court.43  They argued that the ban 
on the sale or import of contraceptives was incompatible with the Constitution and that it 
violated a number of McGee’s constitutional rights.44 The Court found in McGee’s favour, 
and in response to their ruling a bill permitting married couples access to contraception was 
introduced in 1974, only to be rejected – even this modest reform was considered too 
disruptive to the conservative, Catholic, patriarchal social order which required women to 
“do their duty by their husbands”, “submit to God’s will” and bear and rear future citizens, 
regardless of the risks to their health, wellbeing, and lives.45 In 1979 the Health (Family 
Planning) Act successfully passed through the Oireachtas, coming into force in 1980: it 
allowed for the publication and distribution of information about contraception in Ireland, but 
it was still highly restrictive in terms of access to contraception.46 It only permitted the 
provision of contraceptives on prescription for ‘bona fide’ family planning or for ‘adequate 
medical reasons.’47 Moreover, it heavily restricted the importation, manufacture, and 
advertising of contraceptives, and included a section emphasising that nothing in the Act 
could be interpreted to allow for abortion.48 
 
Even this slight relaxation of restrictions was seen by conservative actors as threat to the 
conservative, Catholic, patriarchal social order which required women to fulfil the role of 
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mothering non-citizens.49 As a result, anti-choice organisations successfully campaigned for 
the insertion of Article 40.3.3o into the Constitution.50 The mobilisation and success of these 
conservative actors ‘put the Women’s Movement on the defensive’ at a time when it was 
already fragmented.51 The force of the ‘fundamentalist backlash’ and the anti-amendment 
campaign’s decision to focus on ‘mainly medical and legal/constitutional grounds’ rather 
than feminist arguments for the right to choose left the Irish feminist movement 
demoralised.52 This demoralisation was further compounded by several high-profile tragedies 
and cases in the early and mid-1980s.53 For the next three decades, the 8th Amendment in 
conjunction with the 1861 Act further exemplified women’s oppression and exclusion by 
creating a legal context which forced them into the role of the mothering non-citizen. This 
legislative context resulted in numerous cases and controversies which demonstrated the 
negative consequences for women’s and girls’ lives, health, and wellbeing of this discourse. 
As discussed in the next section, feminists contested this exclusion and oppression through 
domestic, regional, and international human rights activism from the 1980s to the present. 
 
5.2.2. Key cases and feminist contestation 
 
This section discusses some of the key cases and controversies relating to Ireland’s abortion 
legislation, divided into the periods 1983-2007, 2007-2012, and 2013-present. It 
demonstrates that Ireland’s restrictive abortion legislation resulted in multiple human rights 
violations, disproportionately impacting on women and girls experiencing other, intersecting 
forms of oppression. It also demonstrates successive governments’ unwillingness to address 
these harms, resulting in feminist engagement with the regional and international human 
rights systems in an ultimately successful attempt to bring Ireland’s abortion legislation in 
line with (minimal) international human rights standards. The need for ongoing feminist 
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contestation of women’s exclusion from and oppression by the traditional citizenship 
discourse as it manifests in restrictions on access to abortion, and the need for a more unified 




During the late 1980s and early 1990s, anti-choice groups ensured that the abortion ban they 
had campaigned for – and the conservative, Catholic, patriarchal moral order that it sought to 
perpetuate – was further consolidated. In 1985, SPUC initiated High Court proceedings 
against two women’s health centres, Open Door Counselling and Dublin Well Woman, 
arguing that they were violating Article 40.3.3o by providing information on abortion and 
assisting women in obtaining abortions abroad.54 The case went to the Supreme Court, which 
upheld the High Court’s decision to place an injunction on the centres. The fact that the 
Courts agreed with SPUC’s position represented their failure to consider the harms of this 
legislative and constitutional context to women’s human rights, and their commitment to 
upholding the conservative, patriarchal social order that it represented. The case eventually 
came before the ECtHR, and is analysed in greater detail in part 3. 
 
Galvanised by their success, SPUC then brought a case against student union officers for 
distributing UK abortion clinic contact details.55 The High Court again granted the requested 
injunction against the student unions and referred questions to the EC’s Court of Justice for a 
preliminary ruling.56 In 1991, The Court of Justice found that the distribution of this 
information by the student unions was not protected by EC law.57 As a result, British phone 
books were removed from libraries and UK magazines had to publish separate Irish editions 
with information on abortion care removed.58 In granting the injunction, the Irish courts again 
failed to consider the real-world impact of this legislative and constitutional context on 
women in Ireland, and so demonstrated their unwillingness to challenge the conservative, 
patriarchal social order. As for the European Court of Justice, it too failed to address 
women’s human rights issues at stake and instead engaged in a legal analysis of what 
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constitutes a service under EC law. This represented the inability of traditional liberal legal 
reasoning to meaningfully address women’s needs and realities. It was in this context that the 
‘X case’ demonstrated the consequences of Ireland’s restrictive abortion legislation. 
 
In February 1992, the Attorney General (AG) brought a High Court injunction against a 
pregnant, suicidal 14-year-old rape victim (‘X’) in order to prevent her from travelling to 
England for an abortion that the AG argued would violate the constitutional right to life of 
the unborn.59 The girl and her parents filed an appeal, and so the case came before the 
Supreme Court.60 The defendants’ argued that since X was suicidal as a result of the 
pregnancy, ‘the continuation of the life of the unborn child constituted a real and substantial 
risk to’ her life, a conflict that ‘should be resolved by preferring the life of the mother.’61 The 
Supreme Court agreed with this reasoning and overturned the injunction in March 1992, 
holding that a woman had a right to an abortion if she was suicidal because this constituted ‘a 
real and substantial risk to her life.’62 The Supreme Court also emphasised the need for 
legislation on abortion to clarify the circumstances in which abortions could be legally 
carried out in Ireland.63 The Oireachtas, which has the ‘sole and exclusive power of making 
laws for the State’64 and so was not bound by this Supreme Court recommendation, failed to 
legislate on abortion in line with this ruling for the next 21 years, resulting in ongoing legal 
uncertainty and multiple cases and controversies.   
 
Moreover, while the Court’s decision meant that X could travel to the UK for an abortion, the 
judgment’s reasoning failed to address the lived needs and realities of women and girls 
impacted by Ireland’s abortion legislation. The judges focused solely on how to interpret the 
wording of 40.3.3o, rather than on the wider context and real-world implications of this 
provision. They could have done so by considering the impact of this provision on X’s 
constitutional rights or her human rights as enshrined in the UN human rights treaties to 
which Ireland was a State party at the time, the ICCPR and CEDAW. Therefore, the X case 
simply became a symbol of the real-world impact of Ireland’s abortion regime, and the 
judiciary and legislature’s unwillingness to change it. 
 
 
59 AG v X, paras 5, 6 
60 ibid, paras 8, 9, 13 
61 ibid, paras 21, 38-40, 172 
62 AG v X, paras 41-45, 134, 155, 166-169, 187 
63 ibid 
64 Bunreahct na hÉireann, art 15.2.1o 
 181 
Rather than legislating for the X case ruling, the government held a referendum in November 
1992 on three constitutional amendments. The referendum resulted in the 13th and 14th 
Amendments, which guarantee the freedom to travel outside the state for an abortion and the 
freedom to obtain or make available information on abortion services outside the country.65 
The 12th Amendment, which would have partially reversed the ruling by removing the clause 
on suicide as grounds for abortion, was rejected.66 By guaranteeing access to and information 
about abortion abroad, the government hoped to quell any demand for domestic legislation on 
abortion.67 As evidenced throughout this chapter, this unwillingness to directly address the 
issue of abortion characterised state responses to subsequent cases and controversies until 
2018. 
 
While the X case represented the force of the patriarchal legal gaze and the state’s complicity 
in it, it also represented a moment for feminists to contest women’s subordination by and 
exclusion from the Irish citizenship discourse. Public protests, news coverage of the case, and 
opinion pieces in newspapers all highlighted the ways in which X’s rights had been violated, 
first by the man who raped her, and secondly by the state’s attempts to force her to continue 
with the pregnancy.68 Many of these interventions also used the X case as the starting point 
for a deeper analysis of women and girls’ subordinate place in Irish society, analyses which 
were often framed in terms of citizenship. They argued that Ireland’s abortion legislation was 
representative of a patriarchal social order that required women to occupy the subordinate 
position of non-citizen, bearer of future citizens, and bearer of national morality.69 The 
potential for feminists to challenge this social order through the language and mechanisms of 
human rights first became apparent in October 1992. As a result of the ECtHR’s Open Door 
and Well Woman ruling that Ireland was responsible for violations of article 10 ECHR, the 
1995 Regulation of Information Act was introduced to allow for the provision of information 
on abortion services abroad should a woman request it, subject to numerous conditions.70 As 
with the X case and subsequent referendums, the 1995 Act maintained excessive restrictions 
and failed to address the real issue – that Ireland’s restrictive abortion legislation was 
resulting in real and substantial harms to women and girls in Ireland.  
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In 1997, as a result of the ‘intense’ and ‘divisive’ debate engendered by the 1983 referendum, 
the 1992 X case, and the 1997 C case,71 the Government began work on a Green Paper to 
consider the main issues concerning Ireland’s abortion legislation.72 Published in 2000, the 
Green Paper considered Ireland’s obligations under international and European law;73 a 
discussion of grounds for abortion recognised in other jurisdictions;74 and a discussion of the 
wider social context, including repeated calls for the need to improve sex education and 
education about and access to contraception; the need to challenge the social stigma and 
economic hardship facing single mothers; and the inadequacy of counselling services for 
women facing crisis pregnancies.75 The report also noted submissions that framed the 
criminalisation of abortion ‘as a rights issue for women’ which failed to recognise ‘their 
capacity to make good, rational and moral decisions about their lives.’76 The Green Paper 
also highlighted submissions that discussed the socioeconomic impact of Ireland’s abortion 
legislation through the cost of travelling abroad and the disproportionate impact of the 
legislation on women ‘from the lower socioeconomic groups.’77 
 
Despite clear evidence of concern expressed by UN treaty monitoring bodies, despite clear 
evidence of more effective and liberal legal regimes in other countries, and despite 
submissions by individuals and organisations that highlighted the negative human rights 
impact of Ireland’s restrictive abortion legislation, the government nevertheless decided that 
the most appropriate option was to hold another referendum which would permit the 
introduction of legislation completely criminalising abortion but permitting travel outside the 
state to obtain one.78  The 25th Amendment of the Constitution Bill was narrowly rejected.79 
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The ongoing interrelationship between law, Catholicism, and national identity to the 
detriment of women’s human rights was evident in abortion jurisprudence and controversies 
from this period. The racialised, as well as gendered, discourse surrounding Irish identity and 
citizenship was exemplified by the ‘Baby O case.’ This case concerned a pregnant Nigerian 
asylum seeker who was facing deportation following the rejection of her application for 
refugee status. She argued that deporting her would contravene her unborn baby’s right to life 
as enshrined in Article 40.3.3o of the Constitution because healthcare and living standards 
were far lower, and infant mortality rates were far higher, in Nigeria than in Ireland.80 The 
Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s rejection of this assertion, which claimed that the 
case had ‘nothing to do with abortion or the right to life of the unborn.’81 Irish feminist legal 
scholar Mullally highlighted the contradictions, inconsistencies and implicit racism of this 
reasoning: the Court’s prioritising of the ‘right to deport failed asylum seekers’ over the right 
to life of the unborn indicates that this supposedly fundamental constitutional right has limits, 
and that those limits are whiteness and Irish citizenship.82 She also highlighted the silence of 
the anti-choice movement during the case, during which it ‘had little to say in support of 
Baby O or her mother’ despite the case offering them the opportunity to advocate for an 
expansion of the right to life of the unborn.83 This case laid bare that it was white, Irish 
unborn life that was to be prioritised and protected in order to ensure the continuity of an 
exclusionary, patriarchal, white Irish nation.84 
 
As the decade continued, so too did Ireland’s alphabet of abortion cases. In 2006, the ECtHR 
rejected the D v Ireland application (discussed in part 3) on the grounds that D had not 
exhausted available domestic remedies.85 In 2007, 17-year old ‘Miss D’ (Amy Dunne) 
decided to have an abortion since her pregnancy was unviable; however, since she was in 
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state care, she had to seek permission from the Health Services Executive (HSE) to travel. 86 
They refused, and so she took the state to the High Court.87 In a 2019 documentary about the 
case, Dunne discusses the physical and psychological impact of being pregnant with a non-
viable foetus while being the subject of a high-profile court case.88 The Court found in her 
favour, and within a few days she travelled to Liverpool for the procedure.89 She spent 16 
hours in labour and had to travel back to Ireland six hour after giving birth.90 Reflecting on 
her experience, she expresses her anger that she ‘never got to turn around and have my word’ 
–  a succinct summary of the ways in which the voice, agency, and rights of women in 
Ireland have been denied by restrictive abortion legislation. 91 
 
Three years later, in 2010, the ECtHR ruled in A, B, C v Ireland (discussed further in part 3) 
that Ireland’s failure to adopt legislation and establish an effective and accessible procedure 
for women to access lawful abortions amounted to a violation of Ireland’s positive 
obligations under Article 8 in regard to applicant C. Therefore, the ECtHR ordered Ireland to 
establish a legislative framework to implement its abortion law.92 The Irish government 
submitted an action plan to the CoE Committee of Ministers in September 2011 which 
detailed its intentions to establish an expert group, but the government did not establish a 
legislative framework to implement abortion access.93 Two years later, the government’s 
failure to legislate for the X case, the lack of clarity surrounding when an abortion may be 
carried out legally, the extent to which doctors can discuss it with their patients, and the 
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Experiencing an inevitable second-trimester miscarriage, Savita Halappanavar was refused a 
termination because medical professionals failed to recognise that her health was rapidly 
deteriorating as a result of infections arising from the miscarriage, and therefore they did not 
recognise that there was a risk to her life, as distinct from her health, as required by Article 
40.3.3o.94 They also believed they could not intervene because a foetal heartbeat could still be 
detected (even though foetal death was inevitable) and inducing labour would violate its right 
to life.95 She died a week after her admission to hospital from complications caused by the 
medical professionals’ failure to treat septicaemia in the case of miscarriage.96 When news of 
her death became public in November 2012, there was a public outcry, and a new phase in 
Irish pro-choice activism began. No longer satisfied with campaigning to simply ‘legislate for 
X’, feminist activists ranging from those active since the 1970s to those still in secondary 
school mobilised to campaign for a repeal of the 8th Amendment.97 Between 2012 and 2017 
new grassroots, volunteer-led organisations were established, such as the Abortion Rights 
Campaign (ARC), ROSA (For Reproductive Rights, against Oppression, Sexism and 
Austerity), and Migrants and Ethnic-minorities for Reproductive Justice (MERJ).98 These 
organisations, particularly MERJ, were and are committed to an intersectional feminism that 
aims to dismantle the systemic inequalities impeding the full realisation of SRHRs for 
historically oppressed and marginalised groups.99 In September 2013, the Coalition to Repeal 
the Eighth was established; between 2013 and 2018, it brought together feminist, LGBTQ*, 
student, trade union, and professional organisations that were committed to not just abortion 
law reform but also ‘the full range of social justice issues’ facing historically marginalised 
and oppressed groups.100 This new wave of activism coincided with, influenced, and was 
influenced by an international human rights system that was increasingly willing to assert that 
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the criminalisation of abortion resulted in multiple human rights violations and was in of 
itself inherently discriminatory against women. 
 
In 2013, in response to the controversy caused by the death of Savita Halappanavar, and a 
‘strong reprimand by the Council of Europe’ for its failure to legislate in line with the A, B, C 
v Ireland ruling, the Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act (PLDPA) was signed into 
law.101 It legislated for the X Case ruling made 21 years previously and punished the 
intentional ‘destruction of unborn human life’ with 14 years in prison, an unlimited fine, or 
both.102 Abortions could only be carried out in nineteen approved hospitals, and individual 
practitioners could refuse to perform an abortion for reasons of conscience. A woman or girl 
who was said to be suicidal had to be assessed by three doctors, two psychiatrists and an 
obstetrician, who had to agree unanimously that this was the case.103 The ‘Ms Y’ case and PP 
v HSE drew further attention to the deeply problematic consequences such a legislative 
context can have. 
 
In August 2014, it was reported that a young woman known only as ‘Ms Y’, pregnant as the 
result of rape and an asylum seeker in state care, was denied an abortion even though there 
was clear evidence that she was suicidal and so qualified for a legal abortion under the 
PLDPA.104 She had attempted to travel to the UK but was turned back by UK authorities due 
to her lack of migration papers; upon her return to Ireland, she was referred to a HSE panel 
tasked with determining whether she was legally entitled to an abortion.105 The HSE panel of 
two psychiatrists and one obstetrician made their decision 12 weeks after Ms Y first 
presented to health services, by which time she was in the 20th week of her pregnancy.106 
Following a similar logic to that of the Salvadoran Supreme Court in the case of Beatriz, the 
panel determined that performing a Caesarean section on Ms Y in the 25th week of her 
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pregnancy to deliver a live baby constituted ‘termination of pregnancy’ in a way that upheld 
the constitutional right to life of the unborn.107 In response, to this decision, Ms Y went on a 
hunger and fluid strike. Threatened with force-feeding and force-hydration through the 
initiation of a High Court injunction to this effect, she eventually acceded to a Caesarean 
section being performed; she alleges that medical professionals told her that ‘the only route 
that remained was a Caesarean’, that ‘wherever you go in the world…at this point it has to be 
a Caesarean.’108 Ms Y’s treatment once again demonstrated ‘just how unethical and rights-
violating the substance of Irish abortion law’ was, highlighting the ways in which it imposed 
‘cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment’, violated ‘integrity and autonomy’, and 
discriminated against women in general, and against asylum-seeking women, women 
experiencing psychiatric distress, and women with limited economic resources in 
particular.109 ‘Ms Y’ is now undertaking personal injury proceedings against 11 named 
respondents, and a civil action for damages against the state.110 Her case represented the ways 
in which Ireland’s restrictive abortion legislation denied women’s citizenship – their right to 
have rights and determine the scope of those rights – by obliging them to continue with a 
pregnancy regardless of circumstances. Women’s subjection to this obligation, even after 
death, was highlighted by PP v HSE. 
 
PP brought the case on behalf of his daughter NP, who had died at the age of 26 on 3 
December 2014 after ‘a catastrophic internal injury as a result of a blood clot.’111 She was 15 
weeks pregnant at the time of her death and, since a foetal heartbeat could still be detected 
and medical professionals feared prosecution if they failed to protect the right to life of the 
unborn, they began ‘‘somatic care’ – i.e. measures to support the maternal organs after death 
in an attempt to maintain foetal viability.’112 These measures included mechanical ventilation, 
feeding via nasogastric tube, ‘very heavy doses of medication for a number of conditions 
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including pneumonia, fungal infections, high blood pressure, fluid build-up’, and twice-daily 
physiotherapy ‘for secretions from her chest and her joints.’113 PP went to the High Court 
seeking an order for the withdrawal of these somatic support measures, given that he and 
NP’s partner as well as close family members were all in agreement that NP deserved ‘to 
have a dignified death and be put to rest’ and that ‘the chances of the unborn child surviving 
were minimal.’114 On 26 December the Court ruled that the doctors could withdraw somatic 
support, partly because maintaining ‘the present somatic support for the mother would 
deprive her of dignity and subject her father, her partner and her young children to 
unimaginable distress’, but primarily because it was ‘in the best interest of the unborn child’ 
to do so.115 While the Court’s judgment expressed sympathy for NP and her family 
throughout, and while it described medical evidence detailing the gradual decomposition of 
her body as ‘devastating’,116 its focus throughout was on the right to life of the unborn and 
the measures that could reasonably be taken to vindicate this right. As a result of Article 
40.3.3o and the PLDPA, the Court was required – or felt that it was required – to prioritise the 
right to life of the unborn over the human rights, wishes, and well-being of NP’s family. Its 
judgment refers to the ‘unfortunate unborn’ and its ‘dreadful fate of being present in the 
womb of a mother who has died’, and it reduced NP to a ‘uterine environment’ that was 
‘neither safe nor stable’ and which held ‘nothing but distress and death in prospect’ for the 
unborn.117 As noted by Taylor, ‘notions of the woman’s dignity, autonomy, and bodily 
integrity were entirely trumped by what the Court described as “the best interest” of the 
foetus.’118 The Court’s reasoning represented the near-complete disregard for the lived needs 
and realities of women and their families that Ireland’s abortion legislation required. PP v 
HSE represents the deeply disturbing outcomes of restrictive abortion legislation that requires 
women to fulfil the role of the mothering non-citizen, even after death. This case provided 
further legitimacy to national, regional, and international calls for legislative reform in 
Ireland. 
 
Between 2013 and 2017, Ireland’s abortion legislation came under increasing scrutiny from 
UN treaty monitoring bodies and special procedures, as well as the CoE’s Commissioner for 
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Human Rights. 119 As parts 3 and 4 will illustrate, this was partly in response to submissions 
by Irish and transnational organisations campaigning for abortion law reform in Ireland. The 
HRC was the first of four UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies to heavily criticise 
Ireland’s abortion legislation. During the meetings on Ireland’s fourth periodic report in 
2014, HRC Chairman Nigel Rodley’s comment that Irish abortion legislation treated women 
as a ‘vessel and nothing more’ was widely reported in Irish media, and resonated deeply with 
feminist activists in the country.120 The HRC’s Concluding Observations called on Ireland to 
revise its legislation on abortion to permit it in the case of rape, incest, risk to health, and fatal 
foetal abnormality.121  The following year, CESCR reiterated these calls for legislative 
reform.122 In March 2016 the CRC went even further, calling on Ireland to decriminalise 
abortion in all circumstances.123 That June, the HRC View Mellet v Ireland found Ireland 
responsible for violations of freedom from CIDT, privacy, and equality before the law as a 
result of the criminalisation of abortion.124 In the same year, the CoE’s Commissioner for 
Human Rights country visit report paid particular attention to the issue of abortion, urging the 
Irish government to implement a ‘legislative regime that is more respectful of the human 
rights of women, including their right to be free from ill-treatment, the right to the highest 
attainable standard of physical and mental health, and the right to private life.’125 He 
recommended the decriminalisation of abortion or, at ‘the very minimum’, to permit abortion 
‘to preserve the physical and mental health of women, or in cases of fatal foetal abnormality, 
rape or incest.’126 
 
 In 2017, the CEDAW Committee and CAT both called on Ireland to amend Article 40.3.3o 
and decriminalise abortion at a minimum in the cases of rape, incest, risk to the pregnant 
woman’s health or life, and in the case of fatal foetal abnormalities, stating that a failure to do 
so was discriminatory against women and infringed upon their rights to health, and to 
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freedom from torture and CIDT.127 That same year, the HRC reiterated its findings that 
Ireland’s criminalisation of abortion was responsible for violations of the right to freedom 
from CIDT, the right to privacy, and the right to equality before the law in the Whelan v 
Ireland View.128 As a result of this pressure from the international and regional human rights 
systems, as well as from domestic civil society activism, the government finally agreed to 
consider reforming Ireland’s abortion law. To this end, it convened a Citizens’ Assembly. 
 
An exercise in deliberative democracy held over five weekends in 2016 and 2017, the 
Citizens’ Assembly consisted of a Chairperson appointed by the government and 99 
randomly-selected citizens entitled to vote at a referendum.129 The Assembly was tasked with 
considering, making recommendations on, and reporting to the Oireachtas vis-à-vis Article 
40.3.3o.130 Following sessions featuring legal and medical experts as well as interest groups 
representing a variety of positions on abortion, the Assembly recommended by a majority 
vote of 87% that the 8th Amendment should not be retained, that it should be replaced or 
amended, and that the Oireachtas should legislate on abortion.131 A majority of members 
recommended twelve cases in which abortion should be lawful in Ireland, including in the 
case of a risk to a woman’s life or to her physical or mental health; in the case of rape; in the 
case of fatal and non-fatal foetal abnormalities; for socioeconomic reasons; and with no 
restriction as to reasons. The Assembly proposed the inclusion of these last two categories on 
the ballot.132  Members also made five ancillary recommendations to the government on the 
need for comprehensive sexuality education, improvements in reproductive healthcare 
services and equal access to these services, and improvements in counselling and support 
facilities for women during pregnancy or following an abortion.133 Consciously or otherwise, 
the Citizens’ Assembly adopted a feminist, rights-based approach to discussing the topic of 
abortion. For example, following the first session, Members called for better gender balance 
and more representation of young women in the composition of expert panels.134 They also 
requested that women’s personal testimony on their experience of having an abortion be 
 
127 CAT 2017 Concluding Observations, paras 31-2CEDAW 2017 Concluding Observations, paras 10(c), 42-43 
128 Whelan v Ireland, paras 7.7, 7.9, 7.12 
129 The Citizens’ Assembly, First Report, Papers and Presentations from Citizens’ Assembly Speakers (29 June 
2017) paras 12, 91 
130 ibid, para 90 
131 See Appendix E Volumes 1 and 2 of the Citizens’ Assembly First Report; Citizens’ Assembly, First Report, 
3-4 
132 ibid 
133 Citizens’ Assembly, First Report, page 5 
134 ibid, page E247 
 191 
provided.135 In discussions of how best to frame their recommendations to the Oireachtas, 
many members stated that they wanted abortion on health grounds to be conceptualised as 
broadly as possible and they also rejected the inclusion of the language ‘abortion on demand’, 
deeming it ‘flippant’ and a misrepresentation of what straightforward abortion access 
entails.136 Their five ancillary recommendations demonstrates an intuitive understanding of 
the interrelatedness the conditions necessary to the full realisation of SRHRs. Ultimately, 
their reasoning was informed by a desire to ensure that women can make decisions about 
their own lives, and that these decisions be respected – that is, that women should have the 
right to have rights and determine the scope of those rights. In many respects the Citizens’ 
Assembly epitomised Lister’s understanding of citizenship as a process during which rights 
are reinterpreted to represent and respond to women’s lived realities.137 
 
In response to the Citizens’ Assembly’s findings and growing pressure from civil society, the 
Thirty-sixth Amendment of the Constitution Bill 2018 was introduced to the Oireachtas on 9 
March 2018, and successfully passed through both houses on the 27 March 2018. The Bill 
proposed that Article 40.3.3o would be repealed and replaced with the following: 
 
3° Provision may be made by law for the regulation of termination of pregnancy. 
 
In the run-up to the campaign, Together for Yes was established to serve as the national civil 
society campaign in favour of a ‘yes’ vote in the referendum. It was co-led by the National 
Women’s Council, the Coalition To Repeal The 8th Amendment, and the Abortion Rights 
Campaign.138 While one of its co-directors, Ailbhe Smyth, has demonstrated a lifelong 
commitment to intersectional feminist thinking and activism, and while organisations 
representing disabled, ethnic minority, trans, non-binary, and Traveller voices were members 
of Together for Yes, this civil society campaign was largely white, settled, Irish, middle-
class, heterosexual, and non-disabled.139 There were no Black, Traveller or minority ethnic 
women on its Executive, nor were there any disabled, trans* or non-binary Executive 
members or core staff. The Together For Yes campaign’s tone was one of conciliation and 
moderation: it appealed to people’s sense of ‘compassion’ for ‘women in their time of 
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greatest need’ and acknowledged that ‘this is a complex and sensitive issue for many.’140 
Rather than clearly and confidently asserting that Ireland’s abortion legislation was 
responsible for multiple human rights violations and that it disproportionately impacted upon 
women and pregnant people experiencing other, intersecting forms of discrimination and 
oppression, fear of alienating voters once again prevented the Irish feminist movement from 
voicing an assertive intersectional feminist commitment to the need for straightforward, safe 
and legal access to abortion in a range of circumstances to realise women’s human rights and 
full citizenship. This cautious, conciliatory approach that failed to represent and respond to 
intersecting forms of oppression, and the willingness to accept modest legal reform rather 
than push for the best possible legislation, was criticised by organisations such as MERJ 
before, during, and after the referendum.141 These tensions between different feminist 
approaches to theory and praxis represent some of the challenges facing the full realisation of 
the feminist multilevel citizenship project at the national level. 
 
Nevertheless, the success and historical importance of organisations including Together for 
Yes in repealing the Eighth Amendment by 66.4% on the 25 May 2018 cannot be denied.142 
Exit polls indicated that a ‘woman’s right to choose’ was the main reason motivating 
individuals to vote; this suggests that feminist discourse on the need to realise women’s 
human rights and citizenship through liberalising access to abortion was influential on voting 
decisions.143 Between September and December 2018, the Health (Regulation of Termination 
of Pregnancy) Bill was debated and amended by the two houses of parliament, the Dáil and 
the Seanad. Anti-choice politicians attempted to introduce amendments limiting the scope of 
the Bill, such as requiring parental notification/consent for minors.144  Pro-choice politicians 
attempted to introduce amendments to address the continued criminalisation of abortion, the 
continued stigmatisation of abortion through ‘the avoidance of the word abortion’ in the Bill, 
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as well as the need for trans* inclusive language.145 Much like the debates in El Salvador’s 
Legislative Assembly regarding legislative proposals to further restrict or liberalise abortion 
access, these debates represented the competing understandings of citizenship informing pro- 
and anti-choice attitudes, as well as the ongoing and contested nature of the citizenship 
process that drawing up and implementing new abortion legislation represented. The Health 
(Regulation of Termination of Pregnancy) Bill remained largely unchanged throughout; it 
was signed into law on 20 December 2018 and came into effect on 1 January 2019. 
 
The 2018 Act repealed the provisions in the Censorship of Publications Act 1929, Censorship 
of Publications Act 1946, and Health (Family Planning) Act 1979 that limited access to 
information on abortion, as well as the entirety of the 1995 Regulation of Information Act 
and the 2013 PLDPA.146 It allows for abortion in the case of a risk to life or health, which 
requires certification by two medical practitioners, except in an emergency;147 in the case of 
conditions likely to lead to the death of the foetus before or within 28 days of birth, requiring 
certification by two medical practitioners;148 and without restriction as to reasons up to 
twelve weeks of pregnancy, as certified by a medical practitioner and following a three-day 
waiting period.149 The Act also sets out the framework for a reviews procedure through which 
individuals can appeal a medical practitioner’s decision,150 and the circumstances in which 
conscientious objection is permitted.151 Although the legislation is a major improvement 
compared to the 1861 OAPA and 2013 PLDPA, it is still flawed from an intersectional 
feminist perspective. Its limitations include (1) the ongoing stigmatisation of abortion as a 
result of its continued overall criminalisation, the need for two specialists to approve an 
abortion in certain circumstances, the mandatory three-day waiting period, and terminology 
used in the Act; (2) issues of geographical and financial accessibility; (3) the conscientious 
objection clause; (4) the failure to provide for buffer zones or regulation of ‘rogue’ 
counselling services, and (5) the failure to adopt trans* inclusive language.152 These issues 
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were highlighted by intersectional feminist academics and activists throughout the Repeal 
campaign and during the drafting process.153 As such, the repeal of the 8th Amendment and 
Ireland’s current abortion legislation ‘do not yet reflect the new, emancipatory discourse of 
reproductive agency’ that intersectional feminists recognise as necessary to the full 
realisation of SRHRs and women’s citizenship.154 The imperfect nature of the 2018 Act 
represents the inherent ambivalence and limitations of using the law and human rights to 
realise the full transformative intersectional feminist project of SRHRs. This ambivalence 
and these limitations also characterise feminist engagement with the European human rights 
system, as will be discussed in the next part of this chapter. 
 
Part 2: Summary 
 
This part considered the specific forms of women’s exclusion and oppression from 
citizenship, and feminist contestation of this exclusion, in Ireland from 1922 to the present. 
Beginning with an overview of the modern Irish feminist movement, it argued that the 
particularities of this movement and the context in which it operated impeded the full 
realisation of women’s citizenship. This manifested in modest demands for access to 
contraception rather than emphatic demands for abortion access during the 1970s, a 
conservative backlash to strengthen the conservative Catholic patriarchal citizenship 
discourse resulting in the introduction of further restrictions on abortion access in the 1980s, 
and subsequent decades of government unwillingness to address the multiple human rights 
violations arising from Ireland’s restrictive abortion legislation. A range of cases and 
tragedies from the late 1980s to 2017 threw into stark relief the ways in which Ireland’s 
abortion legislation denied women’s right to have rights and determine the scope of those 
rights by reducing them to their reproductive function. Following the death of Savita 
Halappanavar in 2012, a new wave of often intersectional feminist activism for abortion 
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access represented the emergence of a feminist movement that was capable of contesting 
women’s exclusion from and oppression by the traditional Irish citizenship discourse. 
Engaging in national, regional, international, and transnational activism around the language 
and mechanisms of human rights, the Irish feminist movement contributed to the repeal of the 
8th Amendment and the introduction of the 2018 Act. A considerable success for the 
multilevel feminist citizenship project of SRHRs, the ongoing limitations of the Act and its 
implementation indicate the need for continued feminist activism for women’s right to have 
rights and determine the scope of those rights. This process will continue to take place in the 
interconnected national, regional, international, and transnational levels of the human rights 
system. 
5.3. Regional Struggle (CoE) 
Introduction 
 
While the inter-American human rights system has proven to be an effective, responsive site 
and actor in the multilevel citizenship project of feminist contestation of El Salvador’s 
restrictive abortion legislation, the same cannot be said of the European human rights system 
vis-à-vis campaigns for abortion law reform in Ireland. As argued here and in Chapter 3, this 
is due to the conservative, deferential approach to human rights protection that informs the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence. It is also due to the absence of bodies like the IACHR and CIM 
which would provide a platform for feminist activists and their transformative approach to 
human rights and SRHRs through a close working relationship with civil society actors. The 
establishment of the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights, and the commitment of the last 
three Commissioners to SRHRs, may yet address this shortcoming. 
 
The first section analyses the Court’s jurisprudence on Ireland’s abortion legislation, arguing 
that its conservative, deferential approach to human rights protection resulted in partial 
advances for women’s human rights in Ireland but failed to consider the underlying 
discriminatory rationale and real-world impact of Ireland’s abortion legislation. The second 
section analyses the Commissioner’s 2008, 2011, and 2017 reports on Ireland. These reports 
indicate the Commissioner’s more responsive, progressive approach to women’s human 
rights compared to the Court. In light of this responsiveness and the current Commissioner’s 
strong commitment to SRHRs, it will be argued that Irish and transnational feminist 
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organisations campaigning for straightforward, safe, and legal access to abortion should 
foster links with this actor within the European human rights system. 
 
5.3.1. The ECtHR 
 
Open Door and Well Woman v Ireland 
 
As mentioned in part 2, the Open Door and Well Woman case originated in legal proceedings 
brought against these two women’s health centres by the anti-choice organisation SPUC. 
These legal proceedings resulted in injunctions being placed on both centres, which caused 
Open Door Counselling to close down and Dublin Well Woman to suspend its counselling 
service.155 The centres took their case to the ECtHR, which ruled that the injunctions against 
them failed the proportionality test and so violated article 10 (freedom of expression and 
information) of the ECHR.156 
 
While the finding of a violation of Article 10 was of symbolic importance and resulted in the 
introduction of the 1995 Regulation of Information Act, and while the Court acknowledged 
that the injunctions created a risk to women’s health, issues with liberal legal reasoning 
nevertheless inform this judgment. Rather than critiquing the wider context – the negative, 
real-world impact of restricting access to abortion information and services for women’s and 
girls’ health, wellbeing and lives – the ECtHR instead applied the proportionality test.157 
According to this test, the Irish legislation was in fact unproblematic insofar as it fell within 
the state’s margin of appreciation and pursued the legitimate aim of protecting public morals; 
the only issue was that the way in which it pursued this legitimate aim was 
disproportionate.158 The Court failed to undertake a deeper interrogation of these public 
morals, their origins, and their rationale. As Chapter 2 and part 1 of this chapter argued, the 
origins and rationale of the 1861 Act and the 8th Amendment lay in a desire to maintain 
women’s subordinate position of non-citizen and bearer of future citizens in the service of a 
patriarchal social order. In failing to name and make visible the discriminatory rationale 
underlying these provisions, and in failing to centre the negative impact on women’s human 
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rights, health, and equality of restrictive abortion legislation in its judgment, the Court did 
little to challenge impediments to women’s rights and full citizenship. The ways in which the 
Court’s proportionality test have impeded the advancement of women’s human rights as they 
pertain to abortion were also apparent in the Chapter 3 analysis of A, B and C v Ireland. The 
Court’s admissibility procedures, and the way in which it interprets them, have also impeded 
the advancement of women’s human rights in relation to abortion access in Ireland. This is 
demonstrated by the 2006 D v Ireland admissibility decision. 
 
D v Ireland admissibility 
 
D’s application concerned her inability to obtain an abortion in Ireland on the grounds of fatal 
foetal abnormality: in late 2001 she became pregnant with twins and, following an 
amniocentesis in the 14th week of her pregnancy, was informed that one foetus had a fatal 
foetal abnormality that would result in both twins dying shortly after birth.159 She travelled to 
the UK for a medical abortion in January 2002, and in February 2002 experienced 
complications which required further treatment at a hospital in Ireland.160 The facts of her 
case speak to the lack of support, the sense of secrecy and shame, and the ways in which 
these compound an already distressing situation161 As a result of Ireland’s abortion 
legislation, D experienced major gaps in the continuity of physical and mental healthcare she 
required. She claimed that the inability to obtain an abortion in the case of fatal foetal 
abnormality under Ireland’s abortion legislation resulted in violations of ECHR article 3 
(freedom from torture and CIDT), article 8 (privacy), article 10 (right to seek, receive and 
impart information) in conjunction with article 14 (non-discrimination).162 She emphasised 
the lack of continuity in care and access to information in the run-up to the procedure, the 
sense of taboo surrounding abortion, and the absence of follow-up support such as genetic 
counselling, bereavement counselling, and medical follow-up care as reasons for these 
violations.163  
 
Nine years later, the HRC would agree with her arguments, finding that Mellet and Whelan’s 
similar experiences resulted in violations of the right to be free from torture and CIDT, the 
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right to privacy, and the right to equality before the law.164 The ECtHR, however, decided 
that D v Ireland was inadmissible because D had failed to exhaust domestic remedies.165 The 
suggested domestic remedy, proposed by the Irish Government, entailed D initiating High 
Court proceedings, ‘pursued if unsuccessful to the Supreme Court’, to obtain a declaration 
that ‘Article 40.3.3o of the Constitution allowed an abortion in Ireland in the case of a fatal 
foetal abnormality.’166 Apparently taking the ‘novel’ but ‘arguable’ case that Article 40.3.3o 
excluded an abortion in the case of a fatal foetal abnormality to the High Court and Supreme 
Court was a sufficient domestic remedy, despite uncertainty, time constraints, and potential 
loss of confidentiality for the applicant.167 That the ECtHR did not consider such a procedure 
too burdensome, time-consuming, and costly an undertaking for someone already 
experiencing acute emotional distress and dealing with a time-sensitive health issue 
represents a near total disregard for D’s lived reality and for women’s human rights.  
 
A similar inability or unwillingness to address the real-world issues arising from restrictive 
abortion legislation was also evident in A, B and C v Ireland, as discussed in Chapter 3. The 
Court’s failure to find violations of articles 3, 8 and 14 in relation to all the applicants, and its 
expanding of the margin of appreciation on the basis of the supposedly profound moral views 
of the Irish people on the right to life of the unborn, represented the inability of the Court’s 
current approach to legal reasoning to recognise the inherently discriminatory nature of 
restrictive abortion legislation, and its inability to represent and respond to the lived realities 
of women affected by restrictive abortion legislation. In contrast, the CoE Commissioner for 
Human Rights has demonstrated an awareness of the need to address the systemic 
inequalities informing and arising from restrictive abortion legislation. 
 
5.3.2. CoE Commissioner for Human Rights 
 
In 2008, the Commissioner Thomas Hammarberg published a country report on Ireland 
which considered Ireland’s restrictive abortion legislation in relation to sexual and 
reproductive rights.168 He drew attention to civil society activism for access to abortion for 
‘all women in the country, particularly when a woman's health is at risk, she is pregnant as a 
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result of rape or incest or there is evidence of severe foetal anomaly’ – representing 
awareness of and engagement with organisations such as Amnesty and the IFPA – and he 
also mentioned that the case of Miss D illustrated the ‘particular difficulties’ that ‘vulnerable 
women, especially young and migrant women’ face in accessing abortion services abroad.169 
He expressed concern with the absence of legislation formalising the existing case-law 
permitting abortion under limited circumstances, and he urged the Irish government to enact 
such legislation.170 However, Hammarberg stopped short of suggesting further liberalisation 
of Ireland’s abortion legislation in both this and his 2011 report.171 His successor Nils 
Muižnieks, who served as Commissioner from 2012 to 2018, expressed a more assertive 
stance on the need to decriminalise abortion to realise SRHRs through the publication of a 
2017 issue paper on SRHRs and his 2017 report on Ireland. 
 
As mentioned in part 2, the Commissioner’s 2017 report on Ireland paid particular attention 
to the human rights violations arising from Ireland’s restrictive abortion legislation. His 
analysis of Ireland’s restrictive abortion legislation was informed by the work of Amnesty 
and the Coalition to Repeal the Eighth Amendment, as well as UN human rights experts’ 
stance that human rights violations that arise from criminalising abortion.172 In engaging with 
their work, the Commissioner demonstrated an awareness of and responsiveness to national 
and transnational civil society activism, as well as a commitment to the UN’s more 
progressive understanding of SRHRs. 
 
The Commissioner criticised the restrictive and ‘burdensome’ nature of the PLDPA, the 
uncertainty among medical professionals as to what information they could provide about 
abortion, the strong sense of stigma surrounding abortion in Ireland, and smear campaigns 
targeting pro-choice activists.173 He also criticised the ‘burden’ that having to travel abroad 
for abortion care represented, the ways in which it disrupted continuity of care, and the fact 
that it restricted healthcare access for ‘poor women, asylum-seekers and undocumented 
migrants among others’, forcing them to either continue with unwanted pregnancies or resort 
to illegal and potentially unsafe clandestine abortion.174 The Commissioner emphasised that 
‘the lawfulness of abortion does not have an effect on a woman’s need for an abortion, but 
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only on her access to a safe abortion’, indicating an awareness of the real-world implications 
of restrictive abortion legislation.175 In contrast to the ECtHR, the CoE Commissioner 
highlighted the real-world impact of restrictive abortion legislation, and he urged the Irish 
government to decriminalise abortion entirely, or at a minimum to permit it ‘to preserve the 
physical and mental health of women, or in cases of fatal foetal abnormality, rape or 
incest.’176 He argued that complete decriminalisation of abortion, or decriminalisation at a 
minimum in these circumstances, was necessary for the respect of ‘the human rights of 
women, including their right to be free from ill-treatment, the right to the highest attainable 
standard of physical and mental health, and the right to private life.’177  
 
As indicated in Chapter 2, the current Commissioner has reiterated her commitment to this 
position, stating that SRHRs are integral to ‘women’s right to self-determination’178 and ‘an 
essential component of Council of Europe Member States’ obligations to guarantee women’s 
rights and advance gender equality.’179 She has reiterated the 2017 thematic paper’s stance 
that CoE Member States must decriminalise abortion and remove barriers to safe abortion 
care.180 Therefore, the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights is emerging as an actor within 
the European human rights system that supports the full realisation of SRHRs and that is 
responsive to feminist engagement with the language and mechanisms of human rights. 
 
Part 3: Summary 
 
While the ECtHR’s Open Door and A,B, C judgments provided partial symbolic and real-
world redress for those affected by Ireland’s restrictive abortion legislation, the European 
human rights system has overall proven to be of limited utility in advancing the multilevel 
feminist citizenship project of SRHRs including abortion. As discussed here and in previous 
chapters, this is because of its deferential approach to human rights protection, the persistence 
of liberal legal reasoning, and the absence of a body specifically dedicated to women’s rights 
within the CoE. The Commissioner for Human Rights, and their increasing commitment to 
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SRHRs in recent years, may yet provide an important ally in and forum for the advancement 
of SRHRs in the European human rights system. However, given that Ireland’s current 
abortion legislation now meets minimum international human rights standards, and given that 
other CoE Member States have more restrictive legislation or are implementing new 
restrictions on abortion access, Ireland’s abortion legislation will probably not be a priority 
focus of the Commissioner unless feminists in Ireland actively bring the issue to her 
attention. Therefore, feminists in Ireland should foster links with the current Commissioner 
as part of the ongoing process of contesting women’s exclusion from and oppression by the 
traditional discourses of citizenship and rights through campaigns for the full realisation of 
SRHRs.  
 
Although engagement with the European human rights system has only afforded partial 
success, the importance and utility of feminists in Ireland engaging with the UN human rights 
system is apparent, since the UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies contributed to the 
pressure on the Irish government to implement reforms to Ireland’s abortion legislation. The 
fourth and final part of this chapter highlights the ways in which Irish and transnational 
feminist organisations effectively engaged with the UN treaty monitoring bodies through the 
periodic review ‘system’ and the submission of individual complaints, arguing that their 
engagement with the UN human rights system, and the UN human rights system’s 
responsiveness to this engagement, represents the effectiveness of employing a multilevel 
feminist citizenship project to advancing SRHRs including abortion access. 
5.4. International Struggle (UN) 
Introduction 
 
As early as 1990, UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies expressed concern with 
Ireland’s restrictive abortion legislation.181 As evidenced throughout this thesis, since then, 
the UN human rights system has been an important and responsive actor in the multilevel 
feminist citizenship project of advancing abortion access as part of SRHRs. This part 
considers Irish and transnational feminist and human rights organisations’ engagement with 
the UN human rights system in the form of their participation in the periodic sessions review 
process, and their submission of individual petitions to the complaints procedures. It argues 
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that this engagement, and the UN human rights system’s responsiveness to it, is a key 
component of a multilevel feminist citizenship project. This multilevel feminist citizenship 
project of contesting women’s exclusion from and oppression by the traditional citizenship 
discourse as it manifests in restrictive abortion legislation contributed to the introduction of 
Ireland’s abortion law reform. However, this process is as yet unfinished, given the ongoing 
restrictions on straightforward, safe, and legal access to abortion in Ireland. Therefore, this 
part closes by reiterating the need for Irish and transnational feminist and human rights 
organisation to continue engaging with all levels of the human rights system to realise 
women’s full citizenship through the decriminalisation of abortion.  
 
UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies: periodic review 
 
The first available submission by a civil society group to a UN human rights treaty 
monitoring body on the subject of Ireland’s restrictive abortion legislation the IFPA’s 2008 
submission to the HRC. In this submission, the IFPA asserted that Ireland’s abortion ban and 
the lack of legislative clarity constituted a violation of ICCPR articles 2 (non-discrimination), 
3 (effective remedy), 6 (right to life), 7 (freedom from torture and CIDT), 17 (privacy) and 24 
(children’s rights).182 In its Concluding Observations, the HRC highlighted some of the 
IFPA’s criticisms of Ireland’s abortion legislation such as its highly restrictive nature and the 
fact that it forced women to travel abroad.183 It called on Ireland to ‘bring its abortion laws 
into line with the Covenant’ and ensure respect for the rights enshrined in ICCPR articles 2, 
3, 6 and 26 (equality before the law).184 The HRC’s 2014 Concluding Observations also 
reflected submissions by the Abortion Rights Campaign (ARC), Amnesty, Doctors for 
Choice, the Center for Reproductive Rights (CRR), the IFPA, and the Irish Human Rights 
Commission through its criticisms of the highly restrictive nature of the PLDPA and its 
severe criminal penalties; the lack of legal and procedural clarity regarding the meaning of ‘a 
real and substantive risk’ to life; the ‘excessive degree of scrutiny’ required for women 
seeking access to abortion when suicidal which compounded their distress; the discriminatory 
impact of the Act on women who could not travel abroad; restrictions on access to 
information about abortion; and ‘the severe mental suffering caused by the denial of abortion 
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services to women seeking abortions due to rape incest, fatal foetal abnormality or serious 
risks to health.’185 These submissions and the HRC’s Concluding Observations related these 
issues to ICCPR articles 2 (non-discrimination), 3 (effective remedy), 6 (right to life), 7 
(freedom from torture and CIDT), 17 (privacy), 19 (freedom to seek, receive and impart 
information) and 26 (equality before the law), and it called on Ireland to permit abortion in 
the case of rape, incest, risk to health, and fatal foetal abnormality to ensure that these rights 
were respected, protected, and fulfilled.186 
 
Feminist engagement with and influence on the UN human rights treaty monitoring body 
system is also evident in CAT’s 2013 and 2017 Concluding Observations. They criticised the 
restrictiveness and uncertainty of Ireland’s abortion legislation, arguing that it 
disproportionately affected minors, migrant women, and women living in poverty, and that it 
resulted in ‘severe physical and mental anguish and distress’ that was in potential breach of 
UNCAT articles 2 (obligation to prevent torture) and 16 (obligation to prevent CIDT).187 This 
reflected submissions by ARC, Amnesty, the Irish Council for Civil Liberties, and the 
IFPA.188 
 
Submissions by national and transnational feminist and human rights organisations also seem 
to have influenced CESCR’s 2015 Concluding Observations. Dedicating a section to sexual 
and reproductive health, CESCR reiterated these organisations’ criticisms of Ireland’s 
criminalisation of abortion which included the lack of legal and procedural clarity on “real 
and substantive risk to life”; the discriminatory impact on women who could not travel 
abroad to have an abortion; and the limited access to information on sexual and reproductive 
 
185 ARC, ‘4th Periodic Report of Ireland – list of issues’ (12 June 2014); Amnesty, ‘Ireland: Submission to the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee, 111th Session (7-25 July 2014)’ (London, Amnesty 2014) 6-17; 
CRR, ‘Supplementary Information on Ireland Submitted to the Pre-Sessional Working Group of the Human 
Rights Committee during its 109 Session’ (9 August 2013); Doctors for Choice, ‘Submission to the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee for Ireland’s Review under the International Covenant of Civil and Political 
Rights’ (12 June 2014);  HRC 2014 Concluding Observations, para 9; IFPA, ‘Supplementary information on 
Ireland in respect of restrictive laws on abortion’ (9 August 2013); all available at 
<https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/TBSearch.aspx> accessed 5 December 2020 
186 ibid 
187 CAT 2011 Concluding Observations, para 26; CAT 2017 Concluding Observations para 31 
188 ARC, ‘Submission to the United Nations Committee Against Torture (UNCAT) 24 July-7 August’ (June 
2017); Amnesty, ‘Submission to the United Nations Committee Against Torture, 24 July-11 August 2017’ 
(London, Amnesty 2017); ICCL, ‘List of Issues Prior to Reporting – Ireland’ (16 August 2013) sec 9; IFPA, 
‘Supplementary information on Ireland in respect of restrictive laws on abortion for the consideration of the 
Committee Against Torture at its 51st session (28 October to 22 November 2013)’ (9 August 2013) all available 
at <https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/TBSearch.aspx> accessed 2 December 2020 
 204 
health.189 It called on the state to guarantee the enjoyment of ICESCR article 12 (health) by 
revising legislation on abortion to bring it in line with international human rights standards; 
adopting guidelines clarifying what constitutes a real and substantive risk; providing 
information on crisis pregnancy options; and ensuring accessibility and availability of sexual 
and reproductive health information.190 Curiously, CESCR did not allude to article 3 (equal 
rights of men and women) in its consideration of Ireland’s abortion legislation, even though 
most of these civil society organisations did. This represents some of the ongoing, subtle, but 
by no means unimportant divergences between intersectional feminist and IHRL 
understandings of SRHRs. 
 
In March 2016 the CRC Committee called on Ireland to decriminalise abortion in all 
circumstances and to provide comprehensive sexual and reproductive health education as part 
of the mandatory school curriculum, reflecting a submission by ARC which highlighted the 
negative human rights impact of Ireland’s abortion legislation, as well as wider restrictions 
on access to sexual and reproductive care, information, and services.191 Responsiveness to 
national, international, and transnational feminist perspectives on abortion and SRHRs was 
also evident in the CEDAW Committee’s 2017 Concluding Observations. The Committee 
called on Ireland to decriminalise abortion, ensure ‘free access to information on sexual and 
reproductive health information and education’, improve access to and information on 
contraceptives, and ensure the provision of post-abortion care for women irrespective of the 
legality of their abortion.192 As with the HRC and CESCR, the adoption of these 
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recommendations was influenced by Irish and transnational feminist and human rights 
organisations’ submissions.193 
 
In light of this review of Concluding Observations since 2008, it is clear that feminists have 
effectively made use of the language and mechanisms of IHRL to advance their campaigns 
for straightforward, safe, and legal access to abortion in Ireland. As part 1 of this chapter 
illustrated, increasing pressure from the UN human rights system on the Irish government 
was one of the key reasons for the government convening the Citizens’ Assembly and 
agreeing to hold the referendum on the 8th amendment. As this part has demonstrated, one of 
the reasons for this increasing pressure from the UN human rights system was because of 
submissions by Irish and transnational feminist and human rights organisations detailing the 
negative consequences for human rights arising from Ireland’s restrictive abortion legislation. 
Therefore, it can be argued that as result of their engagement with the UN human rights 
system, and the responsiveness of the UN human rights system to this engagement, this 
multilevel feminist activism prompted the government to hold the referendum to repeal the 
8th Amendment and to introduce the 2018 Act. These Concluding Observations, in 
conjunction with the HRC’s Mellet and Whelan Views, represent the utility and necessity of 
feminist engagement with the human rights system to advance women’s citizenship in the 
form of SRHRs and abortion access. The next section discusses how Mellet and Whelan’s 
decision to file individual complaints with the HRC represented the strategic litigation aspect 
of the multilevel feminist citizenship project. 
 
UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies: individual complaints 
 
Mellet and Whelan’s engagement in civil society activism began with the establishment of 
Termination for Medical Reasons (TFMR Ireland) in 2012. Mellet was one of the founding 
members of this group, which served the dual aim of a support group and a campaign for 
change vis-à-vis the inability to access abortion care in Ireland in the case of fatal foetal 
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abnormality.194 In April 2012 they began holding interviews with Irish media and meeting 
with Irish politicians to discuss their experiences and so highlight the ways in which Ireland’s 
abortion legislation compounded the grief they were already experiencing by subjecting them 
to stigma, uncertainty, financial difficulties, and disruptions in continuity of care.195 Initially 
reluctant to identify as pro-choice for fear of losing support, TFMR campaigned for 
termination of pregnancy in the specific case of non-viability.196 Following the failure of the 
PLDPA to include such an exception to the criminalisation of abortion, in November 2013 
Mellet submitted her petition to the HRC with the support of the CRR and Doctors for 
Choice.197 In March 2014 Whelan submitted her petition, again with the support of these two 
organisations.198 Their direct engagement with the UN human rights system represents their 
articulation of a right to have rights and to determine the scope of those rights. The support 
from transnational and national NGOs, CRR and Doctors for Choice, represents the 
interconnected nature of the national, transnational, and international levels of the multilevel 
feminist citizenship project around SRHRs. As such, the dynamics of the multilevel feminist 
citizenship project are apparent: individuals and organisations in Ireland and abroad made use 
of the language and mechanisms of IHRL to contest and seek reparation for the harms arising 
from restrictive abortion legislation. 
 
As already noted, the HRC found both women to have been subjected to human rights 
violations in Final Views issued in 2016 and 2017 respectively. These Views prompted the 
Irish government to offer Mellet financial compensation and access to counselling, and the 
then-Minister for Health provided a personal apology.199 By 2016, TFMR had overcome its 
initial reluctance to be associated too closely with the pro-choice movement and become a 
member of the Coalition to Repeal the Eighth Amendment. Mellet, Whelan, and other TFMR 
members continued to speak about their experience in the hopes of influencing public opinion 
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and politicians to support abortion law reform.200 The fact that ‘the question of fatal foetal 
abnormalities’ was one of the main factors influencing voters’ participation in the 2018 
referendum, and that 53% of voters surveyed stated that they ‘strongly agreed’ with abortion 
being made available in the case of fatal foetal abnormality, suggests that their personal 
testimony and their engagement with the language and mechanisms of human rights 
contributed to repeal of the 8th Amendment and the introduction of the 2018 Act.201 TFMR 
has continued its campaign for full access to abortion in the case of fatal foetal abnormalities, 
given that women are still being forced to travel given the restrictive nature of the 2018 Act 
and its cautious interpretation by medical professionals.202 As such, the multilevel feminist 
citizenship project of realising straightforward, safe, and legal access to abortion in Ireland 
remains an ongoing process. 
 
Part 4: Summary 
 
This part demonstrated the utility and importance of Irish and transnational feminist 
engagement with the UN human rights system for advancing the national discourse on 
abortion and for realising constitutional and legislative change. Through the UN human rights 
bodies’ periodic review and individual petition systems, Irish and transnational feminist and 
human rights organisations have used IHRL to advocate for straightforward, safe, and legal 
access to abortion in Ireland. In doing so, they have participated in the ongoing process of 
contesting women’s exclusion from and oppression by traditional understandings of 
citizenship that denied them the right to have rights and determine the scope of those rights 
on the basis of their reproduction and sexuality. Their achievements have been considerable, 




This chapter argued that Irish and transnational feminist activism for straightforward, safe 
and legal access to abortion in Ireland is best understood as part of the wider multilevel 
feminist citizenship project of SRHRs. It did so by considering the origins and evolution of 
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the feminist movement, key cases and controversies arising from Ireland’s restrictive 
abortion legislation from the 1980s to 2017,  and feminist engagement with the regional and 
international human rights systems. 
 
Despite the considerable obstacles of powerful conservative national actors, government 
reticence, and a conservative regional human rights system, feminist activism and widespread 
societal change resulted in repeal of the 8th Amendment and introduction of the 2018 Act. 
This process is best understood as a multilevel feminist citizenship project: feminists made 
use of the language and mechanisms of human rights to contest women’s exclusion from and 
oppression by traditional citizenship discourse as it manifested in Ireland’s criminalisation of 
abortion.  
 
Understanding the repeal of the 8th Amendment and the introduction of the 2018 Act in this 
manner sheds light on the interconnected nature of national, regional, international and 
transnational struggles around SRHRs and abortion access. It also highlights the ways in 
which the multilevel feminist citizenship project remains unfinished: abortion must be 
decriminalised in Ireland, and the Irish feminist movement must become more unified and 
intersectional in its approach. Modest reform is not enough: there is urgent need for systemic 
transformation of Ireland’s political, social, and economic structures to ensure that the rights 







This thesis considered the following two research questions: 
 
1. In what ways have intersectional feminists harnessed the language and mechanisms of 
international human rights law to advance women’s citizenship in the form of sexual 
and reproductive health and rights? 
 
2. In what ways can they further advance the multilevel feminist citizenship project of 
SRHRs, as represented by the decriminalisation of abortion, through their engagement 
with all levels of the human rights system? 
 
In regard to the first research question, this thesis demonstrated that feminists’ efforts to 
realise women’s full citizenship through engaging with the language and mechanisms of 
human rights has resulted in IHRL now recognising the legitimacy and importance of SRHRs 
including abortion access. This represents the contested, ongoing process of challenging 
women’s exclusion from and oppression by the traditional citizenship discourse as it 
manifests in restrictions on reproductive freedom. Feminists have worked and continue to 
work in interconnected national, regional, international, and transnational fora as UN, CoE, 
and OAS staff; academics; civil society activists; and petitioners. They do so at the national 
level by protesting restrictive abortion legislation, campaigning for constitutional and 
legislative change, and tabling legislation. At the regional, international and transnational 
levels they advocate for a specific focus on women’s human rights issues; participate in 
conferences, seminars, workshops and encuentros; submit information to and participating in 
events and sessions held by the human rights bodies; and engage with the individual 
complaints procedures. 
 
Despite the challenges the multilevel feminist citizenship project faces in terms of the 
practical constraints on the human rights systems; resistance and opposition to SRHRs from 
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conservative actors; and tensions within the feminist movement, it has realised some not 
inconsiderable achievements. These include IHRL’s recognition of the legitimacy of SRHRs, 
and a gradual move towards a more intersectional feminist approach to legal reasoning in 
order to ensure their realisation; increased awareness of and discussion about restrictions on 
abortion and their negative human rights consequences at the national level in El Salvador; 
and, on occasion, legal reform that has at least somewhat improved individuals’ ability to 
access safe and legal abortion in Ireland. In order to continue this process and so realise 
women’s full citizenship, this research project identified areas for further development, which 
will be summarised in the next section of this chapter. 
 
In regard to the second research question – how feminists can further advance the multilevel 
feminist citizenship project of SRHRs as represented by the decriminalisation of abortion 
through their engagement with all levels of the human rights system – this research project 
demonstrated that human rights bodies need to use intersectional feminism to reconceptualise 
concepts underpinning our understanding of human rights such as citizenship, autonomy, 
equality, and justice – this will lead to an interpretation of human rights law by judicial 
bodies that better represents and responds to women’s lived realities. This research project 
also demonstrated the need to use intersectional feminism to imagine new international 
human rights legal mechanisms that are dedicated to realising restorative and transformative 
justice, such as the friendly settlements procedure of the IACHR. It is only by reconfiguring 
the language and mechanisms of IHRL in these ways that IHRL will be able to represent and 
respond to women’s needs and experiences.  
 
However, exclusive reliance on IHRL to address the many harms arising from the current 
white supremacist capitalist patriarchal political and social order. As noted in the introduction 
to this thesis, ‘human rights alone can never fulfil justice.’1 Instead, intersectional feminist 
engagement with the language and mechanisms of IHRL must form just one part of a wider 
process to challenge structural oppression that also includes education/consciousness-raising, 
grassroots activism, and community organising across a range of issues.2 While making use 
of the language and mechanisms of IHRL to advance social justice, feminists must not lose 
sight of the fact that these discourses are inherently limited in how much they can achieve, 
 
1 S Corrêa et al, Sexuality, Health and Human Rights, 152 
2 S Bradshaw, ‘Is the Rights Focus the Right Focus?’ Third World Quarterly, 1338. See also N Menon, 
Recovering Subversion, 5-6, 44-5 
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and that other, non-legal strategies and activism are also necessary to dismantle the current 
white supremacist capitalist patriarchal social order.3  
 
In light of this analysis, this chapter discusses the aims, findings and original contributions of 
this thesis.  It then considers limitations on this research project, before discussing some 
potential areas for future research. 
6.1. Thesis aims, findings, and original contributions 
Chapter 1 of this thesis articulated an intersectional feminist methodology informed by Third 
World and feminist approaches to IHRL. It also developed the theoretical framework of a 
multilevel feminist citizenship project, defined as feminist engagement nationally, regionally, 
internationally, and transnationally with the language and mechanisms of human rights to 
contest women’s historical exclusion from and oppression by traditional citizenship 
discourses as they manifests in restrictive abortion legislation. The articulation of a new 
theoretical framework that synthesised existing feminist literature on and critiques of 
liberalism and IHRL; the application of this theoretical framework to an issue of real-world 
importance, namely the need for straightforward, safe, and legal access to abortion; and the 
challenging of dominant forms of understanding and knowledge production that applying this 
framework entailed represents the main original contributions of this thesis. The ways in 
which each chapter advanced these aims, their findings, and their contributions to research, 
will now be considered. 
 
Chapter 2 developed the theoretical framework of the multilevel feminist citizenship project 
in detail. It argued that traditional citizenship discourses has long been used to exclude and 
oppress women on the basis of their reproduction and sexuality as evidenced by the rationale 
underpinning restrictive abortion legislation, which is to exclude women from citizenship and 
force them to fulfil the role of bearers of future citizens, and bearers of individual, familial, 
and the nation’s honour. It also highlighted that feminists have contested this exclusion from 
and oppression by the traditional citizenship discourse by articulating alternative 
understandings of citizenship as the right to have rights and determine the scope of those 
rights. Chapter 2 demonstrated that understanding citizenship in this manner – as a contested, 
dynamic process where new rights can be articulated and new meanings given to existing 
 
3 C Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law, chapter 8 
 212 
rights – brings a new level of insight to the origins, evolution, and growing legitimacy of 
women’s human rights and SRHRs including abortion in international human rights law 
(IHRL). It then provided an overview of the extent to which the UN, inter-American and 
European human rights systems have incorporated SRHRs, providing general context for the 
close reading of their jurisprudence in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 3’s aim was to engage in a critical analysis of the UN, inter-American, and European 
human rights bodies’ jurisprudence on abortion and SRHRs to demonstrate that the 
multilevel feminist citizenship project of realising SRHRs and therefore women’s citizenship 
is underway but by no means finished in IHRL. In undertaking this analysis, it made the 
original contribution of demonstrating that these bodies have been influenced by 
intersectional feminist thinking to a certain extent – representing a significant achievement 
for the multilevel feminist citizenship project – but that they need to move away from the 
problematic liberal assumptions underpinning legal reasoning and fully embrace an 
intersectional feminist approach in order to ensure the full realisation of SRHRs and, by 
extension, women’s citizenship. It highlighted some of the key strengths and weaknesses in 
terms of these systems’ structures and approaches to legal reasoning in this regard, and it 
demonstrated that the multilevel feminist citizenship project of SRHRs is unfinished and 
ongoing within IHRL. This chapter suggested some new ideas for advancing the multilevel 
feminist citizenship project, such as non-adversarial methods of adjudication that are 
committed to restorative and transformative justice; consistently including the idea of 
reproductive autonomy within the right to privacy; an interpretation of freedom from torture 
and CIDT that recognises restrictive abortion legislation fulfilling the purpose and intent 
criteria; and a more coherent, substantive approach to non-discrimination and equality in 
order to better represent and respond to women’s lived needs and realities. It argued that in 
order to realise women’s full citizenship, quasi-judicial human rights bodies and human 
rights courts need to not only recognise the harms arising from restrictive abortion legislation 
as human rights violations, but that they also need to recognise the structural harms that 
restrictive abortion legislation represent and perpetuate. 
The contested and ongoing nature of the multilevel feminist citizenship project of SRHRs and 
abortion access in El Salvador and Ireland, and the connections between national, regional, 
international, and transnational citizenship processes, were considered in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Chapter 4 demonstrated the utility of applying the theoretical framework of a multilevel 
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feminist citizenship project to the situation in El Salvador. By applying this framework, this 
thesis elucidated ways in which national and transnational feminist and human rights 
organisations such as Agrupación Ciudadana, Amnesty, and CRR are working nationally, 
regionally, internationally, and transnationally to realise women’s full citizenship and rights 
by contesting El Salvador’s complete criminalisation of abortion and prosecution of women 
suspected of having had one. Despite the considerable challenges feminist and human rights 
activists face in pursuing these aims, they are nevertheless making progress: at the national 
level their campaigns have resulted in increasing public awareness and support for legislative 
reform, in between 30 and 41 women being freed, and in proposals for the liberalisation of 
the current abortion legislation being tabled in the Legislative Assembly. Through their 
engagement with the regional and international levels of the human rights system in the form 
of submitting shadow reports, presenting evidence at periodic sessions, meetings during 
country visits, and filing individual petitions, these activists have prompted both the inter-
American and the UN human rights system to be increasingly assertive in their calls for the 
decriminalisation of abortion in El Salvador. This may yet serve as a catalyst for the state to 
reform its legislation. Applying the theoretical framework of a multilevel feminist citizenship 
project makes visible these dynamics. It also highlights potential ways for Salvadoran and 
transnational feminists to advance this process further, for example by engaging with the UN 
individual complaints procedure and by participating in CIM’s campaign for an Inter-
American Convention on Sexual and Reproductive Rights.  
Applying the theoretical framework of the multilevel feminist citizenship project also 
highlights some of the parallels between El Salvador and Ireland, and the ways in which 
these countries’ feminist movements could learn from each other. In the case of the 
Salvadoran feminist movement, the Irish feminist movement’s success in repealing the 8th 
Amendment and realising the liberalisation of Ireland’s abortion law could serve as a point of 
reference and a source of hope for the Salvadoran feminist movement. In the case of the Irish 
feminist movement, it could learn much from the unified, intersectional Salvadoran feminist 
movement. 
Chapter 5 demonstrated the ways in which the multilevel feminist citizenship project explains 
the success of Irish and transnational feminist activism in realising the repeal of the 8th 
Amendment and the introduction of the 2018 Health (Regulation of Termination of 
Pregnancy) Act, which provides access to abortion in line with minimum IHRL standards. 
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These developments came about through feminists engaging with the language and 
mechanisms of human rights nationally, regionally, internationally, and transnationally. It 
found that despite the Irish feminist movement’s own limitations, successive governments’ 
evasion of the abortion issue, and a largely unresponsive and conservative regional human 
right system, feminists in Ireland and in transnational organisations such as Amnesty and 
CRR made use of the language and mechanisms of human rights to exert pressure on the 
government to convene a Citizens’ Assembly, to hold a referendum on the 8th Amendment, 
and to introduce more liberal abortion legislation. Their engagement with the UN human 
rights system in the form of submitting information as part of the periodic review process and 
in the form of filing individual complaints was an especially effective strategy in contesting 
women’s historical exclusion from and oppression by the traditional citizenship discourse as 
it manifested in Ireland’s restrictive abortion legislation. It resulted in the UN human rights 
system exerting increasing pressure on the Irish Government to address the situation. This 
chapter also demonstrated that the multilevel feminist citizenship project of realising SRHRs 
is contested and ongoing in Ireland, and that this struggle for full decriminalisation of 
abortion and political, social, and economic transformation must continue. It argued that a 
key aspect of this will be the development of a more unified and intersectional feminist 
movement that confidently asserts the need for full decriminalisation of abortion. It also 
highlighted the potential of fostering links with the CoE Commissioner for Human Rights as 
part of the ongoing process of contesting women’s exclusion from and oppression by the 
traditional discourses of citizenship and rights through campaigns for the full realisation of 
SRHRs. 
Therefore, this thesis demonstrated throughout that feminist campaigns for SRHRs and 
abortion access are best understood as a multilevel feminist citizenship project around 
women’s right to have rights and determine the scope of those rights, a process from which 
women have historically been excluded from and oppressed by on the basis of their 
reproduction and sexuality. It demonstrated that this multilevel feminist citizenship project is 
taking place in the interconnected national, regional, international, and transnational spaces 
created by feminist activism and IHRL, and that this process is ongoing in both practical and 
theoretical terms. Until women in El Salvador, Ireland, and worldwide have access to the full 
range of sexual and reproductive healthcare they require to live free of discrimination and 
oppression, and until each of the human rights systems consistently and explicitly recognises 
this through legal reasoning informed by intersectional feminism, the multilevel feminist 
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citizenship project of contesting women’s exclusion and oppression must continue. This 
thesis can only offer an insight into this process up to December 2020. Some of its other 
limitations will now be considered. 
6.2. Limitations of the study 
As with any thesis, there are limitations on the research conducted and its outcomes. The 
three main ones identified in regard to this research project are difficulty accessing literature 
and primary sources, and the lack of direct engagement with feminist activists and women 
affected by restrictive abortion legislation in Ireland and El Salvador. 
 
Difficulties accessing literature and cases 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, while Ireland and its restrictive abortion legislation has been the focus 
of a considerable amount of academic research and international public attention, and while 
the researcher herself is Irish and thus has a certain “intuitive” knowledge of the 
particularities of Ireland’s cultural, political and historical dynamics, the situation in El 
Salvador has received comparatively little attention and has only briefly been visited by the 
researcher. This meant that creating a detailed and accurate picture of the situation in El 
Salvador was a particular challenge for this thesis. It endeavoured to capture at least some 
sense of the considerable challenges facing the full realisation of women’s human rights and 
citizenship in the country, and to demonstrate the dynamic, intersectional, transnational 
nature of the Salvadoran feminist movement. As a white, Irish, middle-class researcher based 
in Scotland, fear of inadvertently perpetuating any stereotypes about Central America or of 
simplifying and romanticising the complexity of the situation in El Salvador was never far 
from the researcher’s mind. Throughout the researching and writing process, an attempt was 
made to maintain an intersectional feminism awareness of the contingent, partial nature of 
knowledge production and the power dynamics that inform it. 
 
In regard to both countries, it was on occasion difficult or impossible to access courts cases or 
reports, and so this thesis had to rely on secondary sources such as newspaper articles, 
documentaries, and accounts by academics or activists when discussing certain cases. This 
was especially true of El Salvador, but details of the Miss D and Ms Y cases in Ireland were 
also unavailable. The ability to conduct a first-hand, in-depth critical reading of more 
Salvadoran cases, as well as these two Irish cases, would have enriched this thesis further. It 
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is hoped that future research can address this. Another lacuna that future research could 
correct is the absence of direct engagement with feminist activists and women affected by 
Ireland and El Salvador’s restrictive abortion legislation. 
 
First-person interviews and research  
 
When first starting this research project, it was agreed that the author’s academic background 
and training was best suited to conducting primary and secondary research. It was also agreed 
that conducting fieldwork or interviews would require training and ethical approval, and 
would be better suited to a future project. As such, the desire to ensure that this research 
project gave voice to those directly engaged in the contestation of restrictive abortion 
legislation in Ireland and El Salvador took the form of citing first-hand accounts by women 
affected by the legislation, or citing feminist activists who had interviewed these women and 
their families. Letting women speak for themselves and tell their own stories is a central tenet 
of intersectional feminism, and one which this research project was only able to partly fulfil. 
Future projects that build on this research will endeavour to engage directly with activists, 
women, and their families. This and other areas and forms of future research will now be 
considered. 
 
6.3. Areas for future research 
There are three main areas for future research in relation to this thesis. These are (1) applying 
the multilevel feminist citizenship project framework to the advancement of SRHRs in 
Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Oceania; (2) conducting interviews with those who have 
been directly affected by or who have directly engaged in the process of contesting restrictive 
abortion legislation, with a view to determining whether they agree with the application of 
such a framework; and (3) the potential of applying the framework of a multilevel feminist 
citizenship project to other social justice struggles, such as campaigns for LGBTQ* rights, 







SRHRs in other regions 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, there are currently around 125 countries worldwide where 
abortion is prohibited entirely or permitted only to save a woman’s life or health.4 Of these, 
the majority are in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.5 Therefore, 
there are numerous states within these regions that could be chosen for an analysis of 
multilevel feminist contestation of this restrictive abortion legislation. During research for 
this thesis, Concluding Observations criticising restrictive abortion legislation in a number of 
states from these regions were identified.6 Organisations including the Center for 
Reproductive Rights,  the Guttmacher Institute, and the IPPF also have resources on abortion 
legislation and issues arising from it in countries including Kenya, Nepal, the Philippines, Sri 
Lanka, and Tanzania, among others.7 As such, there is a clear starting point for conducting 
research into feminist engagement with the language and mechanisms of human rights to 
advance SRHRs in these regions. Collaboration with native speakers of local languages other 
than English, French or Spanish would be required to ensure full access to national feminist 
and human rights work were this author to undertake this project, however. 
 
The importance of the African human rights system for the continued development of SRHRs 
in IHRL is another area of research which deserves further attention. As noted in passing in 
this thesis, the African Union (AU) adopted the Maputo Protocol in 2005, article 14 of which 
requires States Parties to authorise medical abortion in certain circumstances.8 The African 
human rights system consists of the AU’s African Commission on Human and Peoples' 
Rights (ACHPR) – which was established in 1986 and began operating in 1987 - and the 
African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACtHPR), which was established in 2004 and 
 
4 S Singh et al, Abortion Worldwide 2017, 224 
5 CRR, ‘The World’s Abortion Laws’ (CRR, 2020) <https://reproductiverights.org/worldabortionlaws> 
accessed 7 December 2020 
6 These are available in UNFPA et al, Reproductive Rights are Human Rights 
7 CRR, Realizing a Healthy, Equal, and Thriving Philippines: The Role of Abortion Law Reform in Achieving 
the Nation’s Development Goals (New York, CRR 2018); CRR, ‘Challenging Institutional Stigma Against 
Abortion Care in Kenya’ (CRR, 2018); CRR ‘Open Secret: The Toll of Unsafe Abortion in Tanzania’ (CRR, 
June 2020); Guttmacher Institute, CREHPA, ‘Abortion and Unintended Pregnancy in Nepal’ (New York, 
Guttmacher Institute 2017); IPPF, ‘Fighting for Safe Abortion Access in Sri Lanka’ (IPPF, 27 February 2019) 
<https://www.ippf.org/blogs/fighting-safe-abortion-access-sri-
lanka#:~:text=Sonali%3A%20Sri%20Lanka%20has%20one,the%20abortion%20is%20not%20permitted.> 
accessed 7 December 2020 
8 African Union, Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in 
Africa (The Maputo Protocol) (adopted 11 July 2003, entered into force 25 November 2005) art 14 
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began holding sessions in 2006.9 According to a brief survey of available information, the 
ACHR has demonstrated a commitment to SRHRs including straightforward, safe, and legal 
access to abortion. In 2014, it issued General Comment No. 2 on article 14 of the Maputo 
Protocol, which takes an intersectional feminist approach to recognising and challenging the 
root causes of women’s oppression as it manifests in restrictions on SRHRs, and which 
emphasises the importance of decriminalising abortion as part of these efforts to realise 
women’s ‘reproductive freedom.’10 In 2015, the ACHPR’s Special Rapporteurs on the Rights 
of Women and Human Rights Defenders issued a joint statement with UN human rights 
experts which called on states to commit to ensuring the full respect, protection and 
fulfilment of SRHRs in the context of the Sustainable Development Goals.11 In 2016 the 
ACHR launched its Campaign for the Decriminalization of Abortion in Africa, and in both 
2016 and 2018 the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women issued statements calling for 
the decriminalisation of abortion on the Global Day of Action for Access to Safe and Legal 
Abortion.12 While the Court has yet to hear a contentious case or issue advisory opinions 
regarding SRHRs and whether it will share the Commission’s intersectional feminist 
approach to SRHRs thus remains to be seen,13 the important contributions that the ACHPR 
has already made to promoting the legitimacy of an intersectional feminist approach to 
SRHRs demonstrates the importance of making visible and engaging with Global South 
knowledge production. An in-depth analysis of the national, regional, and transnational 
dynamics informing the advancement of SRHRs in Africa was beyond the scope of this 
 
9 African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 
1986) OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) Chapter I; Protocol to the African Charter on 
Human And Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights 
(adopted 10 June 1998, entered into force 25 January 2004) OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT.1 
rev.2 (1997) 
10 ACHPR, ‘General Comment No. 2 on Article 14.1 (a), (b), (c) and (f) and Article 14. 2 (a) and (c) of the 
Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa’ 28 
November 2004, para 21 
11 OHCHR ‘Joint Statement by UN human rights experts, the Rapporteur on the Rights of Women of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and the Special Rapporteurs on the Rights of Women and Human 
Rights Defenders of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’ (OHCHR, 24 September 2015) 
<https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=16490> accessed 7 December 
2020 
12 ACHPR, ‘Statement by Commissioner Lucy Asuagbor during launch of ACHPR Campaign for the 
Decriminalization of Abortion in Africa’ (ACHPR, 18 January 2016) 
<https://www.achpr.org/news/viewdetail?id=83> accessed 7 December 2020; ACHPR, ‘Statement by the 
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa commemorating the Global Day of Action for Access to 
Safe and Legal Abortion’ (ACHPR, 28 September 2016) <https://www.achpr.org/news/viewdetail?id=53> 
accessed 7 December 2020; ACHPR, ‘Statement by the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women in Africa 
on the Occasion of the “Global Day of Action for Access to Safe and Legal Abortion” 28 September, 2018’ 
(ACHPR, 28 September 2018) < https://www.achpr.org/pressrelease/detail?id=22> accessed 7 December 2020 
13 ACtHPR, ‘Cases’ (ACtHPR, 2020) <https://www.african-court.org/en/index.php/cases> accessed 7 December 
2020 
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thesis, but it is one which has been identified as a high priority for future projects. It is hoped 
that such a project would not face the same barriers in accessing information that on occasion 
characterised this thesis. 
 
First-person accounts of contesting women’s exclusion from and oppression by citizenship 
 
Carrying out research based on interviews with feminist activists and women directly 
affected by restrictive abortion legislation would be an important area for future research in 
relation to this topic. It could serve multiple purposes, including realising the feminist aim of 
providing space for women to tell their own stories and have their voices heard. This is 
especially important in relation to abortion and other SRHRs because they are often taboo 
and stigmatised, and also because those most impacted by restrictive abortion legislation are 
often those who are least likely to be centred in research or policy. It could also serve the 
purpose of providing an oral history of, for example, the abortion rights campaign in Ireland 
from 2012 to the present, or feminist campaigns for abortion law reform in El Salvador in 
2015-6. Conducting interviews could also provide insight into how feminists and women 
affected by restrictive abortion legislation understand their experiences, and whether the idea 
of citizenship resonates with them. The extent to which the concept of citizenship resonates 
with or has explanatory power in regard to other social justice movements is another potential 
avenue for research provided by this thesis. 
 
Social justice struggles as multilevel (feminist) citizenship projects 
 
The intersectional, transnational nature of social justice struggles around issues such as 
climate justice, prison abolition, and anti-racism lend themselves to a multilevel feminist 
citizenship project analysis. This is because many of the actors involved in these struggles are 
ones who have historically been excluded from and oppressed by the traditional discourse of 
citizenship and rights such as children and young people, Global South and indigenous 
peoples, and LGBTQ* people.14 Their engagement with the language and mechanisms of 
 
14 See for example Black Lives Matter < https://blacklivesmatter.com/>; Fridays for Future 
<https://fridaysforfuture.org/>; Indigenous Climate Action, <https://www.indigenousclimateaction.com> ; Seed, 
<https://www.seedmob.org.au/about_seed> ; all accessed 7 December 2020. See also AY Davies, D Rodriguez, 
‘The Challenge of Prison Abolition: A Conversation’ (2000) 27 Social Justice 212; SJ Hartnett (ed), 
Challenging the Prison-Industrial Complex : Activism, Arts, and Educational Alternatives (Chicago IL, 
University of Illinois Press 2010) 
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human rights to contest this exclusion and oppression, and to articulate new understandings 
of human rights obligations such as non-discrimination or the right to a safe environment, 
represents engagement in a citizenship project that takes place nationally, internationally, 
regionally, and transnationally. Moreover, applying the framework of the multilevel 
citizenship project makes visible the interconnected nature of these struggles with each other 
and with campaigns for women’s human rights – at their core, they are all concerned with 
dismantling white supremacist capitalist patriarchy and building a more just and equitable 
social, political, and economic order. As such, this research project has articulated a 
theoretical framework of relevance not only to SRHRs and IHRL, but also to the most crucial 




This thesis began with the exploration of the parallels between two high-profile tragedies in 
seemingly very different countries, and it evolved into an intersectional feminist critique of 
IHRL and its potential and limits for realising women’s liberation. It demonstrated that 
feminist activism at the interconnected national, regional, international and transnational 
levels of the human rights system has resulted in the growing legitimacy of SRHRs including 
access to abortion in IHRL, and that this feminist activism is part of and speaks to a deeper, 
longstanding contestation of women’s exclusion from and oppression by the white 
supremacist capitalist patriarchal liberal discourse of citizenship and rights. In applying the 
framework of a multilevel feminist citizenship project, this thesis highlighted the root causes 
of women’s oppression that inform and are exacerbated by restrictive abortion legislation. It 
also highlighted the ways in which feminists have contested this oppression, and the ways in 
which this contestation can and must continue both conceptually and practically. 
 
The law is ‘a transformative and emancipatory instrument, flawed and recalcitrant though it 
may be.’15  While progress may be slow, uneven and on occasion reversed, intersectional 
feminist engagement with the language and mechanisms of IHRL to contest women’s 
historical exclusion from and oppression by the discourses of citizenship and human rights is 
a vital endeavour. 
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